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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON CURRENCY RISK MANAGEMENT
Nehad Elsawaf 
Old Dominion University, 2005 
Director: Dr. John Doukas
In recent years a growing number of corporations have committed considerable resources to 
risk management, indicating the potential for risk management to protect and increase firm value. 
One can argue that most prior attempts to directly link the value of the firm to its hedging 
strategies are rather scant. Moreover, several questions with regards to firms’ risk management 
activities remain unanswered. This study consists of two essays dealing with a series of questions 
regarding corporate risk management in modem U.S. multinational corporations.
In the first essay we first, test the valuation effects of currency hedging policies of firms 
around extraordinary exchange rate instability events. The exchange rate shocks of the Asian 
Currency crisis of 1997 and the Brazilian Real Devaluation of 1999 are used as the exchange rate 
instability events. These two currency crises provide us with a unique set of exogenous events to 
assess the effectiveness of currency risk management. The valuation effect is implemented by 
using two measures of firm value, namely Tobin’s Q ratio and the firm’s Excess Market Value. 
Second, we conduct tests specifically designed to shed light on the effectiveness of natural and 
financial hedges, in the attempt to determine whether financial hedging and non-financial 
(natural) hedging techniques are complementary or substitutive means for risk management 
during periods of exchange rate shocks.
By using a large cross section of non-financial firms from the S&P 500, results of the first 
essay indicate that firms, which hedged their foreign exchange exposures using foreign currency 
derivatives, were rewarded by the market at times of exchange rate turbulence. This result is 
robust for both the Asian and for the Brazilian financial crises and regardless of the measure of 
valuation used. Second, results show that firms that hedged their currency exposure using both
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
financial and non-financial hedging techniques were rewarded by a positive market valuation at 
the time of exchange rate shocks. The positive valuation impact is shown to be stronger when the 
total number of foreign country operations (GE02) is used to proxy for non-financial hedging, 
rather than using foreign sales/total sales ratio (GEOO, which is a measure often used in the 
literature as a proxy for the same variable. Our results indicate that financial and natural hedging 
are complementary techniques in managing currency risk and shielding firm value against severe 
and abrupt exchange rate movements. This result is also robust for both currency crises and 
regardless of the valuation measure used.
In the second essay we investigate the relationship between currency risk management 
activities, firm value and the agency-related costs arising from the separation of ownership and 
control. Specifically, we test the damaging effects of corporate hedging motivated by the 
managerial risk preferences hypothesis as outlined by Tufano (1998). This study is the first to use 
the Corporate Governance Index (G); a state of the art measure, to proxy for the level of agency 
costs in the firm and relate it to the firm’s currency hedging profile.
Using a sample of 1422 firm year observations from the S&P 500 during the 1990’s, our 
results indicate that currency hedging is a value increasing strategy. Moreover, results of the 
valuation effects of hedging for firms that suffer from very weak governance structures and with 
severe agency costs (firms in the highest deciles of the G index) indicate that hedging is not a 
value destroying strategy. Using two alternative methods of valuation results show that hedging 
firms, in the above category, still outperformed their non-hedging counterparts and that the 
average hedging premium is positive and significant.
Overall, our findings do not support the negative valuation effect as predicted by Tufano 
(1998). Our results provide support to the hedging theories that link corporate hedging policies to 
managerial career and reputation concerns. In addition, our results are in line with the body of the 
finance literature suggesting that the realization of managerial risk preferences may not always 
lead to a lower shareholder and firm value.
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11. INTRODUCTION
Financial risks facing the corporation influence firm value in many direct and 
indirect ways. Typically, financial risks consist of unexpected changes in exchange rates, 
interest rates, and commodity prices. The fact that a significant number of corporations 
are committing resources to risk management (financial hedging) activities only indicates 
the potential for risk management to increase firm value (Bartram (2000)). The finance 
literature has provided two classes of explanations for the firm’s risk management 
activities. One class focuses on risk management as a means to maximize firm and 
shareholder value. The second focuses on risk management as a means to maximize 
managers’ private utility (see, for example, Smith and Stulz (1984) and Tufano (1996) 
and (1998)).
Risk management as a lever for shareholder and firm value creation is a highly 
debatable issue in the finance literature. It was triggered by the apparent contradiction 
between corporate practice, where financial risk management gained a lot of popularity1, 
and various theories stating that risk management was generally redundant and could 
equally well, if not better, be performed by the shareholders themselves (Bartram 
(2000)).
The irrelevance of risk management has insights from the arguments first made by 
Miller and Modigliani (1958), whose work establishes the irrelevance of financing 
policies. Applying the logic o f  Miller and Modigliani (MM), corporate risk management
1 The global derivative market has increased by a factor o f 60 from the mid 1980’s to late 1990’s and 
reached a value o f USD 63 trillion in the beginning o f 2000 (BIS, 2000). Moreover, Survey results show 
that 50% of US non- financial firms use financial derivatives (Bodnar, Hayt and Marton (1998)). Other 
studies find percentages o f 37% (Guay (1999)), 59.1% for large US firms (Geczy, Minton and Schrand 
(1997)) and 77.8% for German non-financial firms (Bodnar and Gebhardt (1999)).
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2as a financial activity would not increase shareholders Value since the owners of the firm 
could perform the management of foreign exchange, interest rate and commodity price 
risk better than managers due to the effect of portfolio diversification (see also 
Markowitz (1959)). In addition, shareholders have varying preferences that they can only 
address when hedging individually, but not when hedging on the firm level.
Recently, a similar stream of literature argues that risk management may not 
necessarily increase firm value since it can be substituted by corporate diversification, 
whether industrial or geographic. Proponents of this view argue that it is either very 
expensive for firms to use financial hedging for specific risks or financial hedging 
contracts may not be available, after all, for these risks. In addition, firm specific risk is 
associated with moral hazard and adverse selection problems that render financial 
hedging contracts highly unsuccessful (see, for example, Bethel (1999), Hirshleifer and 
Subrahmanyam (1993), Stulz (2000)).
Despite the above arguments, another stream of literature has established several 
justifications for firm risk management activities. In addition, empirical studies have 
documented several rationales for risk management activities. For example, the 
neoclassical assumptions of the MM propositions of complete capital markets without 
information asymmetries, taxes, and transaction costs do not hold in reality. The existing 
capital market imperfections are, therefore, the basis for which corporate hedging 
strategies are needed and can add value (see, for example, Abuaf and Jorion (1990), 
Adler and Lehmann (1983), Alexius (1996), Bartram (2000), Froot and R ogoff (1994) 
and Rhim, Khayum and Kim (1996)).
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3Positive theories of risk management as a means for shareholder value creation argue 
that capital market imperfections such as transaction costs of financial distress, agency 
costs, corporate taxes and costs of external finances cause firm value to be a concave 
objective function. Consequently, a reduced cash flow volatility- from risk management- 
can result in lower costs associated with these capital market imperfections, larger cash 
flows to the owners of the firm and thus higher expected firm value (Bartram (2000), 
Culp and Miller (1995), Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993), Lessard (1990), Nance, 
Smith and Smithson(1993), Santomero (1995), Smith and Stulz (1985), Stultz (1990)).
In addition to capital market imperfections, Smith and Stultz (1984) introduced 
managerial risk aversion as a motivation for corporate risk management. Mangers 
typically have an undiversified wealth position due to their employment in the firm. 
Therefore, mangers whose human capital and wealth are poorly diversified prefer to 
reduce risk to which they are exposed. If managers judge that it will be less costly for 
them to manage this risk than to mange it on their own account, they will direct their 
firms to engage in risk management. Consequently, corporate risk management is driven 
by managerial personal preferences towards risk. The problem with risk management that 
is motivated by managerial preferences is that it has the potential of destroying firm and 
shareholder value. Specifically, Tufano (1998) argues that managerially motivated risk 
management has a damaging effect on firm value, as it allows managers to engineer the 
cash flows of their firms in a manner that allows them to evade the scrutiny of the 
external capital markets and thus allows mangers to engage in any type of project or 
investment under their discretion. The managerial risk preferences hypothesis advanced
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4by Tufano( 1998) fueled more controversy regarding the role o f risk management as a 
tool for shareholder and firm value creation.
Nevertheless, in recent years a growing number of corporations have committed 
considerable resources to risk management, indicating the potential for risk management 
to protect and increase firm value. The empirical examinations of the theories of hedging, 
on the other hand, have been plagued by a general unavailability of data on hedging 
activities (Allayannis and Weston (2000)). Until the beginning of the 1990’s, a firm’s 
exact derivative position was not disclosed. Early empirical studies had to rely on survey 
data to examine the determinants of derivative activity (Nance, Smith and Smithson 
(1993), Geczy, Minton and Schrand (1997)). Moreover, the majority of studies that 
attempted to relate firm value to its risk management strategies focused only on the 
determinants of hedging and whether the firm’s hedging profile fits one theory or 
another. One can argue that most prior attempts to directly link the value of the firm to its 
hedging strategies are rather scant.
Moreover, several questions with regards to firms’ risk management activities remain 
unanswered. For example, does currency risk management help to insulate firm value 
against exchange rate shocks? Second, does risk management alleviate or exacerbate the 
agency problem in multinational corporations? Third, what is the relationship between 
financial hedging and corporate diversification- are they substitutes or complements?
This study consists of two essays addressing a series of questions regarding corporate 
risk management in modem US. multinational corporations, in the hope of being able to 
answer some of the puzzling issues in this field.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
In the first essay we first, test the hypothesis that foreign currency hedging increases 
firm value or at best insulates it against currency and exchange rate shocks. By using, the 
Asian Currency crisis of 1997 and the Brazilian Real devaluation of 1999 as examples of 
exchange rate shocks and by using two measures of firm value, namely Tobin’s Q ratio 
and the firm’s Excess Market Value for a large cross section of non-financial firms that 
have positive foreign exchange rate exposures and who had operations in the Asian and 
Latin American regions around the time of the crises. We argue that the currency crises 
of the 1990’s provide a natural experiment to investigate the relation between the firm’s 
use of derivatives and its market value. As a matter of fact, these crises are the type of 
events that currency risk management is designed to insulate the firm against.
Second, in the first essay we examine the role of natural hedges on firm value. The 
rational behind this investigation stems from the general belief that diversifying the 
firm’s operations overseas can eliminate a portion of currency risk. We conduct tests 
specifically designed to shed light on the effectiveness of natural and financial hedges, in 
the attempt to determine whether financial hedging and non-financial (natural) hedging 
techniques are complementary or substitutive means for risk management.
Finally, in the second essay we investigate the relationship between currency risk 
management activities, firm value and agency-related costs arising from the separation of 
ownership and control in the firm. We use The Corporate Governance Index (G), which 
is an innovative methodology that directly tests the level of agency costs in the firm. The 
motivation of this essay stems from the argument that hedging is likely to be connected to 
managers' utility maximization as suggested by Tufano (1998). Specifically Tufano 
(1998) predicts a negative relationship between agency costs, managerially motivated
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
risk management activities and firm value. This essay provides a direct and unique test of 
this hypothesis.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the valuation 
effects of the Asian and the Brazilian Financial crises of the 1990’s and the relationship 
between the firm’s geographic diversity and its use of currency derivatives. Section 3 
addresses the impact of corporate governance and agency costs on the firm’s hedging 
activities and its value. Section 4 concludes this study.
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72 ESSAY 1: THE VALUATION EFFECTS OF THE 1997 ASIAN CURRENCY 
CRISIS AND THE 1999 BRAZILIAN REAL DEVALUATION
The financial and economic crisis that ravaged Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea, 
Malaysia and other Asian countries during 1997 and 1998 triggered one of the most 
abrupt and severe economic slowdowns seen anywhere in the world during recent 
decades. Financial market volatility increased around the globe soon after the 50% Thai 
devaluation of July 1997. The reverberations of the Asian crisis on the world economies 
have been multifaceted. World economic growth slowed as the shortfall in demand from 
the Asian region caused both severe regional recession and a deterioration in the trade 
balance of important trading partners such as the United States (Pollard and Coughlin, 
1999). Commodity prices weakened, export competition increased in many sectors and 
interest rates fell in the world’s major economies. Moreover, industrial production slowed 
in many countries and corporate profits declined.1
Despite these disruptions, The US economy grew strongly through out the 1997- 
1998 period. Moreover, the cumulative total returns for the S&P 100 index of large US 
firms showed an astonishing 71 percent, nearly 60 percentage points better than the risk­
free rate on 3-month T-Bills (see, for example, Emmons and Schmid (2000)). In fact, this 
experience has led some observers to conclude that the growth enhancing consequences 
of the crisis for the United States -  primarily lower interest rates and commodity prices -  
were simply more powerful than the growth reducing factors which included reduced 
demand for US exports and financial loses suffered by lenders, investors and American
1 For detailed discussion of the Asian crisis and its worldwide effects see the Economic Report of the 
President, 1999, pp. 227-51.
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corporations in the region (see, for example, Coughlin and Pollard (2000), Emmons and 
Schmid (2000)). As a matter of fact, many observers and researchers believed that 
American firms, in particular those that used some kind of financial derivative activity 
were spared a lot of the downturn of the crisis (see, for example, Emmons and Schmid 
(2000)).
Meanwhile, in the international finance literature, research has argued and 
provided evidence that the use of currency derivatives can lower the firm’s exposure to 
fluctuations in exchange rate (see, for example, Allayannis and Ofek (1997) and (1999)). 
Other theories of hedging have focused on the determinants of hedging and whether the 
firm’s hedging profile fits one theory or another. With the exception of a pioneer study 
for a sample of US non-financial firms and another recent comparable international 
study, no research has attempted to investigate the direct link between derivative usage 
and firm value. Even more surprising, no research has ever investigated the link between 
currency derivatives use and the value of the firm during a turbulent time as an exchange 
rate shock.
Studies that discussed the impact of the Asian currency crisis on the United States 
have focused primarily on the manufacturing sector, states exports, trade and commodity 
price effects (see, for example, Coughlin and Pollard (2000), Duca, Gazel and Lamb 
(1998), Gould and Taylor (1998), Pollard and Coughlin (1999), Valleta (1998)). 
Meanwhile, the impact of the crisis on the financial sector and, especially, on the value of 
US firms has been greatly overlooked3.
2 See Allayannis and Weston (2001) for a sample o f  US non financial firms from 1991-1995. Pramborg 
(2003) for a sample o f Swedish firms from 1997-2001.
3 See Emmons and Schmid (2000) for a discussion o f the impact o f the crisis on the riskiness o f the Fortune 
500 firms.
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This essay attempts to fill this void in the literature. More specifically, in this essay 
we test the hypothesis that foreign currency hedging increases firm value or at best 
insulates it against currency and exchange rate shocks. The exchange rate shocks of the 
Asian Currency crisis of 1997 and the Brazilian Real Devaluation of 1999 are used as the 
exchange rate instability events. We argue that these two currency crises provide us with 
a unique set of exogenous events to assess the effectiveness of currency risk 
management. The valuation effect is implemented by using two measures of firm value, 
namely Tobin’s Q ratio and the firm’s excess market value.
Second, in this essay we examine the role of natural hedges (geographic 
diversification) on firm value, in the attempt to determine whether financial hedging 
(currency derivatives) and natural hedging (geographic diversification) techniques are 
complementary or substitutive means for risk management during exchange rate crises 
events. We believe that during periods of exchange rate instability, the firm’s geographic 
diversity and the extent of its foreign operations are important tools in shielding firm 
value against severe and abrupt exchange rate movements, so we hypothesize that a 
complementary relationship exists between the two risk management techniques. In this 
essay we conduct specific tests to shed light on the effectiveness of natural and financial 
hedges on firm value.
The main results of this essay document the presence of a hedging premium. 
Specifically, we find that for a sample of 627 firm year observations of US non-financial 
firms obtained from the S&P 500 and that had foreign exchange rate exposure4 and 
operations in the Asian region around the time of the crisis from 1996-1998, users of
4 A firm is said to have a foreign exchange rate exposure, if  it reports a positive foreign sales to total sales 
ratio.
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currency derivatives were shown to have a higher Q by 0.385 than non-currency 
derivatives users. Given that the mean Q for the sample is 2.31, this premium represents 
16.62% of firm value. Similarly, using excess market value as an alternative valuation 
measure, the overall hedging premium is even greater. The hedging premium is 0.538 
representing 26.5% of firm value for hedging firms through out the entire crisis period 
(1996-1998). In addition, multivariate regression analysis shows that the relationship 
between firm value and the use of derivatives is positive and significant in each year from 
1996-1998 (i.e. during the pre-crisis, crisis and post crisis periods, respectively). The 
hedging premium remains significant even after controlling for other variables that affect 
firm value and regardless of the measure of valuation used.
Second using the Brazilian Real devaluation of 1999 (for robustness check) as our 
testing ground in assessing the effects of this exchange rate shock on firm value, and 
using the same valuation measures as before on a sample of 612 firm year observations of 
US non-financial firms with positive exchange rate exposure in Brazil and the Latin 
American region between 1998-2000, the results still document the presence of a hedging 
premium. The hedging premium is positive in each year and significant in 1998 (pre­
crisis) and 1999 (crisis) and 2000 (post-crisis periods), respectively.
Moreover, when the sample was pooled for the entire period (1998-2000), a 
positive and significant hedging premium is still documented. Using Tobin’s Q as a 
measure of value, the overall hedging premium 0.241 represents 8.89 % of firm value and 
is significant at the 5% level. In addition, using Excess Market value, the overall hedging 
premium 0.078 represents 2.95% of firm value and is also significant at the 5% level for 
the entire sample period (1998-2000). Thus, our results indicate that firms that hedged
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their exposures, using foreign currency derivatives, were rewarded by the market at times 
of exchange rate turbulence.
Third, our results show that foreign currency hedging (financial hedging) and 
geographic diversification (natural hedging) are both complementary risk management 
techniques. The results show that both types of risk management strategies work together 
to increase and protect firm value from exchange rate instability and severe currency 
movements. Moreover, our results show that the hedging premium is positive and more 
significant when geographic diversification is proxied by the number of countries the 
firms operate in the afflicted region rather than relaying on the ratio of regional foreign 
sales to total sales ratio; which is a measure that is often used in the literature to proxy for 
the firm’s degree of global diversification.
This essay contributes to the literature in the following ways: first, it attempts to 
test the currency hedging policies of firms during a time of exchange rate instability. As a 
matter of fact, the financial crises of the 1990’s are the type of events that currency risk 
management is designed to insulate the firm against. Although severe in magnitude and 
relatively short in duration, these currency crises provide us with a natural experiment to 
determine the hedging effectiveness of currency derivatives by analyzing valuation 
changes during the pre-crisis, crisis and post- crisis performance evaluation of firm value.
Second, unlike other papers that focus on a sample of domestic and multinational 
firms, this study focuses exclusively on a sample of multinational firms that have foreign 
operations in Asia and Latin America. Focusing on multinational firms provides us with 
the advantage of appraising the valuation effect and the performance of firms whose use
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of foreign currency derivatives is crucial and more important to maintain investments, 
particularly, in the face of a significant exchange rate instability event.
Third, for robustness purposes, in this essay we capture the valuation effects of 
currency derivatives using alternative valuation measures. Namely, we employ Tobin’s Q 
ratio as well as Excess Market value as two separate measures of firm value.
Finally, in this essay we conduct tests to differentiate between value effects from 
financial hedging (currency derivatives) to those from non- financial hedging (geographic 
diversification) during the events of exchange rate and currency crises in an attempt to 
shed more light on the puzzling relationship between theses two hedging techniques that 
was uncovered in the international finance literature.
The essay is organized as follows. In section 2.1 we provide a brief chronology 
of the Asian crisis. Section 2.2 presents a review of the literature on the use of derivatives 
as a lever for firm value creation. In section 2.3 data sources, sample description and 
methodology are presented. In section 2.4 we document and discuss the empirical results 
of the univariate and multivariate tests of the performance of hedgers and non-hedgers 
during the Asian pre- crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods. In section 2.5 we directly test 
the relation between currency hedging and firm value during the Asian currency crisis in 
both univariate and multivariate frameworks. Section 2.6 presents the results of the 
effectiveness of natural and financial hedging techniques on firm value during the Asian 
currency crisis. Sections 2.7 and 2.8 provide robustness checks using the Brazilian real 
devaluation. Section 2.9 concludes the first essay with summary of the major results.
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2.1. Chronology of the Asian crisis.
The events that initiated the crisis occurred in Thailand. Unable to defend the value 
of the Thai baht following a sustained attack by hedge funds, the Thai government 
decoupled the baht from the US dollar and devalued it by more than 50% of its value on 
July 2,1997 (Economic Report of the President (1999)). At the same time, Thailand 
requested an IMF assistance program to stabilize the economy and the financial sector. 
The Thai government received a rescue package of US$ 17.2 billion. Afterwards, 
attention of world financial markets was turned to Indonesia, which negotiated the first 
of four IMF rescue packages, totaling US$ 43 billion, in September 1997. This was the 
start of a contagion effect that spread to most other Asian countries. In November 1997, 
South Korea followed and negotiated a US$ 57 billion IMF assistance plan. Other Asian 
countries suffered severe economic downturns, but not to the extent of requiring IMF 
assistance. Malaysia imposed foreign currency controls and Hong Kong continued to 
align the value of the $HK with the $US. The Philippines ceased requiring a long 
standing IMF (Prideaux (1999)).
Although the first act in the drama of the Asian financial crisis is often blamed on 
the action of currency speculators withdrawing support for the Thai bath, the 
preconditions for the crisis were put in place in the years prior to 1997. A WTO (1998b) 
report on Asia pacific region provides a useful chronology of the events that occurred in 
the period 1995 to December 1998. From the WTO perspective, the crisis occurred as a 
the result of a series of events, commencing with the recognition as early as 1995 by the 
world’s fund managers, that the high annual rates of economic growth in many Asian
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
14
countries is not sustainable. The economies of many East Asian nations were dependent 
on exports of a narrow range of products, the prices of which were beginning to fall by 
1995. The 75% decline in the price of Korean semiconductor chips was cited as the 
principle cause of the large rise in the Korean current account deficit in 1996. To 
maintain strong growth, infrastructure investment was undertaken, and despite high 
levels of domestic personal savings, overseas borrowings were needed. Managers, on the 
other hand, accustomed to strong and sustained demand for their output, failed to 
recognize changing demand patterns and overproduction resulted. As a consequence, 
profits fell, some companies failed and employment declined. Meanwhile, Japan 
experienced a deflationary restructuring process which resulted in the value of the Yen 
falling, reducing Japan’s ability to “bail out” other nations in the region.
Prideaux and Witt (1999) identified a number of possible causes of the crisis not 
mentioned in the WTO report. These included:
• High protection policies to safeguard national economies;
• Weak financial sectors and lack of domestic capital markets;
• Reliance on offshore markets for borrowing, particularly from Japan in order to 
finance public infrastructure construction and private sector expansion;
• Imprudent lending policies that encouraged the build up of short term debt from 
overseas markets and lending them domestically as long-term debt. In addition, 
corruption and favoritism in lending policies was widely practiced.
• The slowdown in Japanese economic activity, the build up of bad loans and 
corruption in the banking sector of Japan.
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2.2. The Use of Derivatives as a Lever For Firm Value Creation: Literature Review.
Theories suggesting that corporate risk management increases firm and hence 
shareholder value rest on the basis of existing capital market imperfections. By reducing 
the likelihood of bankruptcy and costly financial distress, by harmonizing the need and 
availability of funds through coordinating investment and financing polices and finally by 
fixing the level of taxable income, risk management strategies can increase firm value.
Financial distress arguments for risk management were developed by Smith and 
Stulz (1985). They argue that by reducing the likelihood of financial distress, risk 
management can increase the value of the firm. Financial distress costs can be 
categorized into direct and indirect costs. Direct costs consist of all the costs pertaining to 
the administration of bankruptcy, for example, legal fees, management's labor spent on 
the bankruptcy procedure and so on. Indirect costs include any kind of implicit loss due 
to the possibility of financial distress, such as lost market share. For indirect costs there is 
a continuum of costs that increases at an accelerating rate as exposure to financial distress 
increases. Firms with greater variability of cash flows are more likely to find themselves 
in financial distress. By reducing cash flow variability hedging lowers the probability of 
the firm encountering financial distress and in turn lowers the expected costs of financial 
distress. This decrease in expected costs increases the firm's expected cash flows and so 
benefits shareholder. Moreover, the increase in firm value comes from the reduction of 
dead weight costss and an increase in the debt capacity, which in turn can benefit the firm
5 Uncertainty of future cash flows can result in firms being unable to meet their contractually fixed 
obligations like wages or interest payments. Therefore the transaction cost o f financial distress originates 
from illiquidity. When a firm faces liquidity problems, indirect costs arises as a result o f the negative 
influence on contracts with suppliers, customers, employees and creditors (Bartram (2000), Rawls and
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through valuable tax shields and reduction of agency costs of excess free cash flows 
(Tufano, (1996)).
Empirical investigations of the impact of hedging on firm value generally support 
the financial distress cost arguments. Most of the studies have established an empirical 
relationship between corporate risk management and the probability of bankruptcy of a 
firm, which is measured, for instance, by the leverage ratio, the gearing ratio, the interest 
coverage ratio, credit rating and the firm’s net interest payable or receivable. The higher 
the firm’s gearing, the lower its interest cover ratio, the lower its credit rating and if it is 
paying net interest, the greater the probability of financial distress. Previous studies (i.e., 
Geczy, Minton and Schrand (1997), Graham and Rogers (2002), Haushalter (2000), 
Judge (2003), Myers and Smith (1990), Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993) and Tufano 
(1996)), confirm these relationships between financial distress and hedging.
The second way financial hedging can create value to the firm has been 
introduced by Stulz (1990), Lessard (1990) and Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993). 
According to these researchers, corporate risk management can increase value by 
coordinating investment and financing polices more efficiently. The underlying idea of 
their argument is that the value of the firm can be enlarged by realizing investment 
projects with positive NPV. Profitable projects, however, can only be undertaken if their 
financing is secured. Financial risks, on the other hand, cause corporate cash flows to be 
volatile. Hence, financing optimal investment projects from internal funds is not always 
guaranteed at every point in time. Consequently, the volatility of cash flows induces 
volatility to the investment programs and decisions (Bartram, (2000)). In addition, when
Smithson (1990) Shapiro andTitman (1986), Smith, Smithson and Wilford (1990b)). See also Judge (2003) 
for a detailed review o f financial distress costs.
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the firm’s cash flows are low, obtaining additional external financing is very costly. As a 
result the firm is forced to scale down on its value maximizing investments. Risk 
management programs that break the dependence of investment on cash flow .can 
maximize firm value (Tufano, 1996). Since hedging can reduce cash flow variability, it 
enables the firm to avoid unnecessary fluctuations in either investment spending or 
external financing and so increases firm value. This hedging explanation relies on the 
basic premise that, without hedging, firms may be forced to underinvest in some states of 
the world because it is costly or impossible to raise external funds. Moreover, there is 
likely to be more asymmetric information about the quality of new projects for firms with 
high growth opportunities, for firms that are not in regulated industries and small firms. 
Therefore, Froot, Schafestein and Stein’s (1993) theory suggests that companies with key 
planned investment programs and costly external finance can use risk management as 
away to guarantee the realization of important valuable projects and avoid executing 
them at a high cost of capital.
Empirically, the impact of financial hedging on the coordination of investment 
and financing policies has been investigated by Berkman and Bradbury (1996 and 1999), 
Geczy, Minton and Schrand (1997), Graham and Rogers (1999), Howton and Perfect
(1998), Mian (1996), Nance, Smith and Smithosn (1993) and Tufano (1996). They all 
found a relationship between corporate risk management and liquidity measured by the 
quick ratio, the current ratio and the dividend payout ratio. Results basically suggest that 
companies with low liquidity (small quick or current ratios) are more likely to hedge than 
those with higher liquidity. Moreover, Geczy, Minton and Schrand (1997) found 
evidence that the firm’s use of derivatives is positively related to the amount of R&D
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expenditures, thus supporting Froot, Scharfestein and Stein’s (1993) argument that 
hedging is used as a tool to mitigate the under-investment problems. As far as dividend 
payout ratio is concerned the mixed results found in the literature can be attributable to 
the fact that on the one hand, a lower dividend payout makes it more likely that funds will 
be available to service the firm’s debt obligations (financing needs) as well as its 
investment requirements, therefore the lower the likelihood of the firm hedging. In other 
words, this explanation favors a positive relation between hedging and dividend 
payments (Nance et al. (1993)). Haushalter (2000), on the other hand argues that 
companies facing liquidity constraints might pay little or no dividends. Therefore, low 
dividends might imply liquidity constraints and more hedging, indicating a negative 
association between dividend payout and hedging. In addition, the relationship between 
growth and dividend payout is likely to be negative, according to Graham and Rogers
(1999), Haushalter (1997) and Mian (1996). Gay and Nam (1998), on the other hand 
found that firms with a strong correlation between cash flow and investment expenses are 
naturally hedged and thus use less derivatives.
The third way corporate risk management increases firm value is by fixing the 
level of taxable income. Taxes form the third aspect of capital market imperfection which 
corporate risk management is designed to overcome. Smith and Stulz (1985) formalized 
the tax-induced explanation for corporate risk management. In the presence of a convex 
tax schedule, firms would reduce expected taxes by using risk management to fix the 
level of taxable income. A convex tax system exists in cases where the marginal tax rate 
increases progressively with taxable income. The tax function can also be convex due to 
various tax rules and regulations. Limits on carrying losses backward or forward, foreign
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tax credits can also indirectly induce convex characteristics to the tax code (see, for 
example, Bartram, (2000); Smith, Smithson and Wilford, (1990b); and Smith and Stulz, 
(1985)). In the presence of convex tax regimes, changes in pre-tax income will lead to a 
higher corporate burden. Risk management reduces this burden the more convex the tax 
schedule and the more volatile the corporate income are.
Empirical results are mixed when it comes to the tax argument. On the one hand, 
there is evidence in support of the positive correlation between corporate risk 
management and tax regulations (investment tax credits and tax losses). For example see 
the work of Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993). Howton and perfect (1998) also found a 
significant progressive tax dummy. Moreover, Goldberg et al. (1994) found significant 
convexity variables. Finally, Berkman and Bradbury (1996) found empirical significance 
for the loss carry forwards, but not for the tax loss variable (see, for example, Bartram, 
(2000)).
On the other hand, some studies do not indicate the value relationship of corporate 
risk management and taxes since variables used to capture the convexity property of the 
tax regime do not often show significance. For example, Graham and Rogers (2002), 
Geczy, Minton and Schrand (1997), and Tufano (1996) find no significance of the tax 
variables. Where as Haushalter (1997), and Mian (1996), found very weak significance.
It’s important to note that empirical examinations of the different theories of 
hedging have been plagued by a general unavailability of data on hedging activities. Until 
the beginning of the 1990’s, a firm’s exact derivative position was not disclosed. Early 
empirical studies had to rely on survey data to examine the determinants of derivative
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activity. See for example, Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993), Bodnar et al. (1998) and 
(1999).
Recent Studies have focused on the type of hedging employed by the firm 
(commodity, interest rate or currency). For example, Visvanathan (1997) examined the 
use of interest rate swaps by the S&P 500 non-financial firms; he found evidence of 
transaction costs that are associated with financial distress. Haushlater (2000) examined 
the hedging activities of oil and gas producers and again found that total debt ratio is 
positively related to the use of derivatives, thus, consistent with theories of financial 
distress.
It’s interesting that all the previous studies attempting to see the effect of risk 
management on shareholder value focused on the determinants of hedging and whether 
the firm’s hedging profile fits one theory or another. No study attempted to directly link 
the value of the firm to its hedging profile. With the exception of Allaynnis and Weston
(2001) who used a sample of large domestic and multinationl US firms from 1990-1995. 
Their study documented a presence of a hedging premium that was only clear after 1993. 
Moreover, Pramborg (2003) recently examined the valuation effect of hedging on a 
sample of Swedish firms over the period 1997-2001. A main finding of his study is that 
hedging transaction exposure increases firm value, where as hedging translation exposure 
does not add value.
This study builds on Allayannis and Weston’s (2001) work and directs its focus 
on directly testing the impact of currency hedging on firm value. This study differs from 
its predecessors in several ways. First it tests the valuation effects of currency hedging 
policies of firms around extraordinary exchange rate instability events. The exchange rate
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shocks of the Asian Currency crisis of 1997 and the Brazilian Real Devaluation of 1999 
are used as the exchange rate instability events. We argue that these two currency crises 
provide us with a unique set of exogenous events to assess the effectiveness of currency 
risk management. Moreover these currency crises were severe in magnitude and 
relatively short in duration. Therefore, allow us to conduct a natural experiment to 
determine the hedging effectiveness of currency derivatives by analyzing valuation 
changes during the pre-crisis, crisis and post- crisis performance evaluation of firm value. 
Second, this essay unlike the paper of Allayannis and Weston (2001) focuses on a sample 
of multinational firms with foreign operations-in the Asian and Latin American regions 
and excludes domestic firms. The focus on multinational firms provides us with the 
advantage of appraising the valuation effect and the performance of firms whose use of 
foreign currency derivatives is crucial and more important to maintain investments, 
particularly, in the face of significant exchange rate instability events. Third, this paper 
captures the valuation effect using two measures. Namely, we employ Tobin’s Q ratio as 
well as Excess Market value as two separate measures of firm value.
2.3. Data Sources and Sample Description: Asian Sample
The sample used in this study consists of 627 firm year observations of US. Non- 
Financial firms, from the S&P 500 firms obtained from the COMPUSTAT data base. The 
sample covers the period from 1996-1998 (i.e., the period around the East Asian 
Financial crisis of 1997). The S&P 500 firms were used in this study because the S&P 
500 index includes relatively large firms which are more likely to have exposure to 
various financial price risks and therefore this source potentially provides us with a rich
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cross-section of hedging and non-hedging firms. Second, firms within this sample are 
required by SEC to actively report their hedging activities in their annual financial 
statements during the sample period. For a firm to be included in the sample, the firm 
must meet the following criteria: 1) the firm must be a US firm i.e., has an incorporation 
code of zero (obtained from Company Specifics section of COMPUSTAT). 2) The firm 
must report a positive Foreign sales to Total sales ratio, (obtained from the Geographical 
segment of COMPUSTAT database). Focusing on firms with foreign sales data, as 
mentioned earlier, allows us to concentrate on firms that are affected more by exchange 
rate movements because of the presence of foreign receivables or from operations abroad. 
For those firms the use of foreign currency derivatives is more important to maintain 
investments and may, thus, be rewarded by investors by higher market valuations. 3) The 
firm must have total assets of US$10 million6. 4) The firm should report operations in at 
least one country in the Asian region in 19967. The information about operations is 
obtained from the Directory of American Firms Operating in Foreign Countries.8 5) The 
firm should not have an industrial classification code of 60-67, i.e., the sample excludes 
firms in Finance, Insurance and Real Estate industries. Most of these firms are market 
makers in foreign currency derivatives. They use derivatives for trading purposes hence 
their motivation for hedging might be different. 6) The firm must report data on any type 
of foreign currency derivatives used (i.e., Forwards& Futures, Swaps or Options). Gross 
Notional values of foreign currency derivatives are available in the firm’s 10-K Annual
6 SEC requires companies with more than 500 investors and total assets o f SlOmillion or more to file 
annual reports and other sec filings. The majority o f the S&P 500 firms meet this criteria.
7 The Asian region includes operations in the following countries: China.-Hong Kong- Indonesia- India- 
Japan-Malaysia- Philippines -  Singapore -  South Korea -  Taiwan -  Thailand.
8 The” Directory of American Firms Operating in Foreign countries” is only published every three years. 
Therefore data is only available for the years 1996 then again in 1999. For sake o f conservatism, only firms 
that report operations in Asia in 1996 are included in the sample.
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Reports and are hand-collected from the Electronic data Gathering, Analysis and 
Retrieval “EDGAR” database or from the Annual Report Gallery9.
The Financial Accounting Standard Board (SFAS “133”), Accounting for 
Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities requires every company to formally 
document, designate its hedging activities and other off-balance sheet risk and to assess 
the effectiveness of the transactions that receive hedge accounting. Firms are required to 
implement this disclosure after June 15, 1991. However, firms differ in the starting dates 
of their disclosure. Derivative reporting is usually found in the “Notes to annual Reports” 
section of the 10-K annual report. Information on the “Notional” as well as “Fair” values 
of derivatives is documented in the reports. In this essay the gross notional values of 
foreign currency derivatives are used. Notional value represents the future cash flows 
under the contract. Although the gross notional value may not represent the net amount of 
hedging, this value is used to proxy for the level of a firm’s involvement in hedging. (See 
Allayannis and Weston (2001) for a similar procedure). It’s important to note that firms 
that report different types of derivative instruments, other than currency derivatives, such 
as interest rate hedging or Commodity hedging are considered non-hedgers and are 
included in the “non-hedging” sample. Despite the potential bias that this might create in 
the sample, it seems realistic to focus on currency derivatives users since we are dealing 
with a currency crisis and an exchange rate shock. In addition this bias should work 
against our ability to find a hedging premium. The final sample resulted in 627 firm year 
observations from 1996 to 1998.
Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics of the sample. Panel A shows the
9 If a firm or a firm year is missing from the EDGAR data base, the Annual Report Gallery is used to check 
for the missing information.
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hedging profile of the S&P 500 firms through out the crisis period. By examining the 
number and distribution of Hedging and Non- Hedging firms in the sample, it’s clear that 
more than half of the firms use foreign currency derivatives. This number has definitely 
increased through out the sample period. By 1998, more than sixty percent of the firms 
(63.6%) were using derivatives, compared to fifty three percent (53.6%) only in 1996. 
More interesting is the increase in the mean value of the notional amount of derivatives 
contracts (last column in panel A). In 1998, the mean gross notional value of foreign 
currency derivatives increased to $5938 million from $3998 million in 1996. Indicating, 
that not only the number but also the value of foreign currency contracts has been on the 
rise.
Panel B shows the type of foreign currency hedging instrument used by the 
hedging firms in the sample. From 1996-1998, more than seventy percent (71.62%) of the 
firms use foreign exchange forward contracts, which makes them the most widely used 
currency hedging instruments. Followed by currency options (25.20%) then by currency 
swaps (3.30%). Overall, the results from Table 1 are consistent with previous research10 
which document that foreign exchange forward contracts are the most commonly used 
foreign currency derivative instrument.
< Insert Table 1 about here>
10 For example, Fok et al. (1997) report that 66.2 percent o f their sample o f Fortune 500 firms use 
derivatives, Gay and Nam (1998) find that 66.9 percent o f their sample taken from the Business Week 1000 
use derivatives, Howton and Perfect (1998) find that 61.4 percent o f their sample o f Fortune 500/S&P 500 
firms use derivatives. Surveys o f Fortune 500/S&P 400 firms by Nance et al. (1993) and Dolde (1995) find 
that 61.5 percent and 85.2 percent o f firms use derivatives, respectively. Bodnar, Hayt, Marston and 
Smithson (1995) survey a random sample of 2000 non-financial US firms and find that 65 percent of large 
firms use derivatives. Phillips 1995) surveyed members o f the Treasury Management Association in the US 
and found that 63.2 percent o f US firms use derivatives. Amongst firms using derivatives the most popular 
type of derivative is the forward contract
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Table 2 shows the standard industry classification code for foreign currency 
hedging and non-hedging firms. It’s clear that more than 20% of foreign currency 
derivative users (77 out of 370 hedging firms) are in the Chemicals and Allied products 
industry; SIC code (28). Followed by firms in Industrial and Commercial Machinery and 
Computer equipment; sic code (35), where currency hedgers represent 11% of the total 
number of hedging firms. Industries with sic codes from 10-13 (Mining, Metals and Oil 
& Gas extraction) do not engage in foreign currency hedging activities. On the other 
hand, the highest number of non-hedgers was found in the Business Services sector (SIC 
code 73). Almost twenty percent (19.84%) of non-hedging firms in the sample are in the 
SIC code (73). This is consistent with previous studies that showed that the highest levels 
of non-hedgers are present in the Services industries. The second highest number of non­
hedgers was found in the Electronics and Electrical equipment industry (SIC code 36). 
Almost fourteen percent (13.62%) of firms in the non-hedging sample are in the SIC code 
(36). This is different than most previous studies that document a strong non hedging 
activity in service firms i.e. firms whose sic codes range from sic (73-87). It’s important 
to note, however, that results in this essay should be interpreted carefully when compared 
to other studies. For example, the absence of hedging activities in firms with SIC codes 
36, 10, 12 and 13 could be due to our definition of hedging in the sample. Some of the 
above-mentioned industries relay heavily on commodity hedging (sic codes 10-13) or 
interest rate hedging (sic code 36). And according to the sample construction criteria and 
hedging definition in our sample, any firm that reports any type of derivatives other than 
foreign currency will be included in the non-hedging sample. Therefore, being included
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in the non-hedging sample doesn’t necessarily mean that the firm is not involved in any 
hedging or market risk management activity. It simply means that these companies do not 
engage in currency risk management. Hence, if we take our definition of hedging into 
consideration, our results may well be consistent with what is documented in the 
literature.
< Insert Table2 about here>
Table 3 reports summary statistics of the main variables that are used in the 
subsequent analysis. Tobin’s Q ratio and Excess Market value are used as alternative 
measures of the firm’s value. Tobin’s Q is defined as the ratio of the market value of the 
firm to the replacement cost of assets. It’s computed as market value of outstanding 
shares plus liquidation value of preferred stock plus net current assets plus long- term 
debt divided by total assets of the firm (obtained from COMPUSTAT). Excess market 
value is defined as the market value of equity less book value of equity normalized by 
total sales. The benefit of using Tobin’s Q is that it makes comparisons across firms 
relatively easier than comparison based on stock returns or other measures that require an 
adjustment for risk. The mean (median) value for Tobin’ Q and Excess Market value in 
the sample are 2.31 (1.63), 2.03 (1.09) respectively. The median values are relatively 
smaller than the mean values indicating, that the distribution of Tobin’s Q and Excess 
Market value are relatively skewed. Moreover, the mean and median values of Tobin’s Q 
in the sample is much higher than that reported in Allayannis and Weston (2001), 
indicating that our firms are high market performers.11
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< Insert Table3 about here>
The rest of Table 3 shows the summary statistics of the other variables that act as 
control variables in the subsequent regressions. To be able to infer that currency hedging 
increased firm value or at best insulated it against the Asian currency shock, it is 
important to control for the effect of other variables that could have an impact on value. 
These variables include12: Firm size, proxied by total assets13, Geographic and industrial 
diversification, proxied by foreign sales to total sales ratio and by the industrial 
diversification dummy respectively. The firm’s Leverage position is proxied by the ratio 
of long- term debt to total assets. Profitability is proxied by ROA, ROE and EBIT ratios. 
And finally, the firm’s liquidity position and its ability to access financial markets is 
proxied by the dividend payout ratio. In the following sections we will discuss the impact 
of each variable on the firm value and its hedging profile and the expected signs that 
theory provides
The sample has a mean (median) value of total Assets of $2349.5 ($358) million. 
The mean value of foreign sales to total sales is 33.85% (32.82%). This means that 
hedging firms in the sample have foreign sales that are, on average, above 30% of their 
total sales, indicating that they have huge exchange rate exposures. Moreover, on 
average, the sample’s gross notional value of foreign currency derivatives is $15548 
million. The above values are somewhat greater than those reported by other studies. 
Allaynnis and Weston (2001), and Geczy et al. (1997), for example have reported mean
11 Allayannis and Weston (2001) reported mean (median) Q for their sample of 1.18 (0.96) respectively.
12 For a discussion of the theoretical justification for the use of some o f these variables see Allayannis, 
Brown and Klapper (2001), Allayannis and Weston (2001), Muller (1987) and Peltzman (1977.
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gross notional value of foreign currency derivatives of $186 and $200 million, 
respectively. One possible explanation is that previous studies focused on currency 
derivative activities during the early to mid 1990’s, at a time when derivative usage was 
not effectively reported. In addition, it could be that as time passed, derivative hedging 
became more appreciated by firms.
Mean value of long term debt to total assets ratio is 21.87 (18.91). Profitability 
ratios for the entire sample have the following mean (median) values: ROA 7.41 (6.72), 
ROE 17.23 (16.61), EBIT 14.45 (13.13), respectively. The firms in the sample have a 
mean dividend payout ratio of 28.96%. Finally, the mean diversification dummy is 0.61. 
Which means that on average, approximately 61% of the firms in the sample are 
diversified across industries. The diversification dummy takes the value of one if the firm 
operates in more than one industry segment and zero otherwise. (Information on segment 
data is obtained from the COMPUTAT Line of Business description data file. All other 
variables, except the notional values of currency derivatives, are also obtained from the 
COMPUSTAT database). Overall, with the exception of a few variables, the summary 
statistics results in Table 3 are in line with results reported in earlier studies (see, for 
example Allayannis and Weston (2001)).
2.4. Pre-Crisis, Crisis and Post-Crisis Performance of Hedging and Non-Hedging 
firms: Asian Sample
2.4. A. Univariate Tests
In this section we examine some performance measures and firm-specific 
variables for the sample of foreign exchange currency hedgers and non-hedgers before,
13 The natural log o f total assets variable is also used in some parts o f the analysis.
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during, and after the Asian crisis of 1996. The univariate analysis shows the significance 
of mean and median tests for these variables between the hedging and non-hedging firms. 
The significance of means tests is conducted by one-way ANOVA, where as the median 
tests are conducted by the non-parametric Wilcoxon Sum Rank test. Table 4 presents the 
results of univariate analysis. From the firm-specific variables, it’s clear that hedging 
firms are larger in size than their non-hedging counterparts for the entire sample period. 
The mean and median difference of total assets between hedging firms and non-hedging 
firms is positive and statistically significant during the pre-crisis, crisis and post- crisis 
periods. It’s important to note that, hedging and firm size has been very controversial in 
the literature. For example, Warner (1977) suggests that smaller firms have 
proportionally higher bankruptcy costs than larger firms. Therefore, to the extent that 
hedging reduces the probability of bankruptcy, it is more beneficial for smaller firms to 
hedge than large firms. Nance, Smith and Smithson’s (1993) hypothesis contends that 
large firms are more likely to hedge because the information and transaction costs of 
hedging exhibit economies of scale which makes it easier and cheaper for large firms. As 
far as the empirical evidence is concerned, Chow, Lee and Solt’s (1997) work provide 
evidence on the positive relation between firm size and hedging. Where as Allayannis, 
Brown and Klapper (2001) found weak evidence on the negative relation between size 
and hedging in their work on Asian firms, which supports Warner’s (1977) theory. 
Meanwhile, our results are consistent with those of Chow, Lee and Solt (1997).
<Insert Table 4 about here>
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Table 4 also shows that hedging firms consistently have higher foreign sales to 
total sales ratios than their non-hedging counterparts. The mean and median tests for the 
value of foreign sales to total sales are positive and significant for the hedgers’ sample 
through out the period. This result is consistent with the literature on foreign exchange 
exposure. According to Allayannis and Ofek (1999), Jorion (1990) and Emmons and 
Schmid (2000), multinationality increases the firm’s exposure to currency changes and 
currency risk. Hence, the higher the foreign sales to total sales ratio, the higher the 
exposure to currency risk and the higher the need to mitigate that risk through the use of 
currency derivatives. Therefore, hedging firms consistently have higher foreign sales to 
total sales ratio.
The mean and median tests for the ratio of long-term debt to assets are negative, but 
not significant. Our univariate results, therefore, do not support the existing literature on 
the relationship between debt and hedging that document a positive relationship. Smith 
and Stulz (1985), for example, indicate that hedging can reduce the variance of firm value 
and thereby the expected cost of financial distress. Hence hedging firms tend to have 
higher debt ratios. Graham and Rogers (2000) found a positive and significant relation 
between hedging and total debt for US. firms. In addition, Schmid (1999), explains the 
positive relation between debt and hedging as follows; leverage amplifies the risk of the 
firms’ underlying cash-flows, as perceived by the equity holders, hence its sensitivity to 
changes to the exchange rate movements increases. As a result, currency risk 
management becomes essential to mitigate this risk. Therefore, we see that hedging firms
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are usually associated with a higher debt ratio. Our results, however, do not support this 
explanation.
Our results also show that hedging firms have consistently under-performed their 
non-hedging counterparts in terms of Return on Assets (ROA) and Earning before 
Interest, and Tax (EBIT) ratios14. Mean and median tests are negative and statistically 
significant, through out the period. Results support the predictions of hedging theories 
that less profitable firms are more likely to hedge since they are more susceptible to 
financial distress15.
Finally, Table 4 shows that hedgers consistently paid higher dividends than non­
hedgers. The mean and median differences in dividend payout ratio between hedgers and 
non-hedgers were positive and statistically significant before, during and after the crisis. 
Hence, the results support the view that hedging firms in our sample were not financially 
constrained before, during, and after the crisis. This result is in line with Nance, Smith 
and Smithson’s (1993) predictions that a lower dividend payout makes it more likely that 
funds will be available to service the firm’s debt obligations (financing needs) as well as 
its investment requirements, therefore the lower the likelihood a firm will seek hedging. 
In other words, this explanation favors a positive relation between hedging and dividend 
payments and our results support this prediction.
It is important to note that the relationship between hedging and dividend payout 
ratio has been controversial in the literature. While Nance, Smith and Smithson’s (1993) 
argue for a positive relationship (discussed above), Haushalter (2000), on the other hand,
14 ROE ratio is negative and significant during the crisis period only, but positive and insignificant 
otherwise.
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argues for a negative relationship between hedging and dividend payments. According to 
his prediction, companies facing liquidity constraints might pay little or no dividends 
because they are financially constrained. For these firms hedging is a necessity in order to 
minimize the volatility of the underlying cash flows and escape the pains of having to 
borrow from the external capital markets16. Accordingly, a low dividend payout ratio 
implies that the firm is financially constrained and thus has a greater need to conduct 
hedging. This view predicts a negative relationship between hedging and dividend 
payments. Our results in Table 4 did not support the latter argument, instead they 
document a positive relationship between hedging and dividend payout ratio.
Overall, results of the univariate analysis for the determinants of hedging in Table 4 
showed that hedging firms are larger in size, they have a high level of exposure as 
proxied by their ratio of foreign sales to total sales, they have lower profitability ratio and 
they consistently pay higher dividends than their non hedging counterparts.
2.4. B. The Determinants o f  Foreign Currency Hedging: Multivariate Test
In this section, we examine the determinants of foreign currency hedging in a 
multivariate setting. To draw inferences on the determinants of currency hedging, we 
regress the firm’s hedging profile, proxied by its gross notional value of foreign currency 
contracts (Panel A), to several firm characteristics. Notional value is defined as the 
contract amount of any foreign currency forward, swap or option made by the firm, it 
represents the future cash flows under the contract. Panel A of Table 5 shows cross
15 Allayannis and Weston (1999) in investigating the impact o f  industry structure on currency hedging 
found that most hedging companies in the US are from competitive industries that have a low profitability. 
Hence they hedge more.
16 Tufano (1998) also discussed this possible motivation o f hedging.
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sectional regression results. It is clear that the growth opportunity of the firm, proxied by 
Tobin’s Q variable, is found to be significantly positive in all regression specifications 
indicating that the higher the growth opportunities of the firm, the greater the incentive to 
hedge. This result is, however, different than what has been reported in other studies. 
Allayannis and Weston (2001), Geczy et al. (1997) and Hagelin (2003) have found that 
Tobin’s Q is not significantly related to firms’ hedging decisions. Moreover, this result is 
contrary to Tufano’s (1998) hypothesis that low Q firms, where agency costs are 
expected to be great, can use hedging as a means to camouflage these agency problems 
by stabilizing their cash-flows, avoiding the use of external finance and, ultimately, 
evading the scrutiny of the external capital markets. Therefore, our results suggest that 
high (low) Q firms tend to hedge more (less).
Results in panel A also confirm the results seen previously in the univariate tests. 
For example, Currency hedging is positively and significantly related to firm size. This 
result is consistent with Chow, Lee and Solt’s (1997) results and Nance’s et al (1993) 
hypothesis, which contends that large firms are more likely to hedge because the 
information and transaction costs of hedging exhibit economies of scale that makes it 
cheaper for theses firms to hedge. The ratio of foreign sales to total sales is also 
positively and significantly related to hedging indicating, that the higher the exposure, the 
higher the need to use currency derivatives to mitigate the risk of currency fluctuations.
Again as we saw earlier in the univariate tests, dividend payout ratio is positively 
and significantly related to hedging. Thus we can conclude that hedging firms in our 
sample are not financially constrained firms, therefore, the higher the dividend payout 
ratio, the higher the use of derivatives. The firm’s profitability, as proxied by the firm’s
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EBIT Ratio, ROA is negatively and significantly related to its use of currency 
derivatives. This result supports the prediction of theory as explained above.
As theory predicts (see, for example, Graham and Rogers (2000) and Schmid 
(1999)), we find that the coefficient of long-term debt to total assets is positive. However, 
the results show that this variable is barely significant (at the 10% level) in only one 
specification, but overall the coefficient is positive, but not significant indicating, that 
hedging is not related to debt as a percent of total assets. It is important to note that the 
sign of the coefficient of long-term debt/total assets ratio is opposite to what we saw in 
the univariate tests, where hedgers were shown to have a lower debt ratio than non­
hedgers. But since the mean and median differences were not significant, then this result 
is not surprising.
Panel B of Table 5 presents the same relation, but using logit regressions, where, 
the dependent variable is FCD-dummy, which is a dummy variable that takes the value of 
1 if the firm reports a notional value of foreign currency derivatives, and takes the value 
of zero otherwise. The independent variables are those that are explained above and are 
used in the univariate analysis.
<Insert Table 5 about here>
Results in Panel B confirm the results obtained in panel A as well as the results 
obtained earlier in the univariate analysis. Overall results in table 5 indicate that the 
firm’s decision to hedge is positively and significantly related to the following; the firm’s 
growth opportunities as proxied by Tobin’s Q, firm size as proxied by total assets, the
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degree of exposure to foreign exchange rate movements as proxied by the ratio of foreign 
sales to total sales and the firm’s dividend payout ratio. The decision to hedge, on the 
other hand is shown to be negatively and significantly related to the firm’s profitability 
level as proxied by the ROA and EBIT ratios. Finally, results show that there a positive, 
but weak relationship between the firm’s hedging decision and it’s leverage position as 
proxied by the firm’s debt to assets ratio. This variable was positive and barely 
significant (10%) in panel A and positive, but insignificant in panel B. Overall, our 
results support the predictions of theory and are in line with what has been documented in 
the empirical literature (see, for example, Allayannis et al. (2003) and Hagelin et al. 
(2004)).
2.5. Pre-Crisis, Crisis and Post-Crisis Valuation of Hedging and Non-Hedging firms: 
Asian Sample
2.5. A. The Hedging Premium/Discount: Univariate Tests.
In this section we examine the role of hedging in response to the Asian 1996 
currency crisis. Specifically, we test whether currency hedging increased or at least 
preserved the value of the firm during the Asian currency crisis. Two measures of 
valuation are used to measure firm value; the firm’s Tobin’s Q ratio and its Excess 
market value.17 To infer about the workings of foreign currency derivatives in response to 
the Asian crisis we focus on mean and median Tobin’s Q and mean and median excess
17 Tobin’s Q is defined as the ratio o f the market value o f the firm to the replacement cost of assets. It’s 
computed as market value of outstanding shares plus liquidation value o f preferred stock plus net current 
assets plus long- term debt divided by total assets o f the firm. Excess market value is defined as the market 
value of equity less book value o f equity normalized by total sales.
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1 8market value. Specifically, we look at and compare valuations before, during, and after 
the crisis for hedging and non-hedging firms. If currency hedging works, one would 
expect that hedging firms should have higher valuations than non-hedging firms. The 
univariate tests show the significance of mean and median tests for these variables 
between the two groups. The significance of means tests is conducted by one-way 
ANOVA, where as the median tests are conducted by the non-parametric Wilcoxon Sum 
Rank test. Table 6 reports these results.
<Insert Table 6 about here>
Panel A reports the results of the univariate analysis using Tobin’s Q as a measure 
of value. Results show that during the pre-crisis period (1996) mean Q value is higher for 
hedgers than non-hedgers. The mean hedging premium 0.087, however, is not 
statistically significant. Median values show similar results. Hedgers outperform non­
hedgers, but the median hedging premium 0.038 is not significant.
During the crisis period (1997), the mean Q ratio of hedgers is more than that of 
non-hedgers. The mean hedging premium 0.111 is statistically significant at the 5% level. 
Median Q values are also higher for hedgers. There is a median hedging premium of 
0.127, which is statistically significant at the 1% level. Therefore, the results confirm the 
presence of a positive and statistically significant hedging premium during the crisis 
period.
18 As discussed before, the distributions o f Tobin’s Q and excess market value are skewed (means are 
greater than medians); hence we examine the hypothesis using both means and medians.
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In the post-crisis period (1998), the same trend continues. The mean Q values 
still show a hedging premium of 0.499 that is still significant at the 5% level. Moreover, 
the median difference of Q is positive and significant indicating, that hedging was indeed 
rewarded with higher market valuation during the post-crisis period. The median hedging 
premium is 0.024 and significant at 5% level. One possible explanation for the results of 
post crisis period is that investors may have not appreciated the benefits of hedging until 
the crisis hit, then investors were able to see the superior performance of hedgers during 
the crisis period. This explanation is favored in light of the univariate results. These 
previous results showed that hedgers had a consistently higher dividend payout ratio that 
was significant through out the entire period, which means that these firms were not 
financially constrained during and after the crisis and the use of currency derivatives 
could have been the reason for this performance.
By examining the overall sample (1996-1998), mean and median Tobin’s Q for 
hedging firms are significantly positive than that of their non-hedging counterparts. So, 
when using the pooled sample our results still document a hedging premium that is 
positive and significant at the 5% level.
Focusing on excess market valuations, as shown in panel B, we continue to 
observe the same pattern. First, during the pre-crisis period (1996), mean and median 
excess market value is greater for hedgers than non-hedgers. However, only the median 
hedging premium 0.017 is statistically significant at thel0% level.
Second, during the crisis period (1997), mean and median excess market value 
for hedgers are greater than non-hedgers and the mean and median hedging premium 
0.111 and 0.018 are statistically significant at the 5% level respectively.
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Third, during the post-crisis period (1998), mean and median excess market value 
for hedgers are again higher than non-hedgers and the mean and median hedging 
premium 0.697 and 0.064 are statistically significant at the 5% level respectively.
Finally, by examining the pooled sample (1996-1998), results still document the 
presence of a mean and median hedging premium 0.215 and 0.038 that are significant at 
the 5% and 1% respectively.
Overall, univariate results in Table 6 show that by using Tobin’s Q ratio as a 
measure of value, limited support is given to the hypothesis that foreign currency hedging 
increased firm value before the Asian crisis. The significant hedging premium is found 
only during the crisis and post-crisis periods respectively. By using excess market value 
as a measure of firm value, on the other hand, the evidence becomes stronger. The mean 
and median hedging premium is positive and significant in each year. Moreover, results 
of the overall sample i.e. from 1996-1998 also support the same trend (last row of table 6 
Panels A and B). Hedging firms had a positive and significant hedge premium through 
out the crisis using both methods of valuation indicating, that currency hedging increased 
the market value of the firm during the turbulent Asian currency crisis.
2.5. B. Currency Hedging and Firm value: Multivariate Tests
In this section we test the relation between currency hedging and firm value, 
proxied by Tobin’s Q ratio and Excess market value, in a multivariate framework. To be 
able to document a relationship, we need as before, to control for the effects of other 
possible variables on Tobin’s Q and Excess market value. Most of the control variables 
are those that are discussed earlier. We control for firm size, geographic and industrial 
diversification, firm’s leverage, firm’s profitability and its liquidity and ability to access
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financial markets. Table 7 presents the results of the following cross sectional regression. 
Each panel reports regressions on a yearly basis and for the overall sample period i.e., 
from 1996-1998 (last column of table 7 panels A and B)).
Qi — ( 3 o 3 " PiLog(TA)j + ( 3 2 FSTSj + [33DERVDUMj +(34 DERVj + (3 sROAj + ( 3 6 ROEj 
+ P7 EBIT; + (3 g DIVDUM i + (3 9 LDEBTA; + (3 x0 INDIVi + s i
For i = 1, N, where N is the number of firm year observation.
The most important independent variables that we use to test the hypothesis that 
foreign currency hedging resulted in higher market valuation for hedgers during the 
Asian crisis, is the foreign currency derivative dummy (DERVDUM) (panel A l) and the 
notional value of currency derivatives (DERV) (panel A2). As it is evident from Panel 
Al of Table 7, the coefficient of the foreign currency derivative dummy (DERVDUM) is 
positive for each year and through out the entire sample period indicating, that hedging 
increased the Q value of the firm. The overall hedging premium is (0.317), (0.371) and 
(0.466) (last 3 columns) and is significant at the 5%, 10% and 5% levels respectively. In 
panel A2, results show that the coefficient of the notional value of foreign currency 
derivative variable (DERV) is also positive, indicating a hedging premium that is, 
however, not significant19. Therefore, we can conclude that our results give support to the 
hypothesis that currency hedging was rewarded by higher market valuation. On average, 
users of currency derivatives have a higher Q than non-users by 0.385. Given that the
19 Coefficient o f the notional value of derivatives is positive. The overall hedging premium (0.205), (0.216) 
and (0.221) in the last 3 columns of panel A2 are not significant.
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mean Q for the sample is 2.31, this premium represents 16.62%20 of firm value. It is 
important to note that the hedging premium in our results is higher in value than that 
reported in Allayannis and Weston’s (2001).21 However, the high hedging premium that 
we report in our results is understandable given that we focus on the hedging activities of 
large multinational firms only.
<Insert Table 7 about here>
Panel B of Table 7 shows regression results using, as dependent variable, the 
excess market value. The independent variables are the same as above.
EXMKTj = p 0 + Pi Log(TA)j + £ 2 FSTSi + f33DERVDUMj +(34 DERV; + p 5ROAj 
+ (35ROEj +P 7  EBITj +(3s DIVDUMj +P 9 LDEBTAj + j31 0  INDIVj + Gi 
For i = 1, N, where N is the number of firm year observation.
Results in table 7 again document the presence of a hedging premium. In panel 
B1 the coefficient of the foreign currency derivative dummy (DERVDUM) is positive 
and significant in each year and in the pooled sample. The overall average hedging 
premium is 0.53822 and is significant at the 5% level. Therefore by using a different
20 This value is obtained by taking the average of the overall hedging premium (In the last 3 columns of  
panel A 1) and dividing it by the mean Q o f the sample.
21 Allayannis and Weston (2001) found an overall hedge premium o f 0.068, which represents 5.7% of firm 
value from 1990-1995. This premium, however, is smaller than the hedging premium in our results since 
50% of their sample was domestic firms; with zero foreign exchange exposure.
22 The average hedging premium is the average o f the coefficient of the derivative dummy (DERVDUM) in 
the last 3 columns o f panel B 1.
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measure of value, the results document an even higher hedging premium, which 
represents 26.5% 23of firm value through out the entire crisis period (1996-1998).
For the rest of the control variables in table 7, some turned out significant with the 
expected signs, while others non significant. For example, the coefficient of size, proxied 
by the log of total assets of the firm, is negative and significant in each year and for the 
overall sample and using both methods of valuations. See panels A l, A2, B1 and B2. It 
is important to note that the expected sign in the literature is mixed with regards to this 
variable24. Judge (2003) finds a negative, but insignificant result for size proxied by LN 
of total assets. Allayannis and Weston (2001) and Pramborg (2003) found differences in 
Tobin’s Q for large firms as compared to small firms, where large firms were associated 
with a lower Tobin’s Q. Our result seems to support the latter findings.
The coefficient of the ratio of foreign sales to total sales variable is mixed in our 
results. It is negative and significant in the pre-crisis period (1996), the crisis period 
(1997) and for overall pooled sample (1996-1998). It is also negative post crisis, but the 
coefficient is not significant in panels Al and A2, Moreover, it is positive and significant 
in the overall pooled sample in panel B 1. It is also positive, but not significant in the 
overall sample period in panel B2. These results totally contradict the multinationality 
theory. According to this theory, the greater the degree of multinatinality and the greater 
the extent of the firm’s foreign operations and foreign involvement, the greater firm value 
becomes. See, for example, Morck and Yeung (1991), Bodnar et al, (1999). The result in 
our paper, however, shows a weak association between firm value and global
23 See footnote 19 on how this value is obtained. Here we divide by the mean value of Excess Market 
variable in the sample, which is 2.03
24 See Lang and Stulz (1994) for a discussion of this issue. Also see our discussion on the expected sign of 
this variable in section 2.4.A
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diversification. It seems that our results provide some support to Denis’ and Yost’s
(2002) results, which document a geographic diversification discount in their sample It is 
important to note, however, that further tests are conducted, in the following section, to 
shed more light on the association between firm value and geographic diversification, 
especially in the presence of currency derivatives.
The remaining control variables in Table 7 seem to support existing theories. For 
example, the coefficient of ROE and EBIT are both positive and significant at the 1% 
level, indicating that the higher the profitability of the firm, the higher its value. 
Similarly, the coefficient of the industrial diversification dummy (INDDIV) is negative 
and significant in each year and in the overall pooled sample in all panels. Thus, this 
result supports previous research on the value destroying effect of industrial 
diversification.25
The coefficient of the dividend payout ratio, a proxy for the firm’s liquidity and 
its ability to access financial markets, is negative and significant in each year of the crisis 
and in the overall pooled sample in all panels. This result strongly supports the 
predictions of Lang and Stulz (1994) and Servaes (1996) who argue for a negative 
relationship between dividend pay out and firm value26. Our results, on the other hand,
25 Many theories and empirical investigations document that industrial diversification is an outgrowth of 
the agency problems between managers and shareholders and thus destroys value. (See for example, Jensen 
(1986), Lang and Stulz (1994), Berger and Ofek (1995) and Servaes (1996).
26 According to the predictions o f Lang and Stulz (1994) and Servaes (1996), if  a firm paid dividends, then 
it’s less likely to be capital constrained, which basically allows the firm to engage in any kind of 
investments under the discretion of management. Hence the more likely it can undertake negative NPV 
projects and destroy its value. Therefore, according to the prediction o f this theory, dividend payout is 
negatively related to firm value. Moreover, our results also support Allaynnis and Weston (2001) who 
argue along the same line and add that if  hedgers forego projects because they are not able to obtain the 
necessary financing, Their Tobin’s Q might remain high because they undertake only positive NPV 
projects.
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did not provide support to Fama’s and French’s (1998) “Dividend Signaling Hypothesis” 
and the positive impact of dividends on firm value.
With regards to the impact of leverage on firm value, our results show that the 
coefficient of the firm’s long term debt to its assets ratio is positive and significant each 
year and in the overall sample period in panels Al and Bl. It is positive, but not 
significant in panel A2. Moreover the coefficient of leverage is positive, and not 
significant only during the crisis period and in the overall pooled sample in panel B2. 
Overall, this result is consistent with the predictions of theory. Firms with higher levels of 
debt have higher Q ratios and market values because debt acts as a monitoring 
mechanism for managers (Jensen, 1986). Allayannis and Weston (2001) found a positive 
and significant relationship between debt and firm value. Pramborg (2003), Hagelin et al. 
(2004), on the other hand, found a negative relationship between debt and firm value that 
was not significant. Our result supports the arguments of Jensen (1986) and the results of 
Allayannis and Weston (2001).
Overall, results from Table 7 for the Asian sample confirms that hedging foreign 
exchange risk using foreign currency derivatives was associated with higher market 
valuations through out the crisis period and regardless of the valuation measure used in 
the analysis. Moreover, the majority of the control variables came out significant and 
with the expected sign as theory predicts.
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2.6. Firm Value, Foreign Currency Hedging and the Geographic Diversity of the 
Firm: Asian Sample
In this section we conduct specific tests in order to distinguish value effects from 
financial hedging (currency derivatives) to those from non- financial hedging (natural 
hedges or geographic diversification) during the Asian financial crisis. The rationale 
behind this investigation stems from the general belief that diversifying the firm’s 
operations overseas can eliminate a portion of currency risk.
Researchers have established plausible arguments on how global (geographic) 
diversification and financial hedging (currency derivatives) can be considered substitutes 
for risk management. Such arguments can be traced as early as to Markowitz (1959).He 
argues that equity holders of the firm can generally manage risks more efficiently than if 
they let the firm manage risks for them. For systematic risks, equity holders can use asset 
allocation (global diversification) to achieve their desired level of risk, based on 
individual risk preferences. For idiosyncratic risks, equity holders can manage them at a 
low cost by holding a diversified portfolio.
Recently, the ineffectiveness of financial hedging has been discussed by Bethel 
(1999) and Stulz (2000). They argue that a firm can partly hedge its systematic risk 
components but it’s hard to hedge its firm specific component with financial hedging 
instruments. The ineffectiveness of risk management in reducing firm-specific exposures 
is due to two reasons. First, transaction costs for small numbers of hedging contracts are 
very high, therefore, it is either very expensive for firms to use financial hedging for 
specific risks or financial hedging contracts may not be available after all for these risks. 
Second, firm specific risk is associated with moral hazard and adverse selection problems
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that render financial hedging contracts highly unsuccessful. Based on these arguments, it 
seems that equity holders generally will not want to engage the firm in any type of 
financial risk management activities.
What is intriguing, however, is that financial derivative usage by firms has grown 
consistently over the years (see, for example, Bodnar, Hayt and Marston (1998)). 
Moreover, recent theories in the literature showed that under certain conditions, the 
firm’s ability to allocate its assets cannot substitute for risk management activities (see, 
for example, Lim and Wang (2001)), implying a complementary relation between 
financial hedging and natural hedges.
In this section we shed some light on the relationship between currency hedging 
techniques and the geographic diversity of the firm during the Asian currency crisis. We 
believe that during exchange rate instability events, the firm’s geographic diversity and 
the extent of its foreign operations could indeed be important tools in shielding firm value 
against severe and abrupt exchange rate movements.
In Table 8 we report the results of a multivariate OLS regression that relates the 
firm’s valuation measures to its hedging profile. The analysis is similar to that conducted 
in the previous section, but here we include two sets of interactive variables to proxy for 
the interaction between currency hedging (financial hedging) and geographic 
diversification (non-fmancial hedging) on firm value. The valuation measures are the 
same used in the previous sections. Financial hedging is proxied, as before, by the foreign 
currency derivative dummy (DERVDUM). Geographic diversification, on the other hand, 
is proxied using two variables; the Asian foreign sales to total sales ratio (GEOi)27, and
27 The foreign sales to total sales ratio is a very common proxy for geographic diversification that has 
been used in the literature (see Allayannis and Weston (2001) and Allayannis et al (2003) and (2001)).Here
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rest of the control variables are the same as those used before in our previous analysis.
<Insert Table 8 about here>
In panel A of table 8 results show that currency hedging proxied by the derivative 
dummy (DERVDUM), increases firm value. The coefficient of the DERVDUM is 
positive and significant in each year and in the overall sample period. Thus, confirming 
our earlier results that financial hedging is a value increasing strategy for the firm.
The coefficient of geographic diversification proxied by the ratio of Asian foreign 
sales to total sales (GEOi) is mixed. It is positive, but not significant in the pre-crisis 
period (1996). It is negative and significant in the crisis period (1997) and for the entire 
sample period. Finally, it is negative, but insignificant in the post-crisis period. This value 
discount is similar to that uncovered by Dennis and Yost (2002), but contradicts the 
prediction of multinationality theory, which suggests that geographic diversification is 
valuable, particularly in the presence of intangible assets and multinational networks (see, 
for example, Morck and Yeung, Doukas and Travlos (1998), and Doukas, Pentzalis and 
Kim (1999)).
the Asian foreign sales to total sales ratio in our analysis is calculated as the percentage o f foreign sales 
from the Asian subsidiaries divided by total sales o f the firm. The data for this variable is obtained from the 
firm’s 10K annual Reports. The mean value o f this variable for the sample is 19.25, implying that, on 
average, firms in our sample have 19% of their foreign sales generated in the Asian region.
28 Operation in the Asian region includes operation in the following countries; China-Hong Kong- 
Indonesia- India- Japan -Malaysia- Philippines -  Singapore -  South Korea -  Taiwan -  Thailand. The 
information on this variable is obtained from the Directory o f American Firms Operating in Foreign 
Countries (1996). The mean value of this variable is 4.75 for the entire sample, indicating that on average 
each firm operates in at least 4 countries in the Asian region.
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Interestingly, the coefficient of the interactive variable DERVDUM*GEOi is 
positive, but insignificant in 1996, 1998 and in the overall sample period (1996-1998). It 
is, however, negative, but insignificant in 1997. This result provides a weak support to 
the view that both types of hedging techniques are complementary and are value 
increasing to the firm.
The coefficient of the geographic diversification variable proxied by the number 
of countries in which the firms operate in the region (GEO2) however, provides a stronger 
support to the positive valuation effect of both types of hedging techniques on firm value. 
First, the coefficient of GEO2 is positive and significant in the pre-crisis, post-crisis and 
in the overall sample period. It is also positive, but insignificant in 1997. This result 
indicates that geographic diversification is a value increasing strategy for the firm. 
Second, the coefficient of the interactive variable DERVDUM * GEO2 is positive and 
significant in the pre-crisis (1996), post-crisis (1998), and in the overall sample period 
(1996-1998). It is also positive, but not significant in the crisis period (1997). This result 
shows that financial hedging in the presence of geographic diversification increases or at 
best protects firm value during periods of exchanger rate instability.
In panel B, the results show that by using foreign sales to total sales ratio GEOi 
as a proxy for geographic diversification, the coefficient of the interactive term 
DERVDUM * GEOi is positive, but not significant in the post crisis period and in the 
overall pooled regression. However, the coefficient is negative, but insignificant in the 
pre-crisis period. Moreover, it is negative and significant in the crisis period. This result 
is inconsistent wit the positive valuation effect of financial hedging and geographic 
diversification.
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However, when the GEO2 variable is used to proxy for the firm’s geographic 
diversity, the coefficient of the interactive term DERVDUM * GEO2 is positive in each 
year and in the overall sample. Moreover, the hedging premium is positive and 
significant in the overall sample period and in the pre-crisis period as well. Thus, by 
using GEO2 the positive valuation effects of both types of hedging strategies becomes 
stronger.
The inconsistent results obtained by using GEOi as a proxy for geographic 
diversification compared to the results obtained using GEO2 as a proxy for the same 
variable, however, could be interpreted as follows; the ratio of regional foreign sales to 
total sales (GEOi) is generally a good proxy for the extent of a firm’s international 
involvement and its degree of multinationality. However, in the context of an exchange 
rate instability event, having high foreign sales to total sales ratio might not necessarily 
help the firm to protect its value against adverse exchange rate movements if  the bulk of 
the sales have come from one country; let’s say Thailand or Indonesia, during the 
turbulent period. However, if this firm is present and operates in more than one country 
of the troubled region at the same time, it could do a better job at reducing its exposure 
and preserving its value because not all countries in the region were hit by the crisis in 
the same magnitude and at the same time.
t
If we examine the rest of the control variables in the table, we’ll pretty much see 
a pattern similar to the results we obtained earlier. Firm value is negative and 
significantly related to firm size; it is positive and significantly related to the firm’s 
profitability profile as proxied by the firm’s ROA, ROE and EBIT ratios. The ratio of 
long-term debt to total assets is positive and significant only in the overall pooled sample
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(panel A), but positive and significant in each year and in the overall sample period 
(panel B), thus supporting the arguments that debt can help increase firm value because 
of its monitoring effect on managers (see, for example, Jensen (1986)). Dividend 
payment is negative and significnalty related to firm value as it indicates that firms are 
not capital constraints, which allows managers to engage in type of projects or 
investments under their discretion. Finally, firm value is negatively and significantly 
related to industrial diversification; a finding that has been documented by many studies 
(see, for example, Lang and Stulz (1994), Commnet and Jarrrell (1995) and Servaes 
(1996)).
Overall, results from Table 8 show that firms that hedged their currency exposure 
during the Asian currency crisis, using both financial and non-financial hedging strategies 
were rewarded by a positive market valuation. This result is stronger particularly when 
we proxy for non-financial hedging by the total number of countries the firm operates in 
the region (GEO2) rather than relaying on foreign sales/total sales ratio (GEOi) as a 
proxy for the same variable. Thus, our results support a complementary relationship 
between financial and natural hedging techniques of risk management.
2.7. The Brazilian Real Devaluation:
So far our results show that the use of currency derivatives have been beneficial to 
US firms with Asian currency exposures. However, to be able to generalize this result we 
have to apply some robustness checks and see if the results will still hold out. Luckily, at 
least from a research point of view, the 1990’s have been plagued by several currency 
shocks and financial upheavals that affected many countries and the global financial
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market.29 This permits us to conduct the same experiment on a different sample and at a 
different time period. In this section the impact of foreign currency hedging and firm 
value is investigated on a sample of 612 US non-fmancial firms that operated in Brazil 
and the Latin American region during the Brazilian Real devaluation of 1999. The 
Brazilian crisis allows us to push the time period of investigation a few years forward 
from 1999-2000. In addition, Latin America is the US second largest trading partner. 
Hence, currency disruptions in the region can very well impact American firms there.
2.7. A. Overview o f  the Brazilian Real Devaluation
Faced with growing capital flight caused by a loss of investor confidence in the 
government’s fiscal reforms, the Brazilian government on January 15, 1999 abandoned 
its efforts to defend the Real allowing the currency to float freely against the dollar. By 
January 19, the devaluation of the currency had reached 28%, with most analysts 
predicting it will peak to 30% before stabilizing. By January 29, the Real had plunged by 
44%, while analysts warned that Brazil could follow the path of Mexico and Russia. The 
uncontrolled devaluation was followed by a deep recession.
The loss of investor confidence in Brazilian fiscal reforms came mainly as a result 
of the high fiscal deficit that the government has been incurring for years. The fiscal 
deficit in Brazil came primarily from the cleaning up of the Brazilian banks that had bad 
debts. The government took the responsibility to finance those bad debts and started to 
borrow from the Brazilian banking system. After the Asian crisis hit and particularly after
29 Early in 1994, before the Asian crisis, the world financial markets were shaken by the Mexican Pesos 
crisis. In 1998 the Russian crisis took place just as the world markets were recovering from the Asian 
upheaval. In 1999 The Brazilian crisis took place and its contagion effects were feared, particularly, 
through Latin America.
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the Russian crisis, Brazilians believed that their currency would be next. They started 
demanding higher interest rates.
Hoping to lower interest rates, the Brazilian government started thinking of 
devaluating the Real (15-20% devaluation) did not seem harmful at that time. The final 
blow to the government’s credibility, however, came at the start of January 1999 when 
the governor of Minas Gerais suddenly declared a moratorium on his state’s debt with the 
federal government of Brazilia. Other opposition governors warned that they could not 
continue making their debt payments to the federal government as well. The government 
immediately started a round of renegotiations with the governors on the debt accords 
signed with their states. But the fears that these talks could fall apart and add to the public 
sector deficit, provoked a round of capital flight and loss of investor’s confidence that 
resulted in the collapse of the government’s floating peg exchange policy.30
2.7. B. Data selection and sample description:
The sample used in this study consists of a sample of US. non-financial firms 
from the S&P 500 firms. The sample covers the period from 1998-2000 (the period 
around the Brazilian Real crisis of 1999). The logic behind using the S&P 500 firms is 
the same as that discussed earlier. The index includes relatively large firms which are 
more likely to have exposure to various financial price risks and therefore potentially 
provide a rich cross-section of hedging and non-hedging firms. Second, firms within this 
sample are required by SEC to actively report their hedging activities in their annual 
financial statements during the sample period. We adopt the same firm selection criteria, 
as discussed above in the Asian sample, in section 2.3.
30 For a detailed discussion of the events leading to the Brazilian devaluation see Edwin Taylor’s (1999) 
account o f The Effects o f the Brazilian Devaluation, pp 6-11
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Table 9 presents some descriptive statistics of the sample. Panel A shows the 
hedging profile of the firms through out the Brazilian crisis period. By examining the 
number and distribution of hedging and non-hedging firms in the sample, it’s clear that 
more than sixty percent (60.29%) of the firms use foreign currency derivatives from 
1998-2000. The number of currency derivative users increased from 1998 to 1999 
(60.78%, 62.56% respectively). We notice, however, a slight drop in this number in 2000 
(57.60%). Some firms did not report currency derivative information in the year 2000 
instead they reported interest rate and/or commodity hedging information. Because 
hedging firms in our sample are defined as those who report foreign currency hedging 
information only, these firms were included in the non-hedgers sample. Therefore, we 
notice that in the year 2000 the number of hedging firms slightly declined, where as the 
number of non hedging firms slightly increased (from 39.2% in 1998 to 42.2% in 2000). 
We see the same trend in the mean gross notional value of foreign currency derivatives 
(last column in Panel A). The mean gross notional value of foreign currency derivatives 
increased to $5350.2 million in 1999 from $4165.6 million in 1998 indicating, that not 
only the number but also the value of foreign currency contracts has been on the rise. In 
2000, however, the mean gross notional value of foreign currency derivatives slightly 
declined to $4738.1 million. For the same reason explained above.
Panel B of Table 9 shows the type of foreign currency hedging instrument used 
by hedging firms, in the sample. From 1998-2000, more than seventy percent (71.81%) 
of the firms have used foreign exchange forward contracts, making them the most widely 
used currency hedging instrument. Followed by currency options (25.20%) then by 
currency swaps (2.98%). Overall, results from table 9 are robust with our results from the
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Asian sample and are consistent with previous research.31
<Insert Table 9 about here>
Table 10 shows summary statistics for the main variables that are used in the 
analysis. The mean (median) value for Tobin’ Q and Excess Market value in the sample 
are 2.71 (1.61), 2.64 (1.24) respectively. The median values are relatively smaller than 
the mean values indicating, that the distribution of Tobin’s Q and Excess Market value 
are relatively skewed. Hence in our univariate analysis we’ll be using both mean and 
median tests. We note that the mean and median values for our two valuation measures 
are slightly higher than those reported earlier for our Asian sample, indicating that most 
firms in the Brazilian sample are high market performers.
Again, to be able to infer that currency hedging increased firm value or at best 
insulated it against the Brazilian currency shock, it is important to control for the effect of 
other variables that could have an impact on value. These variables include32: Firm size, 
Geographic and industrial diversification,. The firm’s Leverage, its profitability and 
liquidity measures. The sample has a mean (median) value of total Assets of $14741 
($5622) million. The mean value of foreign sales to total sales is 33.34% (32.65%). This 
means that hedging firms in the sample have foreign sales that are, on average, above 
30% of their total sales. Moreover, on average, the sample’s gross notional value of 
foreign currency derivatives is $4751.8 million.
31 See for example Bodnar, Hayt, Marston and Smithson (1995), Dolde (1995), Fok et al. (1997), Gay and 
Nam (1998), Howton and Perfect (1998) Nance et al. (1993), and Phillips (1995).
32 For a discussion of the theoretical justification for the use o f some of these variables see Allayannis, 
Brown and Klapper (2001), Allayannis and Weston (2001), Muller (1987) and Peltzman (1977).
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Mean value of long-term debt to total assets ratio is 24.80 (22.28). Profitability 
ratios for the entire sample have the following mean (median) values: ROA 7.44 (6.74), 
ROE 19.90 (17.15), EBIT 14.49 (13.08) respectively. The firms in the sample have a 
mean dividend payout ratio of 32.89%. Finally, the results show that on average, 
approximately 59% of the firms in the sample are diversified across industries. Overall, 
most of the mean and median values for most variables are greater than those in the Asian 
sample, possibly because of the time span of the investigation.
<Insert Table 10 about here>
2 .7. C. Univariate Tests o f  Pre-Crisis, Crisis and Post-Crisis Performance o f  Hedging 
and Non-Hedging firms:
In this section we examine some performance measures and firm-specific 
variables for the sample of foreign exchange currency hedgers and non-hedgers before, 
during and after the Brazilian crisis, 1998-2000 using univariate analysis. Table 11 shows 
the results of this analysis. The results show, as before, that hedgers have a larger size 
than non-hedgers thought out the entire sample period. The mean and median difference 
of total assets between hedging firms and non-hedging firms is positive and statistically 
significant pre-crisis, crisis and post- crisis periods. Our results are consistent with those 
of Chow, Lee and Solt (1997) and are robust to those from the Asian sample
<Insert Table 11 about here>
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Table 11 also shows that hedging firms consistently have higher foreign sales to 
total sales ratios than their non-hedging counterparts. The mean and median tests for the 
value of foreign sales to total sales are positive and significant for the hedgers’ sample 
through out the period. This result is consistent with the literature on foreign exchange 
exposure and Multinationality theory. See Allayannis and Ofek (1999), Jorion (1990) and 
Emmons and Schmid (2000).
The mean and median values for the ratio of long-term debt to assets is negative 
and significant during the crisis period only and positive and insignificant otherwise. Our 
univariate results, therefore, do not support existing literature on the relationship between 
debt and hedging. It is also different than that obtained in the Asian sample.
Regarding the performance ratios, hedging firms have consistently under­
performed their non-hedging counterparts in their Return on Assets ratio (ROA) and 
Earning before Interest and Tax (EBIT) ratios33. Mean and median tests are negative and 
statistically significant, through out the period. Results support what hedging theory 
predicts. According to theory, less profitable firms are more likely to hedge since they are 
more susceptible to financial distress. This result is also robust to what we found earlier 
in the Asian sample.
Finally, the mean and median differences in dividend payout ratio between 
hedgers and non-hedgers were positive and statistically significant before, during and 
after the crisis. Hence, the results support the view that hedging firms in our sample were 
not capitally constrained firms before, during and after the crisis. This result is in line
33 ROE ratio is negative and significant during the crisis period only, but positive and insignificant 
otherwise.
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with Nance, Smith and Smithson’s (1993) predictions and is also robust to the results 
obtained from the Asian sample.
2 .7. D. The Hedging Premium/Discount: Univariate Tests
In this section we use univariate analysis to directly test whether currency hedging 
increased or at least preserved the value of the firm during the Brazilian currency crisis
<Insert Table 12 about here>
Table 12 reports the results of the univariate analysis. It is clear that during the 
pre-crisis period (1998) mean Q value is more for hedgers than non-hedgers. The hedging 
premium (0.060) is statistically significant at the 10% level. Median values show similar 
results. Hedgers outperform non-hedgers but, the median hedging premium (0.061) is 
more significant (at 5% level).
During the crisis period (1999), the mean Q ratio of hedgers is more than that of 
non-hedgers. The hedging premium (0.140) is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Median Q values are also higher for hedgers than non-hedgers. There is a median 
hedging premium of (0.039), which, as before, is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Therefore, the results again show that there is a positive and statistical hedging premium 
for users of currency derivatives during the Brazilian Real devaluation. This result is also 
robust to what was obtained earlier in the Asian sample
In the post-crisis period (2000), the same trend continues. The mean Q values 
still show a hedging premium of (0.430) that is still significant at the 5% level. Moreover, 
the median difference of Q is positive and significant indicating, that hedging was indeed
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rewarded with higher market valuation post-crisis. The median hedging premium in 2000 
is (0.380) and significant at 1% level. Results using Tobin’s Q, therefore, indicate that 
investors were indeed anticipating a Real Devaluation and a crisis that could have been as 
bad as the Asian or the Russian crisis. Investors appreciated the benefits of hedging even 
before the crisis hit. They continued to reward currency hedging firms during and after 
the crisis as well. Moreover, through out the entire period (1998-2000) mean and median 
Tobin’s Q is positive and significant, indicating that hedging firms outperformed their 
non-hedging counterparts.
By examining excess market value in panel B of Table 12, we continue to see 
robust results. First, during the pre-crisis period (1998), mean and median excess market 
value is greater for hedgers than non-hedgers. The median hedging premium (0.135) is 
statistically significant at thel% level, where as the mean hedging premium (0.260) is 
significant at the 10% level. Second, during the crisis period (1999), mean and median 
excess market value for hedgers is greater than non-hedgers and the hedging premium is 
statistically significant at the 5% level. Third, during the post-crisis period (2000), mean 
and median excess market value for hedgers is again higher than non-hedgers and the 
hedging premium is statistically significant at the 5% level.
Overall, univariate results of firms with Brazilian exposures provide strong 
support to the positive valuation effects of currency hedging during times of exchange 
rate instability events. The hedging premium is positive and significant in each year of 
the crisis and regardless of the valuation measure used.
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2 .7. E. The Hedging Premium/ Discount: Multivariate Tests
In this section we test the relationship between currency hedging and firm in a 
multivariate framework. To be able to document a relationship between currency hedging 
strategies and firm value during the Brazilian Real Devaluation of 1999, we need to 
control for the effects of other possible variables on Tobin’s Q and Excess market value 
as we did earlier. Most of the control variables are those that are discussed in previous 
sections. Table 13 shows the valuation effects of hedging in the Brazilian sample. Again 
as we did in the Asian sample, in each panel we report the below regression on a yearly 
basis and for the overall sample i.e. from 1998-2000 (last column of table 12 panels A 
and B).
V; = (30 PiLog (TA), +(32 FSTSi +P 3 DERVDUM 1 +P 4 ROA 1 +P 5 ROE 1 + |3gEBITj +(37 
DIVDUMj +(3 8 LDEBTAj + (39 INDIVj + e i
For i = 1, N, where N is the number of firm year observation.
Vi = Tobin’s Q ratio (panel A) and Excess Market Value (Panel B)
As it’s clear from panel A of table 13, the coefficient of the foreign currency 
derivative dummy (DERVDUM) is positive for each year and through out the entire 
sample period indicating, that hedging increased the Q value of the firm. The overall 
hedging premium is (0.088), (0.360) and (0.275) respectively (last 3 columns of Table 
13) and is significant at the 5% level. Therefore, our results document a positive and 
significant hedging premium during the Brazilian currency crisis that is robust to our
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earlier results of the Asian crisis. Users of currency derivatives are shown to have a 
higher Q than non-users by 0.241 Given that the mean Q for the sample is 2.71 this 
premium represents 8.89 % of firm value.
<Insert Table 13 about here>
Consistent to the results in panel A, our results in panel B of Table 13 still 
document a positive and significant hedging premium when using Excess Market value 
as an alternative valuation measure. The overall average hedging premium is 0.078, 
which represents 2.95% of firm value and is also significant at the 5% level for the entire 
sample period (1998-2000).
For the rest of the control variables, we see a pattern in the signs and significance 
of the coefficients of these variables that are consistent and robust to the results in the 
Asian sample. Our results show that firms that are smaller in size, that have high 
profitability ratios, that pay lower dividends, that have a higher leverage, that are 
industrially focused tend to have a higher market value regardless of the measure of 
valuation used.
Overall, results from the Brazilian sample confirms that hedging foreign currency 
risk using foreign currency derivatives was rewarded by higher market valuation each 
year and through out the entire crisis period and regardless of the measure of valuation 
used in the analysis. In addition, the majority of the control variables used in the 
regressions came out significant and displayed the same expected sign as theory predicts. 
It is important to note that these results are robust and consistent to results uncovered
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earlier in the Asian sample. Together both samples provide a strong support of the 
positive valuation hypothesis and to the benefits of foreign currency hedging, as a risk 
management technique, during exchange rate shocks.
2.8. Firm Value, Foreign Currency Hedging and the Geographic Diversity of the 
Firm: Brazilian Sample
In this section, we investigate valuation effects from financial hedging to those 
from geographic diversification. We use the same set of interactive variables as we used 
in the Asian sample. Namely we employ GEOi and GEO2 as alternative proxies of 
geographic diversification. GEOi represent the Latin American foreign sales to total sales 
ratio34. Similarly GEO2 represents the number of countries that the firm operates in the 
Latin American region. Table 14 reports the results of this analysis.
<Insert Table 14 about here>
In panel A of Table 14 the results again show that by using the ratio of regional 
foreign sales to total sales ratio GEOi as a proxy for the firm’s geographic diversity, we 
do not support the positive valuation effect of the two types of hedging techniques on 
firm value. Specifically, we find that the coefficient of the interactive term 
DERVDUM * GEOi is negative in the pre-crisis period and in the overall sample, 
whereas it is positive in the crisis and post-crisis periods respectively. In addition, the 
variable is not significant in any year. On the other hand, when GEO2 variable is used in
34 This variable is obtained for the Directory o f American Firms Operating in Foreign Countries in the year 
1999.
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the regression a positive and statistically significant hedging premium is documented in 
the crisis, post-crisis and the overall pooled sample respectively.
The same trend and pattern is similarly observed in panel B of Table 14. As a 
matter of fact, by using Excess Market Value as an alternative measure of value, an even 
more significant hedging premium is documented.
Overall, results from Table 14 are robust to our results in the Asian sample. Both 
results support the arguments that financial and non-fmancial hedging techniques are 
complementary and can both work together to increase firm value or at least protect it 
against exchange rate and currency shocks. It is important to note that this result is 
generally true and stronger when the number of countries that the firm operates in the 
crisis region is used as a proxy for the firm’s geographic diversity.
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2.9. Summary of Results.
This essay examines whether foreign currency hedging increases firm value or at 
best insulates it against currency and exchange rate shocks. Financial theory suggests that 
hedging exchange rate risk through currency derivatives can increase or at best can 
protect firm value by reducing the chances of financial distress. The Financial and 
currency crises of the 1990’s provide us with an exogenous set of events that allows us to 
carry out an investigation in order to determine the effectiveness of foreign currency 
hedging in periods of currency upheavals.
By using first a large cross section of firms from US non-fmancial firms from the 
S&P500 that have a positive foreign sales total sales ratio and who had operations in the 
Asian and Latin American regions around the time of the Asian financial crisis of 1997 
and the Brazilian Real devaluation of 1999, the results indicate that firms, which hedged 
their foreign exchange exposures using foreign currency derivatives, were rewarded by 
the market at times of exchange rate turbulence. This result is robust for both the Asian 
and for the Brazilian financial crises and regardless of the measure of valuation used. 
Second, results show that firms that hedged their currency exposure using both financial 
and non-financial hedging techniques were rewarded by a positive market valuation at the 
time of exchange rate shocks. The positive valuation impact is shown to be stronger when 
the total number of foreign country operations (GEO2) is used to proxy for non-fmancial 
hedging, rather than using foreign sales/total sales ratio (GEOi), which is a measure often 
used in the literature as a proxy for the same variable. Our results indicate that financial 
and natural hedging are complementary techniques in managing currency risk and
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shielding firm value against severe and abrupt exchange rate movements. This result is 
also robust for both currency crises and regardless of the valuation measure used.
Moreover, results for the Asian sample are generally consistent with previous 
research35 that showed that the effect of the Asian crisis on US firms had been benign and 
that the growth enhancing consequences of the crisis for the United States -  primarily 
lower interest rates and commodity and input prices-were simply more powerful than the 
growth reducing factors which included reduced demand for US exports, financial and 
revenue disturbances suffered by lenders, investors, and firms that have operated in the 
region during the crisis.
35 See, for example, Coughlin and Pollard (2000) and Gould and Taylor (1998)
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3. ESSAY 2: CURRENCY RISK MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES AND
AGENCY COSTS
Agency theory has had a strong impact on research in financial economics (Bartram, 
2000). Central elements in the agency problem are the interdependence of different 
interests, information sets, and alternatives of action for two major parties; the principle 
(a shareholder) and an agent (a manager). The role of risk management in alleviating or 
exacerbating the agency problem, resulting from the separation of ownership and control, 
has fueled a lot of controversy in the finance literature.
While, some researchers argue that risk management eliminates agency costs by 
reducing the under-investment and asset substitution problems, particularly in firms that 
have volatile returns and that are highly leveraged (for example see Dobson and Soenen 
(1993), MacMinn (1978), Meyers (1977), Smith, Smithson and Wilford (1990), and 
Smithson (1998) among others), others argue that divergent risk preferences exist 
between managers, whose wealth position is undiversified, and shareholders. Hence 
managers may use the investing and financing policy of the firm, or more specifically 
corporate risk management policy as a tool to suit their own personal risk preferences. 
Corporate hedging motivated by managerial risk preferences is potentially damaging if 
mangers use it to evade the scrutiny of the external capital markets, engage in value 
destroying projects and hence exacerbate the agency problems in the firm (see, for 
example, Bartram (2000), Haeglin et. al. (2004), Mayers and Smith (1982), Smith and 
Stulz (1984), Stulz (1984), Stulz (1990), Tufano(1996) and (1998)).
Empirical investigations of the agency costs of risk management focused on firm 
specific performance indicators and ratios to measure the asset substitution problem, such 
as debt ratio, R&D to sales, capital expenditures to total assets, book value to market
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value of equity and Tobin’s Q ratio (see, for example, Allayannis and Weston (1997), 
Berkman and Bradbury (1996), Dolde (1995), Fehle (1998), Gay and Nam (1998), 
Graham and Rogers (1999), Haushalter (1997), Howtan and Perfect (1998), Mian (1996), 
and Nance, Smith and Smithson, (1993)).
On the other hand, empirical studies testing the divergence of managerial interest 
component of the agency problem focus on the incentive structure in general and 
managerial compensation in particular. This is due to the fact that shareholders can 
resolve management’s conflict of interest through suitable incentive structures. By 
linking the compensation and evaluation of managers appropriately to stock prices, 
shareholders can ensure that corporate policies take shareholder value into account and 
that risk reducing value destroying strategies on part of management are mostly avoided. 
Results of empirical studies support the hypothesis that corporations are less likely to 
conduct risk management and that they hedge less, the more important stock options are 
for management compensation whose value increases the more volatile firm value 
becomes (Gay and Nam (1998), Geczy, Minton and Schrand (1997), Haeglien et.al. 
(2004), Haushlater (1997), Schrand and Unal (1998), and Tufano (1996)).
While the empirical literature recognizes the relationship between corporate hedging 
policies and managerial agency conflicts arising from managerial risk preferences, it does 
not take into account other important determinants of managerial agency conflicts that 
have been documented in the literature such as the extent to which managers can act on 
their own self interests and the costs of evaluating and replacing managers (see Jensen 
and Meckling (1976), and Lei (2004)). These different aspects of managerial agency 
conflicts highlight the importance of governance structures on corporate hedging policies. 
Corporate governance should be an important determinant of risk management activities,
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as corporate governance is the market solution to agency problems (see Fama (1980) and 
Lei (2004))
This essay provides new evidence on the potential effects of corporate governance 
structure on the firm’s currency hedging activities. Specifically this essay investigates the 
relationship between currency risk management activities, firm value and the agency- 
related costs arising from the separation of ownership and control using an innovative 
methodology, which proxies for the level of agency conflict in the firm. The degree of 
agency conflicts in the firm is proxied by the Corporate Governance Index or the “G” 
index. The Corporate Governance Index is a state of the art measure, which proxies for 
the balance of power between shareholders and managers. The index is constructed by 
Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2001) using laws, regulations and 24 distinct corporate 
governance provisions, which define the power sharing relationship between shareholders 
and managers during the 1990’s. The higher the index, the lower shareholders’ rights and 
the more powerful managerial provisions become, hence, resulting in a higher level of 
agency conflicts (i.e. weaker governance) in the firm and vice versa.
The use of the Corporate Governance index “G” provides some advantages for our 
study. Specifically, using the “G” index which is composed of the regulations set by the 
securities commission (at the federal level), corporate laws (at the state level), and 
corporate by laws, charter provisions, and other rules (at the firm level) allows us to focus 
on a larger and much broader set of corporate-govemance provisions and its relationship 
to the firm’s hedging activities and its value. These provisions are viewed as a slow 
moving “constitution” for the firm that sets the rules for faster adjusting forms of 
governance such as board membership, CEO compensation, and shareholder activism. 
(Gompers et al. 2001). As far as the currency hedging literature is concerned, to the best
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of our knowledge, no study using US data has attempted to directly use the firm’s 
corporate governance structure as a measure of agency costs and relate it to the firm’s 
currency hedging profile.
This essay builds on recent international evidence that documents the role of 
managerial agency conflicts, corporate governance and hedging policy in foreign firms. 
While these recent studies1 have only focused on certain aspects of the governance 
structure at the firm level and at the country level, this essay extends the literature by 
analyzing the role of managerial agency conflicts and currency hedging strategies using a 
corporate governance index for US firms that takes into account federal, state and firm 
level governance provisions.
In this essay we test the damaging effects of corporate hedging motivated by the 
managerial risk preferences hypothesis as outlined by Tufano (1998). If currency risk 
management strategies (currency hedging) are undertaken to suit managerial risk 
preferences in order to evade the scrutiny of the external capital markets and to protect 
managers ”pet” projects, then currency risk management should exacerbate the agency 
costs in the firms. It is predicted, therefore, that currency hedging strategies should be 
more (less) prominent in firms in the higher deciles of the “G” index, which are 
associated with higher (lower) levels of agency conflicts and weaker (stronger) corporate 
governance structures. Moreover, this type of currency hedging will be associated with a 
decline (increase) in firm value.
1 For example Allayannis, Lei and Miller (2003) used the inside and outside ownership o f the largest block 
holder as a measure of the degree of internal governance structure in the firm and used the English legal 
origin as a proxy for strong external governance at the country level to examine the impact o f corporate 
governance on hedging decisions and firm value for a sample of American Depositary Receipts (ADR’s) 
from thirty five countries in the 1990’s. Lei (2004) examined the relationship between hedging policies 
and the degree o f agency conflicts associated with corporate governance at the firm and country levels for a 
sample o f 34 countries around the world. He also used the inside and outside ownership of the largest block
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By using a sample of 1422 firm year observations from the S&P 500 during the years 
1993, 1995, and 1998 respectively, results show that firms that hedge currency risk tend 
to be in the higher deciles of the G index (high agency costs, weak governance structure). 
Where as non-hedging firms tend to be in the lower deciles of G (low agency costs, 
strong governance structure). This relationship is significant and consistent in each year 
and through out the pooled sample. In addition, the results show that the G index is 
positively and significantly (5% level) related to the likelihood of hedging in the sample, 
indicating that the higher the G index of the firm (weak governance and less protection 
for shareholder rights), the higher its currency hedging activity.
With regards to currency hedging, corporate governance and firm value, the overall 
results document that hedging firms in our sample have significantly higher valuations 
than their non-hedging counterparts using both Tobin’s Q and Excess Market value as 
two alternative valuation measures. The average hedging premium2 using Tobin’s Q is 
0.192, which represents 9.2% of firm value. Using the Excess Market valuation measure, 
the average hedging premium is 0.260 and 0.102 representing 14.2% and 5.5% of firm 
value, respectively. Overall, the results indicate that currency hedging is a value 
increasing strategy
The valuation effects of hedging for firms in the Management Portfolio (G > 14) i.e. 
for firms that suffer from very weak governance structures and with severe agency 
conflicts show that their hedging activities are not value destroying. Using Tobin’s Q as a
holder as a measure o f the degree of internal governance structure in the firm and used the “strict 
enforcement o f law” to proxy for external governance structure at the country level.
2 The average hedging premium is the average of the coefficient of the derivative dummy in all three 
regressions (see table 11, panel A l).
3 The average hedging premium is the average o f the coefficient o f the derivative dummy (and the average 
coefficient o f the continuous value o f the derivative variable) in all three regressions. ( see table 11, panel 
Bl)
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measure of value, results show that hedging firms, in the above category, still 
outperformed their non-hedging counterparts and that the average hedging premium 
0.9094 is positive and significant at the (5% level). By using Excess Market value as 
another measure of valuation (for robustness checks), the average hedging premium 
0.705 is also positive and significant at the (5 %level). Moreover, firms in the 
Shareholder portfolio (G < 5), which have the strongest governance structures and the 
lowest degrees of agency conflicts, have showed a positive hedging premium as well. 
The average hedging premium 0.3995 is smaller than that of firms in the Management 
Portfolio (G > 14) i.e. firms with the weakest governance structures and the highest 
degrees of agency conflicts. Moreover, the results show that this hedging premium is 
only significant at the (5% level) when using Tobin’s Q as a valuation measure, but not 
significant using Excess Market value.
Overall, our findings do not support Tufano’s (1998) prediction that currency risk 
management in firms suffering from high levels of agency conflicts is associated with 
value decreasing effects. Overall, our results are more in line with the body of the finance 
literature suggesting that the realization of managerial risk preferences may not always 
lead to a lower shareholder and firm value. The realization of the mangers’ risk 
preferences aims eventually at the reduction of corporate risk in order to avoid 
bankruptcy. Therefore, this leads to a hedging strategy that increases shareholder value.6
4 The average hedging premium is the average coefficient o f the derivative dummy in all three regressions 
(see table 11, panel A3).
5 The average hedging premium is the average coefficient of the continuous value of the derivative 
variable used in all three regressions ( see table 11, panel A2)
6 Bartram (2000) makes a similar argument; “while corporate mangers may be risk averse due to their 
undiversified personal wealth position, they cannot sell the stock o f their firm short in order to reduce the 
riskiness o f their private portfolio. As a result they not only have a special interest in the ongoing existence 
of the firm, but also have an incentive to reduce their personal exposure by means of corporate hedging.”
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Our results also provide some support to the hedging theories that link corporate 
hedging policies to managerial career and reputation concerns. Hedging can reduce the 
noise associated with performance measures to the extent that it reduces firm’s cash flow 
volatility (Stulz, 1996). Therefore, hedging can reduce the degree of informational 
asymmetry among managers, shareholders, and the labor market. This implies that 
managers with superior skills may engage in hedging to better communicate their skills to 
the labor market (see Breeden and Viswanathan, (1998)). Consequently, the higher the 
degree of information asymmetry7, the higher the desire of “good-performing” managers 
to convey their superior skills to the market by aggressively hedging currency risk 
exposure in a way that adds value to the firm and to the shareholders. This explains why 
hedging firms in the Management Portfolio (i.e. firms with the weakest corporate 
governance structure, highest level of agency and with the highest level of asymmetric 
information between managers and shareholders) were rewarded with higher valuations 
than non hedging firms and their hedging premium was even higher than the hedging 
premium for firms in the Shareholder Portfolio (i.e. firms with the strongest corporate 
governance provisions, lowest agency costs and lowest degree of asymmetric information 
between mangers and shareholders).
Finally, our results support the recent international literature regarding the role of 
corporate governance and agency costs on the firm’s hedging decisions that was 
documented in foreign firms. Specifically, our results support the study of Allayannis, 
Lei and Miller (2003), which documents that hedging is valuable even when internal 
(firm specific) corporate governance is weak, if the firm happens to reside in a country
7 Studies have used the level o f institutional ownership in the firm and whether the largest block holder is 
an outsider or an insider to proxy for the information asymmetry between managers and shareholders in the
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with good external governance (English legal origin). And that is true for the firms in our 
sample. The US enjoys a large and stable financial market with overall strong governance 
provisions compared to many other countries and that could explain the positive 
valuation effect for firms in the Management Portfolio.
This essay is organized as follows, in section 3.1, a review of the literature on the 
agency cost of risk management is provided. Section 3.2, shows the corporate governance 
index construction, research methodology, data selection and sample description. 
Section 3.3 shows descriptive statistics of the sample, and the major empirical results of 
the essay. Section 3.4 concludes this essay with a summary of the major results.
firm. ( see for example Tufano (1996), Geczy et al (1997), Graham and Rogers (2002), Lei (2004) and 
Allayannis et al. (2003)).
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3.1. Agency Cost of Risk Management: Literature Review
3.1. A. Corporate Risk Management as a means to alleviate agency costs:
Positive theories of corporate risk management argue8 that hedging can be an 
effective tool to eliminate or alleviate conflicts of interest between shareholders and debt 
holders by reducing the volatility of firm value (see for example, Dobson and Soenen 
(1993), Smith, Smithson and Wilford (1990) and Smithson (1998)).
Conflicts of interest can arise when the firm is highly leveraged and its value is 
volatile. While it is in principle optimal to realize investments projects with positive net 
present value (NPV) and to reject those with negative NPV, managers who act in the 
interest of shareholders may not realize all profitable investment projects in the presence 
of high leverage (under-investment problem)9. This is because firm value is volatile (due 
to financial risks), and increases in value generally have to be used to satisfy debt holders 
first. Therefore, low firm value and high leverage can lead to the rejection of profitable 
projects, if the success of the investment primarily increases the probability that debt can 
be repaid, but does not largely benefit equity holders. This under-investment problem is 
more important as more investment projects and growth options are available (Dobson 
and Soenen (1993), Smith, Smithson and Wilford (1990a)).
Corporate risk management represents a means to alleviate the conflicts of 
interest and the welfare loss resulting from the non-realized valuable investment 
opportunities by reducing the volatility of firm value.
Empirical investigations of the under-investment problem indeed document a 
relationship between the firm’s risk management activities, firm’s debt level and its 
growth opportunities. For example, Berkman and Bradbury (1996), Fehle (1998),
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Graham and Rogers (1999), Haushalter (1997), Howton and Perfect (1998), and Schrand 
and Unnal (1998) all found empirical evidence in support of the fact that risk 
management activities are concentrated to a larger extent in companies with higher debt 
ratios, many investment projects and higher growth options10. Moreover, Guy (1999), 
Goldberg et al. (1994), Mayers and Smith (1982), and Mian (1996) found that companies 
in more regulated industries are less likely to hedge since regulation reduces the under­
investment problem.
Ceczy, Minton and Schrand (1997), Dolde (1995b), Guay (1999), Nance,Smith 
and Smithson (1993) find a significant relationship between risk management and 
investment variables such as R&D to sales and Tobin’s q ratio. However, these studies 
could not identify a significant difference in the debt ratio of users and non-users of 
derivatives. Tufano (1996), on the other hand, finds significant results for the debt ratio, 
however, results for variables representing the investment opportunities are not 
significant
In addition, to the under-investment problem, agency costs can arise because of 
risk shifting or asset substitution problems between shareholders and debt holders. The 
asset substitution problem arises because shareholders of a leveraged firm have a strong 
interest in taking on very risky projects. This is because the residual claims of 
shareholders can be interpreted as a call option on the assets of the firm (for example see, 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), MacMinn (1987), and Mason and Merton (1985)). In 
general, there is a positive relationship between the value of an option and the volatility
8 For a thorough review o f the literature on risk management and shareholder value see Bartram (2000)
9 See MAcMinn( 1987a) and Myers (1977)
10 Where the investment set is proxied by various ratios such as; R&D to sales, Tobin’s q, capital 
expenditures to total assets, book value o f equity to market value o f equity, book value of equity to total 
assets or the price earnings ratio.
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of the underlying asset (Bartram (2000), and Tufano (1996)). Hence the realization of 
risky investment projects increases the value of the shareholders’ options (even if the 
project has a negative NPV) since the volatility of firm value increases. The incentive to 
pursue this wealth transfer increases when corporations carry excessive amounts of debt, 
as the call option of the shareholders has only its time value left11 (Bartram (2000)).
Agency costs occur in the presence of the asset substitution problem due to the 
justified attempts of the debt holders to block this wealth transfer. This is done either by 
demanding higher compensations for supplying capital12, or by imposing restrictive debt 
covenants on the financing or investment policies of the firm. Debt covenants are welfare 
reducing as they limit the degrees of freedom of management and possibly obstruct the 
realization of profitable, yet risky investment opportunities (see for example, Fite and 
Pfleiderer (1995), Mayers and Smith (1982), Mayers and Smith (1987), Smith and 
Warner (1979).
Corporate hedging contributes to the reduction or avoidance of the agency costs 
resulting from the asset substitution problem by lowering the riskiness of the investment 
projects. As a result, both groups (shareholders and debt holders) have the same incentive 
of realizing less risky projects if they have positive NPV (Bartram (2000), Bessembinder 
(1991), Campbell and Kracaw (1990)).
Empirically, the asset substitution component of the agency problem and risk 
management has been investigated by looking at the violation of debt covenants in the 
presence of financial risks. Empirical investigations show that corporate hedging is 
indeed used to reduce the risk of breaking a covenant (Francis and Stephen (1993), and 
Geczy, Minton and Schrand (1997)). Other studies investigated the impact of using
11 See Dobson and Soenen (1993) for numerical examples.
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convertible debt and preferred stock, as substitutes for risk management. Theoretically, 
companies that are using these instruments are less likely to face the asset substitution 
problem, hence using these instruments should mean less use of risk management 
hedging strategies for these firms. Empirical investigations, on the other hand, did not
1 Tfind support for these arguments.
3.1. B. Corporate Risk Management as a means to exacerbate agency costs:
While risk management offers benefits, it has costs as well. One of the potentially 
serious costs of risk management is exacerbating the agency conflicts between managers 
and shareholders, leading firms to poorer investment decisions. By facilitating the 
protection of managers “pet” projects that enhance management’s welfare, risk 
management can reduce shareholder and firm value. This potential cost arises from cash 
flow hedging (Tufano (1996) and (1998)).
The principles of cash flow hedging has been first discussed by Donaldson (1961) 
and Lessard (1991) and refined by Froot, Scharfestein and Stein (1993, 1994) and Tufano 
(1998). The cash flow hedging concept suggests that managers engineer their operating 
cash flows in such a way as to be able to carry out investment projects without having to 
resort to expensive capital markets (Tufano (1998)). This principle, however, might cause 
a potential source of concern from an agency perspective. If the projects that managers 
seek to protect are negative NPV investments to shareholders, and managers are only 
supporting them because of some private utility and benefits that they derive from, then 
the absence of external capital market scrutiny can lead to serious resource misallocation 
and destruction of shareholder and firm value. It is clear, therefore, that risk management
12 See Smitih, Smithson and Wilford (1990c)
13 for example, Geczy, Minton and Schrand (1997), Goldberg et al. (1994), and Nance, Smith and Smithson 
(1993) all found weak empirical evidence for preferred stock as a substitute for hedging.
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strategies that help managers bypass these external monitors exacerbate the agency 
problem between managers and shareholders.
Risk management as a potential source of agency conflict also has its roots in the 
work of Stulz (1984, 1990), Mayers and Smith (1982), and Smith and Stultz (1985). Stulz
(1984) introduced managerial risk aversion as a motivation for corporate risk 
management. Managers typically have an undiversified wealth position due to their 
employment in the firm. Therefore, managers whose human capital and wealth are poorly 
diversified prefer to reduce risk to which they are exposed. If managers judge that it will 
be less costly for them to manage this risk than to manage it on their own account, they 
will direct their firms to engage in risk management. Consequently, corporate risk 
management is driven by managerial personal preferences towards risk.
It can be argued, however, that the risk preferences of managers and shareholders 
may not always fully deviate. This is because managerial risk preferences ultimately aim 
at reducing corporate risk, in order to prevent the firm from going bankrupt. Hence 
managerial strategies can lead to a hedging strategy that increases firm and shareholders’ 
value14. Moreover, by linking the compensation and evaluation of managers appropriately 
to stock price, shareholders can insure that corporate policies take shareholder value into 
account and avoid or minimize value-destroying strategies on part of management.
In addition, divergent risk preferences between managers and shareholders may not 
always have negative impact on firm value. Hedging theories link corporate hedging 
policies to managerial career and reputation concerns. Hedging can reduce the noise 
associated with performance measures to the extent that it reduces firm’s cash flow
14 For further discussion o f this argument, see Bartram (2000), Miller and Reuer (1994), Santomero (1995). 
and Sercu and Uppal (1995).
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volatility (Stulz, 1996). Therefore hedging can reduce the degree of informational 
asymmetry among managers, shareholders, and the labor market. This implies that 
managers with superior skills may engage in hedging to better communicate their skills to 
the labor market (see, for example, Breeden and Viswanathan, (1998), and Lei (2004)). 
Moreover, several studies test whether the degree of informational asymmetry influences 
hedging decisions and they find that firms with greater fraction of institutional ownership 
should have less hedging activities if hedging is undertaken to reduce the problems 
related to informational asymmetry between managers and shareholders (see, for 
example, Tufano (1996), Geczy et al. (1997), Haushalter (2000), Graham and Rogers 
(2002)).
Nevertheless, the potential conflict of interest from divergent risk preferences 
between managers and shareholders cannot be ignored. For example, conglomerate 
diversification, which in many cases is considered as a substitute to risk management, is 
associated with a loss of value to the owners and is pursued only because they are in the 
interest of management (see for example, Allayannis and Weston (1997), Berger and 
Ofek (1995), Comment and Jarrell (1995), Densis, Denis and Sarin (1997), and Levi and 
Sercu (1991)).
Studies that relate firm risk management activities to managerial private utility focus 
on managerial compensation and incentive structures. For example, in Smith and Stultz’s
(1985) model, the degree and intensity of corporate risk management depends on the 
amount of managerial wealth tied in options or stock. Mangers with greater option 
holdings are less likely to engage in risk management activities than mangers with greater 
stock ownership. Stocks provide linear payoffs whereas options provide convex payoffs. 
The convexity of the option contract may induce managers- whose wealth is tied in
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options- to accept higher degrees of risk because lower risk reduces the volatility and 
hence the value of their options.
The results of empirical studies support the hypothesis that corporations are less 
likely to conduct risk management and that they hedge less, the more important stock 
options are for management compensation ( see, for example, Gay and Nam (1998), 
Geczy, Minton and Schrand (1997), Haushalter (1997), Schrans and Unal (1998), and 
Tufano (1996)).
Apart from the use of managerial compensation structures, no study in the US has 
focused on the overall governance structure and the extent of the agency conflicts 
between mangers and shareholders on the hedging strategies of the firm.
3.1. C. Corporate Risk Management and governance structure: The two faces o f  
corporate governance
As corporate governance is the market solution to agency problems, therefore 
corporate governance should be an important determinant of risk management (see, for 
example, Fama, (1980)). It is important to note, however, that the literature is divided 
with regards to the impact of governance structure on hedging policies. While Aggrawal 
and Samwick (1999), Demarzo and Duffie (1995), Demsetz (1983), Fama and Jensen 
(1983) suggest that strong corporate governance increases hedging and weak governance 
decreases it, Tufano (1998) argues the opposite; weak corporate governance may indeed 
encourage hedging activities and vice versa.
According to proponents of the first view15, strong corporate governance may 
encourage hedging in several ways. First, to prevent any disciplining actions by 
shareholders, poorly performing mangers may hedge more aggressively so as to make
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sure the firm meets its performance targets, which in turn, helps managers secure their 
jobs, reputation and possible bonuses. Second, hedging makes it easier (lower monitoring 
costs for shareholders to evaluate managerial performance because it reduces the noise in 
firm measures (see, for example, DeMarzo and Duffie (1995)) Hedging also lowers the 
variance of firm’s performance, which is expected to have a positive effect on the 
executive pay-for-performance sensitivity (see, for example, Aggarwal and Samwick
(1999)). Further shareholders may prefer corporate hedging because it enables better 
portfolio optimization decisions.
By the same logic, weak corporate governance may reduce hedging. For example, 
managers with considerable voting power do not have much incentive to meet the 
performance targets as their low voting counterparts would (see, for example, Demsetz 
(1983), Fama and Jensen (1983)). In addition, because of their uncontested control of the 
firm’s activities and the low level of shareholder’s monitoring, mangers with inferior 
skills may opt out of hedging so that their true type will not be revealed to the labor 
market (Lei, 2004). Overall, proponents of this view predict that a positive relationship 
between hedging and strong governance mechanisms will be consistent with the primary 
goal of corporate governance.
The proponents of the second view, however, argue that weak corporate governance, 
may be associated with more hedging, since corporate insiders benefit fully from 
hedging, though they bear only a part of the costs associated with it. In addition, hedging 
may insulate managers from the monitoring power provided by the external capital 
markets, which may motivate mangers to engage in hedging (see, for example, Tufano
15 For a thorough explanation o f this view see Lei (2004)
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(1998)). Therefore, according to this hypothesis, well- governed firms may be less likely 
to engage in hedging and vice versa.
On the empirical front, two very recent studies investigated the impact of governance 
structure on firm value and hedging in foreign firms. Allayannis, Lei and Miller (2003) 
used the inside and outside ownership of the largest block holder as a measure of the 
degree of internal governance structure of the firm and used the “English legal origin” as 
a proxy for strong external governance at the country level to examine the impact of 
corporate governance on hedging decisions and firm value for a sample of American 
Depositary Receipts (ADR’s) from thirty five countries in the 1990’s. Moreover, Lei 
(2004) examined the relationship between hedging policies and the degree of agency 
conflicts associated with corporate governance at the firm and country levels for a sample 
of 34 countries around the world. He also used the inside and outside ownership of the 
largest block as a measure of internal firm specific governance and used the “strict 
enforcement of law” to proxy for external governance structure at the country level.
Both studies document that currency hedging is a value increasing strategy for firms 
around the world. They also found that stronger “internal” corporate governance 
structures as well as stronger “external” governance structures lead to increases in firm 
value. They also found that weak “internal” governance associated with weak “external” 
governance leads to a positive hedging premium that is not significant. Finally they 
document that currency hedging is valuable even when “internal” governance is weak, if 
the firm resides in country with strong “external” governance mechanisms.
This essay builds on the recent body of literature that acknowledges the role of 
governance structure on hedging policies. In this essay the relationship between currency 
risk management activities, firm value and the agency-related costs arising from the
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separation of ownership and control is investigated using the Corporate Governance 
Index as a proxy for the level of agency conflict in the firm. The Corporate Governance 
Index is a state of the art measure, which proxies for the governance structure in the firm 
by emphasizing the balance of power between shareholders and managers. This index 
was constructed by Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2001) using laws, regulations and 24 
distinct corporate governance provisions, which define the power sharing relationship 
between shareholders and managers during the 1990’s. The higher the index, the weaker 
the firm’s governance structure, the lower shareholders’ rights and the more powerful 
managerial provisions become, hence, resulting in a higher level of agency costs in the 
firm and vice versa.
Using the Corporate Governance index “G”, which is composed of the regulations set 
by the securities commission (at the federal level), corporate laws (at the state level), and 
corporate by laws, charter provisions, and other rules (at the firm level) provides us with 
the opportunity of focusing on a larger and much broader set of corporate-govemance 
provisions and investigate their relationship to the firm’s hedging activities and its value. 
As far as the currency hedging literature is concerned, to the best of our knowledge, no 
study using US data has attempted to directly use corporate governance structure as a 
measure of the level of agency in the firm and relate it to the firm’s currency hedging 
profile.
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3.2. Methodology, Data Sources and Sample Selection.
3. 2. A. The Governance Index
In this essay we test the valuation effects of hedging in firms associated with 
weaker governance structures and higher levels of agency costs using a state of the art 
measure of the level of agency in the firm. We use Gomper’s, Ishii’s and Metrick’s 
(2001) “Corporate Governance index (G)” as a proxy for the level of agency in the firm. 
The G index is constructed using regulations and 24 distinct corporate governance 
provisions16, which define the power sharing relationship between shareholders and 
managers in the 1990’s. The index construction is straightforward: For every firm one 
point is added for every provision that restricts share holder rights17. Such restrictions can 
also be interpreted as increases in managerial power. It is important to note that in the 
construction of this index, no judgment as to the efficacy or wealth effects of any of these 
provisions is made, rather the interest is on what a given provision does to the balance of 
power between shareholders and mangers. (Gompers, Ishii and Metrick, 2001)
The Governance index “G” is just the sum of one point for the existence of each 
provision with an index range from 0-24. The firms are broken up into groups beginning 
with G < 5, then each value for G from G -  6 through G -  13, and finishing with G > 14. 
These ten “deciles” are similar but not identical in size, with relative sizes that are fairly 
stable from 1990 to 1995. Most of the changes in the distribution of G come from 
changes due to mergers, bankruptcies, and additions of new firms by the IRRC. In 1998, 
the sample size increased by about 25 percent, with the distribution of these new firms
16 See Appendix A for a detailed list and explanation o f each provision.
17 The Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) publishes detailed listings o f these provisions for 
each firm in years 1990, 1993, 1995 and 1998. The IRRC universe covers most o f the value weighted 
market. The IRRC firm-level data does not include provisions that apply under state law, hence the IRRC
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tilted towards lower values of G. At the firm level, G is relatively stable.
In most cases, the existence of a provision indicates an active move by 
management and an attempt to restrict shareholder rights. There are two exceptions to 
this mle -  “secret ballots” and “cumulative voting” -  in which the provisions tend to 
come from shareholder pressure18. A secret ballot, also called “confidential voting” by 
some firms, designates a third-party to count proxy votes and does not allow management 
to know how specific shareholders vote. Cumulative voting allows shareholders to 
concentrate their directors’ votes so that a large minority holder can ensure some board 
representation (see, for example, Appendix A for detailed descriptions). Both of these 
provisions tend to be proposed by shareholders and opposed by management after they 
have been proposed. In contrast, none of the other 21 provisions enjoy consistent 
shareholder support or management opposition; in fact, many of these provisions receive 
significant numbers of shareholder proposals for their repeal (Ishii, (2000)). Thus, the 
presence of secret ballots and cumulative voting are considered to be increases in 
shareholder rights. For the Governance Index, one point is added for all firms that do not 
have these provisions.
It is important to note that out of the 23 provisions listed in Appendix A, there are 
only two provisions -  anti greenmail and golden parachutes -  whose classification seems 
ambiguous. Greenmail -  the payment of above-market prices to corporate raiders in order 
reduce their threat of takeover is certainly a discretionary tool that adds to managerial 
power once a raider has accumulated a large stake. In this respect, an anti-greenmail 
provision reduces managerial power, and, by extension, increases shareholder rights. It is
data is supplemented by state-level variation in take over laws as given by Pinnell (2000); another IRRC 
publication.
18 For a detailed discussion o f this issue see Gompers Ishii and Metrick (2001) pp 11-15
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also true, however, that greenmail is a profitable exit route for raiders, and the prohibition 
of greenmail payments will make the accumulation of large “raider” stakes less 
profitable, ex ante. In this respect, prohibitions on greenmail payments are like 
prohibitions on paying ransom to kidnappers (Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2001)). By 
restricting their later options, managers reduce the probability of ever receiving hostile 
attention in the first place. The net impact on both managerial entrenchment and 
shareholder wealth of these two different effects -  discretion and deterrence -  is unclear 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). However, Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2001) found 
evidence that the presence of anti-greenmail restrictions is positively correlated with 20 
out of the 23 other provisions. It is significantly positively correlated in eight of the cases 
and is not significantly negative for any of them. Furthermore, according to Pinnell
(2000), states with anti-greenmail laws tend to pass them in conjunction with laws 
designed, less ambiguously, to prevent takeovers. Since it seems likely that most firms 
and states perceive anti-greenmail as a takeover defense19, anti-greenmail provisions are 
treated like other provisions and are coded as a decrease in shareholder rights.
Golden parachutes -  large payments to senior executives in the event of job 
separation following a change in control -  are another case with some ambiguity. While 
such payments would appear to deter takeovers by increasing their costs, one could argue 
that these parachutes also ease the passage of mergers through contractual compensation 
to the managers of the target company. While the net impact on managerial entrenchment
19 It is well known that in the United States, the primary methods of reducing agency conflicts arising from 
the separation of ownership and control are the legal protection o f minority investors, the use o f board of 
directors as monitors of senior management and an active corporate control (takeover) market. Therefore 
anti-take over defenses implemented by firms is seen as a way to exacerbate the agency conflicts in the 
firm and distorts the power sharing relationship between managers and shareholders in favor o f mangers. 
This explains the focus on anti-takeover provisions placed in corporate by-laws o f firms in the construction 
of the G index..
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and shareholder wealth is ambiguous, the more important effect is the clear decrease in 
shareholder rights. In this case, the “right” is the ability of a controlling shareholder to 
fire management without incurring an additional cost. Furthermore, golden parachutes, 
Like anti-greenmail provisions, are found to be highly positively correlated with all the 
other 20 provisions (see Gompers Ishii and Metrick (2001)). Thus, golden parachutes are 
treated as a restriction of shareholder rights. Firms that have such provisions were added 
one point in the G index.
In the subsequent sections of this essay, special attention and analysis is given to 
the two extreme deciles of G. The first decile is known as the “Shareholder Portfolio” 
which includes firms that score from 0-5 (G< 5). Firms in the Shareholder Portfolio have 
a low level of agency because managerial provisions are small and shareholders rights are 
more protected. On the other hand firms in the last decile of G are firms with a G index 
score of 14 and above (G > 14). They are considered to be firms in the Management 
portfolio. The Management Portfolio is comprised of firms with the weakest shareholder 
rights (highest management power). Hence this portfolio contains firms that have a very 
high level of agency. Between these two extreme situations, however, a general rule 
applies: the higher the index, the higher the level of agency costs in the firm.
3.2. B. Data sources and sample selection.
Our sample consists of the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500 firms for the years 1993, 
1995 and 1998. The S&P 500 firms is a logical choice for this investigation since the 
main data source used in the construction of the corporate governance index is the 
Investor Responsibility Research Center data base (IRRC), which publishes detailed 
listing of corporate governance provisions and corporate bylaws for each firm during the 
years 1990, 1993, 1995 and 1998. The IRRC universe itself is drawn from the Standard &
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Poor’s (S&P) 500 as well as the annual lists of the largest corporations in the publications 
of Forbes, Fortune and Business Week. Therefore using the S&P 500 sample facilitates 
the process of data compilation and increases the accuracy of matching firms across the 
CRSP, COMPUSTAT data bases with the G index data set. The rationale behind 
matching the sample across these three databases is discussed below.
The S&P 500 firms are obtained from the COMPUSTAT database in the years
9 0  • •1993, 1995 and 1998. This resulted m a sample of 535 firms on average in each year. 
In other words a total sample of approximately 1605 firm year observations is obtained 
for all three years. For each firm in each year, the company name, SIC code, company 
ticker symbol and CUSIP number is obtained from the company specifics section of the 
COMPUSTAT database. Information on long-term debt, institutional ownership, total 
assets, dividend payout ratio, Tobin’s Q, Excess Market value and the profitability profile 
for each firm is also obtained from various sections of COMPUSTAT21. In order to 
obtain the G index score for each firm in the sample, each firm is hand-matched to the 
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database. The matching is done by using 
company name and supplemented by company CUSIP number or ticker symbol, where 
necessary.
From the CRSP database, information on each company’s primary number
99 • • •(PREMNO) is obtained. The primary number for each firm is again hand-matched to
20 The year 1990 was excluded from the analysis despite the availability of the G index data for that year 
because hedging information and derivative reporting was not required by the SEC before June 15 1991.
21 This information will be used as regression variables in the subsequent analysis. The rationale behind the 
use of these variables will be discussed in the following section.
22 The Primary number (PREMNO) is one of the ways that firms are identified and classified in the CRSP 
database. In fact, company information can be obtained from CRSP by using either; company name, 
company ticker symbol, CUSIP number or by PREMNO number. Once a company is identified in CRSP 
using any o f the above ways, information on the other identifiers becomes displayed as well. Information in 
the G index database, on the other hand can be obtained only through knowing the company’s PREMNO 
number. Hence matching the sample to CRSP is crucial for the analysis.
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the PREMNO in the G index data set in order to obtain the corresponding G index score 
for each firm. Using the S&P 500 firms as our sample proved to be very reliable. We 
were able to match more than 95 percent of the firms in the sample to the CRSP database 
and we were able to find complete annual data for more than 90 percent of these matches 
in the COMPUSTAT. The matching process resulted in a sample of approximately 525 
firms in each year (1575 firm year observations) with complete information on the G 
index score, long-term debt, institutional ownership, total assets, dividend payout ratio, 
Tobin’s Q, Excess Market Value and the firms’ profitability ratios.
Afterwards, we proceed to obtain currency derivative information for the sample. 
Information on derivatives and currency hedging is available in the firm’s 10-K Annual 
Reports. Gross notional values of foreign currency derivatives are found in the “Notes to 
Annual Reports” section of the firms’ 10 K annual Reports. The 10 K reports are 
retrieved from the Electronic Data Gathering and Retrieval “EDGAR” database and from 
the Annual Report Gallery, where necessary. For every firm in the sample, the derivative 
information is hand collected from each report in each year of the sample.
Notional value of derivatives represents the contract amount and the future cash 
flows under the contract. Like other research, we use this variable to proxy for the level 
of a firm’s involvement in hedging.23 Firms that report any form of currency hedging 
such as currency forwards, currency options and currency swaps contracts are included as 
“hedging” firms in the sample. Firms that do not report any form of currency hedging 
activity or report interest rate and or commodity hedging only are included as “non­
23 See Allayannis and Weston (2001) for a similar procedure.
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hedging” firms in the sample24. Firms in the Finance, Insurance and Real Estate 
industries i.e., firms with an industrial classification code (SIC 60-67) are excluded from 
the sample entirely. Most of the firms in these industries are market makers in foreign 
currency derivatives. They hedge for trading purposes; hence managerial motivation for 
hedging might be different than the rest of the firms in other industries.
After screening the sample for derivative information and after excluding firms in 
SIC codes 60-67 from the sample, the final sample consists of 459, 472, and 491 firms 
with complete information on currency hedging strategies, firm specific and performance 
variables, valuation measures and the G index score for the years 1993, 1995 and 1998 
respectively. The final sample consists of 1422 firm year observations covering the 
entire sample period.
3.3. Empirical Results.
3.3. A. Descriptive statistics o f  the sample.
Table 15 reports the distribution of the “G” index in the sample. Panel A reports 
the summary statistics of G in the overall S&P 500 sample in each year. It is clear that G 
is relatively stable for firms in each year. The MIN G is 2, 3, 3 in 1993, 1995 and 1998 
respectively. The MAX G is 16 in every year. The median G is 10 and is stable between 
years as well. Mean G for the sample is 9.597 which, shows that on average the overall 
level of agency for the S&P 500 firms is moderate. Panel B reports the summary statistics 
of G for “Hedging firms” in the sample. It is clear that MIN, MAX, mean and median 
values of G are greater for hedging firms in each year than those reported for the overall 
sample in panel A. In 1998 we also notice that the mean value of G has declined, in
24 While we are aware that the restriction of interest rate and commodity hedging firms to the non-hedging 
sample might create some kind o f bias, we are interested in studying the impact o f currency risk 
management only.
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absolute terms, by one point (almost 3%) compared to its mean value in the previous two 
years. Similarly, we find that the median value of G in 1998 had declined by one point, in 
absolute terms, (almost 10%) than the previous two years. This is basically due to the 
increase in the number of firms in the G index data base by the IRRC. As mentioned in 
the previous section, most of the firms added to the data base had G index distributions 
that were tilted towards lower G values.
Panel C reports the distribution of the G index for “Non-Hedging firms”. It is 
clear that the mean, median, MIN, and MAX values of “G” are lower than those reported 
for hedgers in each year and in the overall pooled sample. Mean and (median) “G” values 
for non-hedging firms are 9.165 and (9) in the overall sample respectively. Overall, these 
results indicate that non-hedging firms had a lower “G” index score than their hedging 
counterparts and that result is consistent in every year of the sample.
<Insert Table 15 about here>
Finally, panel D reports the total number of firms in the sample in each year and 
across each decile. The total number of firms in the sample increased from 459 in 1993 to 
491 in 1998 (an addition of only 32 firms over the five year period). If we examine the 
number of firms across each decile, we’ll notice that the total number of firms in the 
Shareholder portfolio (G< 5) is 110 firms in all years and that the number of firms 
increases from 1993 to 1998. Whereas the total number of firms in the Management 
portfolio (G > 14) is only 59 firms in all years, the number of firms slightly increases 
(from 18 to 21 firms in 1993 to 1998 respectively). This shows that the shareholder 
portfolio has the greatest activity level in terms of number of firms being added. This
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reflects the overall improvement in governance structure (protection of shareholder 
rights) of firms in the mid to late 1990’s. If we examine the number of firms in the 
remaining deciles in each year, we’ll notice that this number does not necessarily increase 
from year to year. The reason is that some firms drop out due to bankruptcy or mergers. 
Finally, in panel D we see that the majority of the S&P 500 firms are concentrated in 
decile G - l l  in years 1993 and 1995 respectively. And are concentrated in decile G =10 
in the year 1998. This reflects the fact that, overall, most of these firms have moderate to 
high agency costs.
Table 16 reports the use of foreign currency derivatives in the S&P 500 firms in 
each year and in the entire sample period. Overall there are 744 hedging firms and 678 
non-hedging firms in the entire sample period. The number of hedgers increases each 
year in the sample; from 199 firms in 1993 (representing 43.4% in 1993) to 303 firms in 
1998 (representing 61.7% in 1998). By examining the mean gross notional value of the 
foreign currency derivative contracts in the sample, we’ll again see an increase in value 
throughout the sample period; from $1747 million in 1993 (14.9%) to $ 7820 million in 
1998 (66.7%). Overall, the results in Table 16 show that not only the number of hedging 
firms increased throughout the sample period, but also the value of foreign currency 
contracts increased considerably, indicating the overall importance that foreign currency 
derivatives gained throughout the 1990’s.
<Insert Table 16 about here>
Table 17 reports the number and distribution of hedging and non-hedging firms in 
the sample based on the G index deciles. In 1993, the highest number of hedging firms
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was found in decile G=11, where as the highest number of non-hedging firms in the same 
year was found in decile G=6. The same trend continues in the following year. In 1995, 
the highest number of hedging firms was found in decile G = ll, where as the highest 
number of non-hedging firms in the same year was found in decile G < 5 (management 
portfolio). Similarly, in 1998 the highest number of hedging firms was found in decile 
G=10 and the highest number of non-hedging firms in the same year was also found in 
decile G < 5. Overall, the results in this table show that hedging firms tend to be in the 
higher deciles of G (higher agency costs, weaker governance structure), while non­
hedging firms tend to be in the lower deciles of G (lower agency costs and stronger 
governance structures).
<Insert Table 17 about here>
Table 18 presents the summary statistics of the valuation measures and some of 
the performance and firm specific measures for the entire sample (panel A) as well as for 
hedging firms (panel B) and non-hedging firms (panel C) in the sample. Tobin’s Q ratio 
and Excess Market value are used as alternative measures of the firm’s value. Tobin’s Q 
is defined as the ratio of the market value of the firm to the replacement cost of assets. 
It’s computed as market value of outstanding shares plus liquidation value of preferred 
stock plus net current assets plus long- term debt divided by total assets of the firm 
(obtained from COMPUSTAT). Excess market value is defined as the market value of 
equity less book value of equity normalized by total sales. The benefit of using Tobin’s Q 
is that it makes comparisons across firms relatively easier than comparison based on 
stock returns or other measures that require an adjustment for risk. The firm’s currency 
hedging profile is proxied by two variables; namely the gross notional value of foreign
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
92
currency derivatives, which is the future cash flow under the contract (obtained for the 
10-K annual reports) and the foreign exchange derivative dummy, which is a dummy 
variable that equals to one if the firm reports any form of currency derivative hedging, 
zero otherwise. The rest of the variables in the table are the control variables used in the 
subsequent regressions25. They include: Total assets of the firms as a proxy for firm size. 
Long-term debt and the ratio of long-term debt to total assets as a proxy for the firm’s 
leverage position. Return on assets, Return on Equity and Earning before income and tax 
(EBIT) as a proxy for the firm’s profitability profile. Dividend payout ratio is used as a 
proxy for the firm’s liquidity position and its ability to access financial markets26. Finally 
the institutional ownership structure of the firm is used a proxy for the degree of 
information asymmetry in the firm between managers and shareholders27.
In panel A, the mean (median) value for Tobin’ Q and Excess Market value in the 
sample are 2.07 (1.49) and 1.83 (0.91), respectively. It is important to note that the mean 
and median values of Tobin’s Q in the overall sample are much higher than that reported 
in Allayannis and Weston (2001), indicating that our firms are high market performers28 
The mean gross notional value of foreign currency derivatives is $ 4266 million. This 
value is greater than those reported by other studies. Allayannis and Weston (2001), and 
Geczy et al. (1997), for example, have reported mean gross notional value of foreign 
currency derivatives of $186 and $200 million, respectively. One possible explanation for 
the difference is that these studies have focused on currency derivative activities during 
the early 1990’s. It could be that as time passed, derivative hedging became more
25 For a detailed definition of each variable see Appendix B
26 See Allaynnis and Weston (2001) for a similar procedure.
27 Allayannis, Lei and Miller (2003), Lei (2004), Tufano (1996), Geczy et al. (1997), Graham and Rogers 
(2002) all used institutional ownership structure to proxy for the degree o f information asymmetry in the 
firm.
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appreciated by firms. Results for the foreign currency derivative dummy variable indicate 
that on average 52% of firms in the sample use foreign currency derivatives. This result is 
generally in line with most usage ratios reported for US based studies (see, for example, 
Allayannis and Weston (2001), but is generally lower than usage ratios reported in non- 
US based firms. For example Bodnar (1999) finds that 78% of German firms use 
currency derivatives.
Mean and (median) value of total assets in the sample is $10609 million ($3630 
million), mean and (median) long-term debt to total assets ratio is 20.36 (18.06). 
Profitability ratios for the entire sample have the following mean (median) values: ROA 
6.82 (6.42), ROE 16.41 (14.01), EBIT 13.80 (12.58) respectively. The firms in the 
sample have a mean and (median) dividend payout ratio of 44.85 (24.70). Finally, the 
mean and (median) institutional ownership of the firm is 25.67 (24.92).
Panel B presents the summary statistics for hedging firms in the sample. Results 
show the following ; with regards to Tobin’s Q and excess market value measures, 
hedging firms have a mean (median) values of 2.27 (1.56) and 2.05 (0.99) respectively. 
This value is higher than the mean and median reported for the entire sample in the 
previous panel, indicating that hedging firms have a higher value than the mean of the 
sample. The mean and (median) notional value of foreign currency derivatives for 
hedging firms is $111719 million ($7772 million).Hedging firms are also larger in size 
as indicated from the mean and (median) values of total assets; $10738 million ( $3750 
million) respectively. Mean and (median) long term debt / assets ratio is also greater for 
hedging firms than for the overall sample; 21.84 (18.42), indicating that hedging firms 
have a greater leverage ratio. This result is consistent with what currency hedging
28 Allayannis and Weston (2001) reported mean (median) Q for their sample o f 1.18 (0.96) respectively.
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literature has documented regarding the relationship between hedging and debt. Debt 
amplifies the volatility of the underlying cash flows hence risk management becomes 
essential to mitigate that risk (see, for example, Graham and Rogers (2002) and Schmid 
(1999)). With regards to profitability ratios, hedging firms generally have lower 
profitability ratios than the overall sample as evident from their ROA, ROE and EBIT 
ratios. Finally, results show that hedging firms in the sample have a high dividend payout 
ratio and low institutional ownership structure than the overall sample. The theoretical 
justification behind these relationships will be discussed in the following section.
Panel C reports the summary statistics for non-hedging firms in the sample. It is 
clear from these results that non-hedgers have a lower Tobin’s Q and Excess market 
value measures than hedging firms. The mean and (median) values for these variables 
are 1.87 (1.45) and 1.57 (0.85), respectively. Mean and (median) total assets for non­
hedgers are $10480 million ($3295 million), indicating the non-hedgers have smaller size 
than non-hedgers. Similarly for their leverage ratio, non-hedgers have lower debt to 
assets ratio than non-hedgers. With regards to profitability ratios, non-hedging firms have 
higher profitability ratios than their hedging counterparts as evident from their ROA, 
ROE and EBIT ratios. Finally, results show that hedging firms in the sample have a lower 
dividend payout ratio and higher institutional ownership structure than hedging firms in 
the sample. Overall, the results from this table show that hedging firms have a higher 
value than non-hedging firms as shown by Tobin’s Q and Excess Market value, they have 
larger sizes, higher debt ratios, lower profitability ratios, higher dividend pay out ratios 
and a lower level of institutional ownership.
<Insert Table 18 about here>
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Table 19 presents summary statistics of the valuation measures, performance and 
firm specific variables in the sample across the deciles of the corporate governance index 
“G”. Regarding the valuation measures, results show that firms in the (shareholder 
portfolio), the lowest decile of “G” (G<5) have higher mean and median values than 
firms in the (Management portfolio) highest decile (G > 14). Mean (median) Tobin’s Q in 
the shareholder portfolio is 2.66 (2.27), while mean (median) Tobin’s Q in the 
Management portfolio is 1.70 (1.30). With respect to Excess market value, the results 
show that mean (median) Excess market value in the shareholder portfolio is 2.14 (1.70), 
while mean (median) Tobin’s Q in the Management portfolio is 1.36 (0.88). This result is 
consistent with that of Gompers’, Ishii and Metrick (2001), who documented that the 
higher the index, indicating higher levels of agency conflicts in the firm, the lower the 
value of Tobin’s Q .
With regards to the notional value of derivatives, the results show that its value is 
highest in decile G= 10 where the mean notional value of derivatives is $13077 million. 
Generally, the notional value of derivatives is higher at the higher values of the G index, 
indicating that the volume of hedging activities is greater at the higher levels of G ( firms 
with weaker governance and higher agency costs).The lowest mean notional value of 
derivatives is in the Shareholder portfolio ($96 million). This result is consistent with the 
results of the previous tables that show that hedging firms are in the highest deciles of G.
<Insert Table 19 about here>
Results for the remaining variables in Table 19 show that firms in the higher 
deciles of G have the following characteristics ; a larger size, a higher leverage position,
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as indicated by the ratio of long-term debt to total assets. Firms in the higher deciles of G 
also have a lower institutional ownership structure, higher dividend payout ratios and 
lower profitability ratios, as indicated by their ROA, ROE, and EBIT ratios. It is clear 
that most of these characteristics are similar to the characteristics of hedging firms in the 
sample, as we documented earlier in Table 18. Therefore the overall results in Table 19 
indicate that the majority of hedging activities take place in firms in the higher deciles of 
the Corporate Governance Index (G).
Table 20 presents the Industry classification code for hedging and non-hedging 
firms in the sample based on the 2-digit SIC code for each year. Panel A presents the 
results for firms in the year 1993, panels B and C present the results in years 1995 and 
1998 respectively. It’s clear from Panel A that more than 21% of foreign currency 
derivative users are in the Chemicals and Allied products industry; SIC code (28). 
Followed by firms in Industrial and Commercial Machinery and Computer equipment; 
sic code (35), where currency hedgers represent 16% of the total number of hedging 
firms. Industries with SIC codes 13, 14, 25, 42, 45, 48, 49, 50, 51, 55, 58, 75, 87 do not 
engage in foreign currency hedging activities. It is important to note, however, that the 
absence of hedging activities in these industries is due to our definition of hedging in the 
sample. Some of the above-mentioned industries relay heavily on commodity hedging 
(SIC codes 13-14) or interest rate hedging (the rest of the industries above), according to 
the sample construction criteria and hedging definition in our sample, any firm that 
reports any type of derivatives other than foreign currency will be included in the non­
hedging sample. Therefore, firms not being included in the hedging sample don’t 
necessarily mean that they are not involved in any hedging or market risk management
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activity. It simply means that these companies do not engage in currency risk 
management activities.
Panel A also shows that the highest number of non-hedging firms is found in the 
Business Services sector (SIC code 73). Almost thirteen percent of non-hedging firms in 
the sample are in SIC code (73). Panel B and Panel C of table 20 also show a similar 
pattern for hedging and non-hedging firms. In panel B results show that in 1995 (22.7%) 
of hedging firms are in SIC code 28 and (13.4%) of non hedging firms are in SIC code 
73. In 1998 (panel C), we again see that the highest number of hedging firms(18%) is in 
the Allied products and Chemicals industry (SIC code 28) and the highest number of non 
hedging firms(13.8%) are in the Business Services industry (SIC code 73).
Moreover, by examining the SIC code classification of firms across the G index 
decdes m each year, results show that the majority of firms in SIC code 28 are in the 
higher deciles of G ( G= 11, 15 and 10 in the years 1993, 1995 and 1998 respectively). 
Similarly, the majority of firms in SIC code73 are in the lower deciles of the G index (G= 
6, 7 and G< 5 in the years 1993, 1995 and 1998 respectively). This is consistent with the 
above results that document that hedging firms are in the highest deciles of the G index, 
while non-hedging firms are generally in the lower deciles of G.
Overall, results in Table 20 are consistent with previous studies that showed that 
the highest levels of hedging firms are in the Chemicals and Allied products, Industrial 
and Commercial Machinery and Computer Equipment and Electronics industries i.e. SIC 
codes 28, 35 and 36, while non-hedging firms are mainly present the Services induatries 
i.e., in SIC codes 70-87 (see for example Allayannis and Weston (2001) and Bodnar et al.
(1999)).
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<Insert Table 20 about here>
3.3.B. Foreign Currency Hedging, Corporate Governance and Agency Costs: Univariate 
Analysis
Table 21 presents the univariate analysis of the mean (median) values of the 
Corporate Governance index across the S&P500 hedging and non hedging firms in each 
year and pooled across the entire sample period. The results show that the mean and 
median G index of hedging firms (G Ih) is consistently and significantly30 higher than the 
G index of non-hedging firms (G Inh) in each year and throughout the entire sample 
period. The results strongly indicate that hedging firms are characterized by having 
higher agency conflicts, and weaker corporate governance structures than their non­
hedging counterparts.
Moreover, results in Table 21 appear to be consistent with Tufano’s (1998) 
hypothesis which predicts that firms with weak corporate governance, as evident by the 
severity of managerial agency conflicts, may be associated with more hedging, since 
corporate insiders benefit fully from hedging, though they bear only a part of the costs 
associated with it. In addition, hedging may insulate managers from the monitoring 
power provided by the external capital markets, which may motivate mangers to engage 
in hedging. Our results provide support to that argument.
<Insert Table 21 about here>
29 See Appendix C.
30 The mean and median difference between GIH - GINH is positive and significant at the 5% level in 1993, 
1995 and 1998 respectively. For the entire sample period it was positive and significant at the 1% level.
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In Table 22 we present the univariate analysis for the performance and firm 
specific variables of hedgers and non-hedgers in the sample in each year based on the G 
index deciles. The univariate analysis shows the significance of mean and median tests 
for these variables between hedging and non-hedging firms in the sample. The 
significance of mean tests, conducted by one-way ANOVA, where as the median tests are 
conducted by the non-parametric Wilcoxon Sum Rank test. In panel A we report the 
univariate analysis for all firms pooled across the deciles of G. Results in panel A show 
that hedging firms are larger in size than non-hedgers. The mean and median difference 
of total assets between hedging firms and non-hedging firms is positive and statistically 
significant in each year in the sample period. It’s important to note that, hedging and firm 
size has been very controversial in the literature. For example, Warner (1977) suggests 
that smaller firms have proportionally higher bankruptcy costs than larger firms. 
Therefore, to the extent that hedging reduces the probability of bankruptcy, it is more 
beneficial for smaller firms to hedge than large firms. Nance, Smith and Smithson’s 
(1993) hypothesis contends that large firms are more likely to hedge because the 
information and transaction costs of hedging exhibit economies of scale which makes it 
easier and cheaper for large firms. As far as the empirical evidence is concerned, Chow, 
Lee and Solf s (1997) work provide evidence on the positive relation between firm size 
and hedging. Allayannis, Brown and Klapper (2001), on the other hand, found weak 
evidence for the negative relationship between firm size and its hedging profile. Our 
results are consistent with those of Chow, Lee and Solt (1997).
<Insert Table 22 about here>
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The mean and median tests for the ratio of long-term debt to assets are negative, 
but not significant in 1993 and are positive and significant in 1995 and 1998 respectively. 
Our univariate results, therefore, support the existing literature on the positive 
relationship between debt and hedging. For example Graham and Rogers (2000) and 
Schmid (1999) found a positive and significant relation between hedging and total debt 
for US firms. Our results support theories (see, for example, Smith and Stulz (1985)) that 
indicate that hedging can reduce the variance of firm value and thereby the expected cost 
of financial distress. Hence hedging firms tend to have a higher debt ratio.
Results in panel A also show that hedging firms have a consistently lower 
institutional ownership structure. The mean and median difference is negative and 
significant in 1998. The median is negative and significant in 1995. The mean and 
median differences in institutional ownership are negative, but not significant otherwise. 
Institutional ownership is used as a proxy for the degree of informational asymmetry in 
the firm. Lower institutional ownership is also a sign of higher agency conflicts and bad 
governance structure in the firm as it reflects a high level of information asymmetry 
between mangers and shareholders (see, for example, Allayannis et al (2003), Lei (2004) 
and Tufano (1996)).
Our results also show that hedging firms have consistently under-performed their 
non-hedging counterparts in terms of Return on Assets (ROA), Return on Equity (ROE) 
and Earning before Interest, and Tax (EBIT) ratios. Mean and median tests are negative 
and statistically significant, through out the period. Results support the prediction of the
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theories of hedging that argue that less profitable firms are more likely to hedge since
•a i
they are more susceptible to financial distress .
Finally, Table 22 shows that hedgers consistently paid higher dividends than non­
hedgers. The mean and median differences in dividend payout ratio between hedging and 
non-hedging firms were positive and statistically significant in 1993, 1995 and 1998 
respectively. This result is in line with Nance, Smith and Smithson’s (1993) predictions, 
which favor a positive relation between hedging and dividend payments. According to 
their theory, a lower dividend payout makes it more likely that funds will be available to 
service the firm’s debt obligations (financing needs) as well as its investment 
requirements, therefore the lower the likelihood a firm will seek hedging and vice versa.
Overall, the results of the univariate analysis show that hedging is associated with 
economies of scale as indicated by the fact that hedging firms are larger in size,. 
Moreover, hedging is undertaken by firms having higher debt capacities, indicating that 
hedging can lower the volatility of the firm’s underlying cash flows, thus enabling the 
firm’s to pay their debt and contractual obligations and avoid costly external finance. In 
addition, results show that hedging is undertaken in firms with lower institutional 
ownership structures, where shareholders monitoring of managers activities is low, thus 
indicating that currency risk management may be driven by managerial risk preferences. 
Finally, results in this table indicate that hedging is undertaken in firms that have lower 
profitability ratios, who are more susceptible to financial distress. As well as in firm who 
pay high dividends as more dividends imply less funds being available to service the 
firm’s debt obligations.
31 Allayannis and Weston (1999) in investigating the impact o f industry structure on currency hedging 
found that most hedging companies in the US are from competitive industries that have a low profitability. 
Hence they hedge more.
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3.3. C. The determinants o f  Foreign Currency Hedging: Multivariate Analysis
To draw inferences on the determinants of currency hedging and whether the 
governance structure and the level of agency impact the hedging decision in the firm, we 
use a logit regression to regress the firm’s hedging profile, proxied by the foreign 
currency derivative dummy (DERVDUM)32 to the G index and some firm specific 
characteristics. The independent variables include the following; the Corporate 
Governance Index (G) as a proxy for the level of agency conflicts and the governance 
structure in the firm and the firm specific and performance variables discussed above.
<Insert Table 23 about here>
Results in table 23 show that the Corporate Governance Index “G” is positively 
and significantly (1% level) related to the likelihood of hedging. This result indicates that 
the higher the G index in the firm, indicating a weak governance structure as well as high 
agency costs in the firm, the more likely that firms will undertake currency hedging. This 
result provides strong support to Tufano’s (1998) hypothesis regarding the rationale for 
hedging in firms with weak governance/high agency conflicts between shareholders and 
managers. Specifically, Tufano (1998) predicts that the severity of managerial agency 
conflicts may be associated with more hedging, since corporate insiders benefit fully 
from hedging, though they bear only a part of the costs associated with it. In addition, 
hedging may also insulate managers from the monitoring power provided by the external 
capital markets, which may motivate mangers to engage in hedging. Therefore, according
32 which is a dummy variable that take the value o f one if  the firm is involved in any type of currency 
hedging , such as forwards, futures or options contracts
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to this hypothesis, firms with high agency conflicts and firms with weaker governance 
structures may be more likely to engage in hedging and vice versa.
As for the remaining firm specific variables in the regression, some variables turned 
out significant and with the same sign as theory predicts, while others were not. For 
example, results confirmed that currency hedging is positively and significantly related to 
firm size, indicating the importance of economies of scale for hedging firms. This result 
is consistent with Chow, Lee and Solf s (1997) and and Nance’s et al (1993) hypothesis 
discussed previously. This result is also consistent to the results of the univariate analysis 
discussed in the previous section.
We find that the coefficient of long-term debt to total assets is positive. However, the 
results show that this variable is not significant, indicating, that hedging is not related to 
debt as a percent of total assets. This variable was positive and significant in the 
univariate analysis in the previous section.
Institutional ownership is found to be negative and significantly related to the 
likelihood of hedging. This result confirms our findings in the univariate analysis. This 
negative relationship could be explained in two ways. First, lower institutional ownership 
structure is an indication of low shareholder’s monitoring. So if managerial hedging 
decisions are based on managerial risk preferences that might go against that of the 
shareholders, then we should expect that the lower the institutional ownership in the firm, 
the higher the hedging activity. Second, low institutional ownership could be interpreted 
as creating a high level of informational asymmetry in the firm between shareholders and 
managers33. Hedging, on the other hand, can reduce the noise associated with
33 Studies have used the level o f institutional ownership in the firm to proxy for the information asymmetry 
between managers and shareholders in the firm. ( see for example Tufano (1996), Geczy et al (1997), 
Graham and Rogers (2002), Lei (2004) and Allayannis et al. (2003)).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
104
performance measures to the extent that it reduces firm’s cash flow volatility (Stulz, 
1996). Therefore hedging can reduce the degree of informational asymmetry among 
managers, shareholders, and the labor market. This implies that managers with superior 
skills may engage in hedging to better communicate their skills to the labor market (see 
Breeden and Viswanathan, (1998)). Therefore, as the degree of information asymmetry 
in the firm becomes high, the desire of “good-performing” managers to convey their 
superior skills to the market by aggressively hedging currency risk exposure becomes. It 
is important to note that since the valuation effect of hedging is not knows at this point, 
then the negative relationship between hedging and institutional ownership could be 
interpreted as either the first or the second view
With regards to the firm’s profitability level and the likelihood of hedging, results in 
Table 23 confirm what we saw earlier in the univariate analysis. The firm’s profitability, 
as proxied by the firm’s EBIT ratio and ROA ratio is negatively and significantly related 
to its use of currency derivatives. The firm’s ROE ratio, however, is not significant. 
Overall results support the hypothesis that less profitable firms are more likely to hedge 
since they are more susceptible to financial distress.
Finally, the results show that dividend variable does not have a significant 
explanatory power in the decision to hedge. The coefficient of the dividend pay out ratio 
(DIVP) is negative and insignificant. This result is opposite to our result in the univariate 
analysis. A negative relationship between dividends and hedging is, however, consistent 
with Haushalter’s (2000) predictions. Low dividend payments may imply that the firm is 
capitally constrained. If hedging is used as a tool to minimize the volatility and the 
unpredictability of the underlying cash flows, then it is expected that hedging will be
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more prominent in firms that are capitally constrained. The negative relationship in our 
result is consistent with this prediction. However, the variable is not significant.
Overall results in this table show the following; currency hedging is undertaken by 
firms with weak governance structures and high agency conflicts between managers and 
shareholders. They are also prominent in firms with high informational asymmetry and 
low managerial monitoring as indicated by the low institutional holding ratio. These 
firms are also shown to be more financially constrained, as indicated by their low 
dividend payout ratio. Finally, these firms are also shown to have a lower profitability 
ratios, larger sizes and greater debt ratios.
3.3. D. Firm Value, Corporate Governance and Foreign Currency Hedging Strategies: 
Univariate Analysis
So far the results, particularly those that revealed the relationship between 
currency hedging and the G index, on one hand and the results between currency hedging 
and the level of institutional ownership holding, on the other hand, seem to strongly 
suggest that hedging is pursued to satisfy the risk preferences of managers as agued by 
Tufano (1998). It is important to note, however, that risk management driven by 
managerial risk preferences might not necessarily go against the wealth and value of the 
shareholders. In other words, in order to be able to either fully support or refute Tufano’s 
(1998) predictions regarding managerially motivated risk management strategies, the 
valuation effects of hedging in presence of agency conflicts between managers and 
shareholders have to be ultimately examined.
Table 24 presents the results of the valuation effect of hedging in the presence of 
agency conflicts, between shareholders and managers of the firm, in a univariate setting.
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The mean and median difference in firm value between hedgers and non-hedgers is 
examined in each year and through out the sample period. Firm valuation is captured 
using two variables namely; Tobin’s Q and Excess Market value measures. Panel A 
reports the results for all firms pooled across the G index deciles. Overall results in panel 
A show that hedging firms were rewarded with higher market valuation in each year and 
throughout the entire sample period. The mean and median difference is positive using 
both Tobin’s Q and Excess market value measures. The mean and median differences 
(the hedging premia) are positive and significant in 1998, and for the overall sample 
period using the two valuation measures. The median difference is significant and 
positive only in 1995 using both measures of valuation. In 1993, however, the hedging 
premium is positive, but not significant using both measures of value. This last result 
could be attributed to the fact that currency hedging became more important in the mid to 
late 1990’s, when the world financial markets were rattled with currency crises and the 
benefits of currency hedging was shown and more emphasized in the finance literature.34 
Overall, results in panel A show that hedging is a value increasing strategy for the firm, 
thus supporting results reported in earlier studies that document the positive effects of 
hedging on firm and shareholder value (see, for example, Allayannis and Weston (2001), 
Allayannis et al. (2003), Lei (2004), Hagelin et al. (2004)).
<Insert Table 24 about here>
Panel B reports the univariate results of the valuation effects of hedging in the 
Shareholder Portfolio. Results show that, overall, hedging adds value to well-governed
34 Allayannis and Weston (2001) also documented a hedging premium for their sample that was only
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firms that are suffering from the least levels of agency conflicts. The mean and median 
difference in Tobin’s Q between hedgers and non-hedgers is positive and significant only 
in the overall sample period. The hedging premium is positive, but not significant in 
1995 and 1998. Moreover, in 1993 results document a hedging discount that is not 
significant. By using Excess market value as a measure of value, the results document a 
hedging premium in 1995, 1998 and in the overall sample period, that is not significant. 
In the year 1993, a hedging discount that is not significant is again documented. Overall, 
results for the Shareholder Portfolio are surprising, as they don’t quite fit the predictions
• T S • • •of existing literature . At best we can say that our univariate analysis shows a weak 
support to the positive valuation effects of currency hedging on well-governed firms.
Finally in panel C we report the results of the univariate analysis for the 
Management Portfolio. By using both measures of valuation, results document the 
presence of a positive hedging premium that is highly significant in each year and for the 
overall sample period. This result contradicts Tufano’s (1998) hypothesis. Despite the 
fact that hedging strategies appear to be more prominent in the higher deciles of the G 
index these activities are not value destroying to the firms and to the shareholders. 
Overall this result documents that not all forms of managerially motivated hedging is 
value destroying to the firm.
significant after 1993.
35 See our discussion on “The two faces of corporate governance” in the literature review section of the 
essay.
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3.3. E. Firm Value, Corporate Governance and Foreign Currency Hedging Strategies: 
Multivariate Analysis
In this section we test the relation between currency hedging and firm value,
proxied by Tobin’s Q ratio and Excess market value, in a multivariate framework. To be
able to document a relationship between hedging, firm value in presence of agency 
conflicts, we need as before, to control for the effects of other possible variables on 
Tobin’s Q and Excess market value. Most of the control variables are those that are 
discussed earlier. In panels A1-A3 of Table 25, the following OLS regression is 
performed.
Qi = Pq +Px DERVi + p 2DERVDUMi + p 3 Log(TA) +(34 LDEBTAj + p 5 INSTIT, 
+ |36EBITi + (% ROAj + (% ROEj + DIVP + E 4
For i = 1, N, where N is the number of firm year observation.
Panel Al reports the results for the overall sample of firms pooled across the G 
index deciles. Results show that the coefficient of the foreign exchange derivative 
dummy (DERVDUM) is positive and significant in all regressions. The average hedging 
premium36 using Tobin’s Q is 0.192, which represents 9.2% of firm value. The 
coefficient of the continuous variable of hedging (DERV) is also positive in all
36 The average hedging premium is the average o f the coefficient of the derivative dummy in all three 
regressions. ( see table 11, panel A l).
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regressions, but not significant. Overall, results using Tobin’s Q support the hypothesis 
that currency hedging increases firm value.
For the rest of the control variables, some turned out significant with the expected 
signs, while others non significant. For example, the coefficient of the log of total assets 
of the firms, which proxies for firm size is negative and significant at the 5% level in all 
regressions. This result is in line with Allayannis and Weston (2001) and Pramborg 
(2003) who found differences in Tobin’s Q for large firms as compared to small firms, 
where large firms were associated with a lower Tobin’s Q.
With regards to the ratio of long term debt to assets, results show this variable to 
be insignificant. The sign on the variable is also mixed. It is negative in 4 regressions and 
positive in the other 2. Theory predicts that firms with higher levels of debt have higher 
Q and market values. The reason is because debt acts as a monitoring mechanism for 
managers (Jensen, 1986). Allaynnis and Weston (2001) found a positive and significant 
relationship between debt and firm value. Pramborg (2003), Hagelin et. al. (2004), on the 
other hand, found a negative relationship between debt and firm value that was not 
significant. Our results seem to support that of Pramborg’s (2003).
Regarding the institutional ownership structure of the firm, results show that a 
negative and statistically significant relationship exists between institutional ownership 
and firm value. This result is puzzling and contradicts what theory predicts. Specifically, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that large shareholders, such as institutions, have a 
stronger financial incentive to monitor management, while Coffee (1991) and Gillan and 
Starks (2000) add that institutional investors have greater incentives to monitor since they 
cannot always sell the shares of underperforming firms due to potential adverse price 
effects, as well as due to indexing. McConnel and Servaes (1990) find empirical evidence
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of a significant positive relationship between Q and the fraction of shares owned by 
institutional investors and Smith (1996) finds an increase in shareholder wealth when 
financial institutions include a firm in their watch list. Finally, recently, Hartzell and 
Starks (2003) find that institutional ownership is positively related to the pay-for- 
performance sensitivity of executive compensation and negatively related to the level of 
compensation suggesting that institutions mitigate agency costs through effective 
monitoring.
With the regards to the remaining control variables, results show the following; 
the coefficient of ROA and EBIT are both positive and significant, indicating that the 
higher the profitability of the firm, the higher its value. This result is consistent with the 
predictions of theory and other studies (see for example Allayannis and Weston (2001)). 
Finally, our results show that Dividend pay out ratio is negative, but insignificant. This 
result is in line with the predictions of Lang and Stulz (1994) and Servaes (1996) who 
argue that if a firm paid dividends, then it’s less likely to be capital constrained. Thus the 
firm does not need the external capital markets, which basically allows it to engage in any 
kind of investments under the discretion of the management. Hence the less capital 
constrained a firm is, the more likely it can undertake negative NPV projects and hence 
destroy its value. Therefore, our results support the theory that dividend payout is 
negatively related to firm value.
In panel A2, we present the valuation effect (using Tobin’s Q) of currency 
hedging in the shareholder portfolio. Results show that the coefficient of the notional 
value of derivative is positive. The average hedging premium 0.39937 is positive and 
significant at the 5% level in all regressions. The derivative dummy, however, is
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
I l l
negative, but not significant. Overall, results show that hedging is a value increasing 
strategy for firms in the lower deciles of the G index (i.e. lowest agency conflicts and 
better governance structure).
Results for the rest of the control variables are the same as above with the 
exception of institutional ownership and dividend pay out ratio. Institutional ownership 
(INSTIT) is found to be positive and significantly related to firm value in 2 regressions, 
consistent with the predictions of Shleifer and Vishny (1997) (see our discussion above). 
Moreover Dividend pay out (DIVP) is positive and significant in 2 regressions, thus 
consistent with the predictions of Fama and French (1998), who inferred from their 
empirical results that dividends signal information about future profitability (expected net 
cash flows), where high dividend payouts may act as a signal that a firm’s cash flows and 
profitability are high. Hence, this signaling per se could increase firm value. It seems that 
results for the Shareholder Portfolio support the “Dividend Signaling Hypothesis”.
<Insert Table 25 about here>
Panel A3 reports the valuation effect (using Tobin’s Q) for firms in the 
Management portfolio. Results document that hedging firms outperformed their non­
hedging counterparts and that the average hedging premium 0.90938 of the derivative 
dummy is positive and significant at the (5% level). By using the continuous variable of 
derivatives (DERV), a hedging premium is still documented, but not significant in any 
regression specification. The rest of the control variables were found to have the same
37 The average hedging premium is the average coefficient of the continuous value of the derivative 
variable used in all three regressions ( see table 11, panel A2)
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pattern as explained in Panel Al. Overall, results in Panel A3 are consistent with the 
earlier results of the univariate analysis, we find that hedging is not a value destroying 
strategy for firms in the highest deciles of the G index, which are characterized by having 
the weakest governance structure and have the highest level of agency conflicts. Again 
this result contradicts the potential value destroying effect of hedging in the presence of 
agency conflicts, as outlined by Tufano (1998).
In panels B1-B3 of Table 25 we present the valuation effect of currency hedging 
in the presence of agency conflicts using Excess Market value as an alternative valuation 
method. The following regression is conducted;
EXM KTj =  p 0 + p! D ERV i + p2DERVD UM , + p 3 L o g (T A )+ p 4 LDEBTAj + p 5INSTITj 
+ p 6EBITj + p 7 R O A i+p8 ROE; + p 9 DIVP + E i
For i = 1, N, where N is the number of firm year observation.
Panel B1 reports the results for the overall sample of firms pooled across the G index 
deciles. Using Excess Market valuation measure, the average hedging premium39 for 
derivative dummy (DERVDUM) is 0.260 and for the continuous value of derivatives 
(DERV) is 0.102 which represent 14.2% and 5.5% of firm value respectively. Results 
indicate that, overall, currency hedging is a value increasing strategy for the firm. It is 
important to note that using Excess market valuation as a measure of value, stronger
38 The average hedging premium is the average coefficient o f the derivative dummy in all three regressions 
(see table 11, panel A3).
39 The average hedging premium is the average o f the coefficient o f the derivative dummy (and the average 
coefficient o f the continuous value o f the derivative variable) in all three regressions. ( see table 11, panel 
Bl)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
113
support is given to the positive valuation theory of hedging since both the derivative 
dummy as well as the continuous value of the derivative variable are positive and 
significant. The rest of the control variables display the same pattern as panel Al.
Panel B2 reports the results of the valuation effect in the Shareholder Portfolio. 
Results document the presence of a hedging premium using both the derivative dummy 
and the continuous value of derivative, however both are not significant. So weak support 
is provided for the positive value effect of hedging in the Shareholder Portfolio when we 
use Excess Market Value, as an alternative valuation measure.
Finally, results in Panel B3 confirm the positive valuation effect of hedging in the 
Management Portfolio. The average hedging premium 0.705 for the derivative dummy is 
also positive and significant at the (5 %level). The coefficient of the notional value of 
derivatives (the continuous derivative variable) is also positive, but not significant.
Overall results from table 25 did not support Tufano’s (1998) predictions regarding 
the potential value decreasing effect of currency risk management in firms suffering from 
high levels of agency conflicts. Overall our results are more in line with the body of 
finance literature that suggest that the realization of managerial risk preferences may not 
always lead to a lower shareholder and firm value. The realization of the mangers’ risk 
preferences aims eventually at the reduction of corporate risk in order to avoid 
bankruptcy. Therefore, this leads to a hedging strategy that increases shareholder value.40
Our results also provide some support to the hedging theories that link corporate 
hedging policies to managerial career and reputation concerns. Hedging can reduce the
40 Bartram (2000) makes a similar argument; “while corporate mangers may be risk averse due to their 
undiversified personal wealth position, they cannot sell the stock o f their firm short in order to reduce the 
riskiness o f their private portfolio. As a result they not only have a special interest in the ongoing existence 
of the firm, but also have an incentive to reduce their personal exposure by means o f corporate hedging.”
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noise associated with performance measures to the extent that it reduces firm’s cash flow 
volatility (Stulz, 1996). Therefore hedging can reduce the degree of informational 
asymmetry among managers, shareholders, and the labor market. This implies that 
managers with superior skills may engage in hedging to better communicate their skills to 
the labor market (see Breeden and Viswanathan, (1998)). Therefore, the higher the 
degree of information asymmetry41 in the firms; the higher the desire of “good- 
performing” managers to convey their superior skills to the market by aggressively 
hedging currency risk exposure in a way that adds value to the firm and to the 
shareholders. This explains why hedging firms in the Management Portfolio (the weakest 
corporate governance structure, highest level of agency and with the highest level of 
asymmetric information between managers and shareholders) were rewarded with higher 
valuation than non hedging firms and their hedging premium was even higher than the 
hedging premium for firms in the Shareholder Portfolio (strongest corporate governance 
provisions, lowest agency costs and lowest degree of asymmetric information between 
mangers and shareholders).
Finally, our results support the recent international literature regarding the role of 
corporate governance and agency costs on the firm’s hedging decisions that was 
documented in foreign firms. Specifically, our results support Allayannis’, Lei’s and 
Miller’s (2003) study, which documents that hedging is valuable even when internal 
(firm specific) corporate governance is weak, if the firm happens to reside in a country 
with good external governance ( English legal origin). And that is true for the firms in our
41 Studies have used the level o f institutional ownership in the firm and whether the largest block holder is 
an outsider or an insider to proxy for the information asymmetry between managers and shareholders in the 
firm. ( see for example Tufano (1996), Geczy et al (1997), Graham and Rogers (2002), Lei (2004) and 
Allayannis et al. (2003)).
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sample. The US enjoys a large and stable financial market with overall strong governance 
provisions compared to many other countries and that could explain the positive 
valuation effect for firms in the Management Portfolio.
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3.3.4. Summary of Results
This essay provides new evidence on the potential effects of corporate governance 
structure on the firm’s currency hedging activities. Specifically, in this essay we 
investigate the relationship between currency risk management activities, firm value and 
the agency-related costs arising from the separation of ownership and control using an 
innovative methodology, which proxies for the level of agency conflict in the firm. The 
degree of agency conflicts in the firm is proxied by the Corporate Governance Index or 
the “G” index.
By using a sample of 1422 firm year observations from the S&P 500 during the 
years 1993,1995, and 1998 respectively, results show that currency hedging firms tend to 
be in the higher deciles of the G index (high agency costs, weak governance structure). 
Where as non-hedging firms tend to be in the lower deciles of G (low agency costs, 
strong governance structure). With regards to currency hedging, corporate governance 
and firm value, the overall results document that hedging firms in our sample consistently 
showed a significantly higher value than their non-hedging counterparts using both 
Tobin’s Q and Excess Market value as two alternative firm valuation measures. The 
average hedging premium using Tobin’s Q is 0.192, which represents 9.2% of firm value. 
Using Excess Market valuation measure, the average hedging premium for the notional 
value of derivatives is 0.260 and for the derivative dummy 0.102 which represents 14.2) 
and 5.5% of firm value respectively. Results indicate that, overall, currency hedging is a 
value increasing strategy for the firm.
By examining the valuation effect of hedging on the two extreme deciles of G, results 
show the following; for firms that suffer from very weak governance structures and are
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accordingly plagued by the severest levels of agency conflicts (Management Portfolio), 
hedging is not a value destroying strategy. Using Tobin’s Q as a measure of value, results 
show that hedging firms still outperformed their non-hedging counterparts and that the 
average hedging premium 0.909 is positive and significant at the (5% level). By using 
Excess Market value as another measure of valuation (for robustness checks), the average 
hedging premium 0.705 is also positive and significant at the (5 %level).
Firms which have the strongest governance structures and the lowest degrees of 
agency conflicts (Shareholder portfolio) have also showed a positive hedging premium. 
The average hedging premium 0.399 is, however, smaller than that in the Management 
Portfolio and is only significant at the (5% level) when using Tobin’s Q as a valuation 
measure, but not significant using Excess Market value
Overall, the results in this essay did not support Tufano’s (1998) predictions 
regarding the potential value decreasing effect of currency risk management in firms 
suffering from high levels of agency conflicts. Overall, our results are more in line with 
the body of finance literature that suggest that the realization of managerial risk 
preferences may not always lead to a lower shareholder and firm value because mangers 
still have an interest in the existence of the firm and want to prevent it form going 
bankrupt. Our results also provide some support to hedging theories that link corporate 
hedging policies to managerial career and reputation concerns.
Finally, our results support the recent international literature regarding the role of 
corporate governance and agency costs on firm’s hedging decisions, which documents 
that hedging is valuable even when firm-specific corporate governance is weak, if the 
firm happens to reside in a country with good external governance. Our results are 
consistent with these findings. Because the US enjoys a large and stable financial market
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with overall strong governance provisions compared to many other countries, positive 
valuation effects from currency hedging is still documented even for firms suffering from 
weaker governance provisions and higher levels of agency conflicts between mangers 
and shareholders.
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4. CONCLUSION
In recent years, despite controversial arguments in the finance literature regarding 
the irrelevance of risk management activities, a growing number of corporations have 
committed considerable resources to risk management, indicating the potential for risk 
management to protect and increase firm value. One can argue that most prior attempts to 
directly link the value of the firm to its hedging profile is limited. Moreover, several 
questions with regards to firms’ risk management activities remain unanswered. In this 
study, we presented two essays on currency risk management activities in US non- 
financial, multinational corporations in an attempt to investigate some of the puzzling 
issues in the hedging literature.
In the first essay we first, examined the valuation effects of currency hedging 
policies of firms around extraordinary exchange rate instability events. The exchange rate 
shocks of the Asian Currency crisis of 1997 and the Brazilian Real Devaluation of 1999 
were used as the exchange rate instability events. Financial theory suggests that hedging 
exchange rate risk through currency derivatives can increase or at least protect firm value 
by reducing the chance of financial distress. Moreover, the financial and currency crises 
of the 1990’s, although severe in magnitude, were relatively short in duration hence they 
provided us with a pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis evaluation of firm value. Second, in 
the first essay we also investigated the effectiveness of natural and financial hedges on 
firm value and the relationship between the two hedging techniques during periods o f  
exchange rate instability.
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By using a large cross section of non- financial firms from the S&P500 that had 
positive foreign sales total sales ratio and that had operations in the Asian and Latin 
American regions around the time of the crises, the results document the presence of a 
hedging premium. By using Tobin’s Q and excess market value as alternative measures 
of value and by controlling for the effect of other variables that may impact firm value, 
such as size, geographic and industrial diversification, firm’s leverage position, firm’s 
profitability and it’s liquidity and ability to access financial markets, the results 
document a hedging premium. In firms with Asian exposure, results document that users 
of currency derivatives were shown to have a higher Q by 0.385 than non users. This 
premium is significant and represents 16.62% of firm value. Similarly, using Excess 
Market Value as an alternative valuation measure, the overall hedging premium is 0.538 
and it represents 26.5% of firm value for hedging firms through out the entire crisis 
period (1996-1998).
Moreover, in firms with Brazilian exposure, using Tobin’s Q as a measure of 
value, the overall hedging premium 0.241 was found to be significant and represented 
8.89 % of firm value. In addition, by using Excess Market value, the overall hedging 
premium 0.078 was also significant and represented 2.95% of firm value for the entire 
sample period (1998-2000).
Our results thus indicate that firms, which hedged their foreign exchange exposures 
using foreign currency derivatives, were rewarded by the market at times of exchange 
rate turbulence. This result is robust for both crises and regardless o f  the measure o f  
valuation used. Moreover, results for the Asian sample are generally consistent with 
previous research that showed that the effect of the Asian crisis on US firms had been
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benign and that the growth enhancing consequences of the crisis for the United States -  
primarily lower interest rates and commodity and input prices-were simply more 
powerful than the growth reducing factors which included reduced demand for US 
exports, financial and revenue disturbances suffered by lenders, investors, and firms that 
have operated in the region during the crisis.
Regarding the effectiveness of natural and financial hedging on firm value and the 
relationship between the two hedging techniques, our results showed that firms that 
hedged their currency exposure using both financial and non-financial hedging 
techniques were rewarded by a positive market valuation at the time of currency 
devaluations and exchange rate shocks. This result is robust for both crises and regardless 
of the valuation measure used. It is important to note, however, that when we proxied for 
non-financial hedging techniques by the total number of countries the firm operates in 
rather than relaying on foreign sales/total sales ratio as a proxy for the same variable, the 
coefficient of the interactive variable between financial hedging and natural hedging 
(DERVDUM * GEO2) became more significant and more pronounced, indicating that 
both types of hedging strategies increase firm value. Overall, results of this investigation 
support theories that suggest that currency derivative hedging and geographic 
diversification are complementary tools of currency risk management.
In the second essay, we investigated the relationship between currency risk 
management activities, firm value and the agency-related costs arising from the 
separation of ownership and control. Specifically, we conducted tests to assess the 
damaging effects of corporate hedging motivated by managerial risk preferences as 
outlined by Tufano (1998). The degree of agency costs in the firm was proxied by the
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Corporate Governance Index (G). The G index is an innovative methodology that proxies 
for the balance of power between managers and shareholders in the firm, thus it proxies 
for the level of agency costs in the firm.
By using a sample of 1422 firm year observations from the S&P 500 during the 
years 1993, 1995, and 1998 respectively, results showed that currency hedging firms tend 
to be in the higher deciles of the G index (i.e. in firms with high agency costs and weak 
governance structures). This result generally supports the managerial risk preference 
hypothesis. However when the valuation effect of hedging was investigated in the 
“Management Portfolio” of the Corporate Governance Index (i.e. the portfolio containing 
the firms suffering from the weakest shareholder rights, the highest levels of agency costs 
and the weakest governance structures), interestingly, hedging was not value decreasing.
This result does not provide support to Tufano’s (1998) predictions regarding the 
damaging effects of managerially motivated hedging on firm value. Our results, on the 
other hand are in line with the body of the finance literature suggesting that the 
realization of managerial risk preferences may not always lead to a lower shareholder and 
firm value because mangers still have an interest in the existence of the firm and want to 
prevent it from going bankrupt.
Finally, our results support the recent international literature regarding the role of 
corporate governance and agency costs on firm’s hedging decisions, which documents 
that hedging is valuable even when firm-specific corporate governance is weak, if the 
firm happens to reside in a country with good external governance.
The overall results of this study can be summarized as follows; Currency risk 
management is a value increasing strategy for the firm. It is particularly an important tool
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in protecting and shielding firm value at times of exchange rate upheavals and severe 
currency devaluation events. Furthermore, currency risk hedging in the presence of 
natural hedging techniques (geographic diversification) results in a positive value 
premium for the firm, indicating that both types of hedging strategies work together as 
complements to enhance firm value at times of exchange rate shocks. Finally, our results 
show that currency risk management strategies are more common in firms that enjoy high 
managerial provisions and greater power to managers over shareholders i.e. in firms with 
weak corporate governance structures and high agency costs, indicating that currency risk 
management is driven by managerial risk preferences. However, our results show that 
this managerially motivated hedging is not necessarily damaging (value decreasing) to 
the firm. Our results show that hedging firms in the above category still outperformed 
their non-hedging counterparts and that the average hedging premium is positive and 
significant.
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Table 1
Number and Percentages of US firms using Foreign Exchange Currency Derivatives and the Type of
Instrument Used: Asian Currency Crisis sample
The table presents the number and percentages o f foreign Exchange Derivative use for a sample o f 627 US. 
Non-Financial firms around the East Asian Financial crisis (1996-1998) Panel(A). The sample excludes 
firms with: Foreign Sales/Total Sales Ratio equal to zero. Firms with size less than $10 million. Firms that 
do not have operations (subsidiaries and /or Foreign Sales) in any o f the East Asian countries. Financial 
Firms in Finance, Insurance and Real Estate (2-Digit sic codes from 60-67) are also excluded from the 
sample. “Hedging” firms are defined as firms that have data on any type o f Foreign Exchange Currency 
Derivatives (Forwards, Options, swaps) available in the firm’s 10-K Annual Reports from 1996-1998. 
“Non-Hedging” firms are defined as firms that do not report any type o f currency hedging activity in their 
annual reports. Firms that report other types of hedging activity (Commodity and/or Interest Rate hedging) 
are also included in the “Non-Hedging” sample. Foreign Currency Hedging data is obtained from the 
Firms’ 10-K annual Reports via the Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis and Retrieval database “EDGAR” 
and/or Annual Report Gallery. Mean Notional value o f foreign currency derivatives is the average contract 
amount o f any foreign currency forward, futures, swap or option made by the firm during the year, it 
represents the future cash flows under the contract. It is expressed in millions o f dollars Foreign operations 
data is obtained from the Directory o f  American Firms Operating Abroad. All other variables are obtained 
from the COMPUSTAT database. Panel (B) shows the total number and percentages o f the type o f foreign 
currency derivative instrument used by the hedging firms in the sample
Panel A
Foreign currency hedging profile for the S&P500 Firms
Year #HedgingFirms %
# Non- 
Hedging 
firms
% Total % Mean Notional Value(millions) %
1996 112 53.6 97 46.4 209 100 $3998 26.0
1997 125 60.0 84 40 209 100 $5512 35.6
1998 133 63.6 76 36.4 209 100 $5938 38.4
All
Years
370 59.0 257 41 627 100 15448 100
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Table 1 (continued)
Panel B
Type of Foreign Currency Derivative Instruments used by Hedging firms
Year ForwardContracts %
Options
contracts %
Swap
contracts % Total Users %
1996 77 68.75 30 26.79 5 4.46 112 100
1997 90 72 31 24.8 4 3.2 125 100
1998 98 73.68 32 24.06 3 2.25 133 100
All 265 71.62 91 25.20 12 3.30 370 100
Years
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Table 2
Industry Classification of US. Foreign Currency Hedging and Non-Hedging Firms Based on the 2 
Digits SIC Classification. -  Asian currency crisis sample
The table presents the industry classification o f 627 Non Financial US. Firms based on the 2-digit industry 
classification codes for the period from 1996-1998. The sample excludes firms with: Foreign Sales/Total 
Sales Ratio equal to zero. Firms with size less than $10 million. Firms that do not have operations 
(subsidiaries and /or Foreign Sales) in any o f the East Asian countries. Financial Firms in Finance, 
Insurance and Real Estate (2-Digit sic codes from 60-67) are also excluded from the sample. “Hedging” 
firms are defined as firms that have data on any type of Foreign Exchange Currency Derivatives (Forwards, 
Options, swaps) available in the firm’s 10-K Annual Reports from 1996-1998. “Non-Hedging” firms are 
defined as firms that do not report any type of currency hedging activity in their annual reports. Firms that 
report other types o f hedging activity (Commodity and/or Interest Rate hedging) are included in the “Non- 
Hedgers” sample. Foreign Currency Hedging data is obtained from the Firms’ 10-K annual Reports via the 
Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis and Retrieval database “EDGAR” and/or Annual Report Gallery. All 
other variables are obtained from the COMPUSTAT database.
2 Digit 
SIC 
Code
Title & Description of Industry # of Hedging firms
# of Non- 
Hedging 
firms
10 Metal Mining - 2
12 Coal Mining - 3
13 Oil and Gas Extraction - 10
14 Mining and Quarrying Nonmtl Minerals (Except Fuels) 8 -
17 Construction-Special Trade Contractors - 2
20 Food and Kindered Products 16 2
22 Textile Mill Products 8 -
23 Apparel and Other Finished Products 6 2
24 Lumber and Wood Products, Except Furniture 7 3
25 Furniture and Fixtures - 2
26 Paper and Allied Products 11 4
27 Printing, Publishing and Allied Industries - 5
28 Chemicals and Allied Products 77 10
29 Petroleum Refining and Related Industries 8 -
30 Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastic Products 15 2
32 Stone, Clay, Glass and Concrete Products 8
33 Primary Metal Products 8 5
34 Fabricated Metal Products. Except Machinery and 
Transportation Equipment
9 10
35 Industrial and Commercial Machinery and Computer 
Equipment
40 17
36 Electronics and Other Electronic Equipment 34 35
37 Transportation Equipment 10 11
38 Measuring, Analyzing and Controlling Instruments 29 20
39 Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries 18 3
42 Motor Freight Transportation, Warehousing - 3
45 Air Transportation - 3
47 Transportation Services 8 3
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2 Digit 
SIC 
Code
Title & Description of Industry # of Hedging firms
# of Non- 
Hedging 
firms
48 Communications 8 2
49 Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services - 3
50 Whole Sale Trade- Durable Goods 13 11
51 Whole Sale Trade -  Non Durable Goods - 6
55 Automotive Dealers, Gas Service Stations - 3
58 Eating and Drinking Places - 3
59 Miscellaneous Retail 6 3
73. Business Services 15 51
75 Automotive Repair Services and Parking - 3
78 Motion Pictures - 3
79 Amusement and Recreation Services - 3
80 Health Services - 3
87 Engineering, Accounting and Research Services 
Total
8
370
6
257
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Table 3
Summary Statistics for US. Foreign Currency Hedging and Non-Hedging firms (Asian sample)
The table presents the summary statistics of firms in the S&P 500 that “used” or “have not used” foreign currency derivatives to hedge 
their exposure to currency risk around the East Asian Financial crisis in the period from 1996-1998. The sample consists of 627 firm 
year observations on Non Financial firms that have data available on their foreign currency hedging activity in their 10-K. annual 
reports. The sample does not cover firms that have foreign sales to total sales ratio equal zero. Firms with size less than $10 million. 
Firms that do not have operations (subsidiaries and /or Foreign Sales) in any of the East Asian countries. Financial Firms in Finance, 
Insurance and Real Estate (2-Digit sic codes from 60-67) are also excluded from the sample. Excess market value is defined as the 
market value of equity less book value of equity normalized by total sales. Tobin’s Q is computed as market value of outstanding 
shares plus liquidation value of preferred stock plus net current assets plus long term debt divided by total assets of the firm. Notional 
value of foreign currency derivatives is the contract amount of any foreign currency forward, futures, swap or option made by the 
firm, it represents the future cash flows under the contract. Foreign exchange derivative dummy is a dummy variable that takes the 
value of 1 if  the firm hedges its foreign currency exposure and equal zero otherwise. Return on assets (ROA %) is defined as the 
income before depreciation and other extraordinary items divided by total assets. Return on Equity (ROE%) is defined as Income 
before depreciation and other extraordinary items divided by common Equity. EBIT margin is defined as operating income after 
depreciation less cost of goods sold, Selling, General & administrative expenses divided by net sales. LDebt/Assets ratio is defined as 
the percentage o f long- term debt divided by total assets. Ldebt is the firm’s long term debt. Dividend pay out is defined as the 
percentage of the total amount of dividends declared on the common stock divided by income before extraordinary items and 
discounted operations less preferred dividend requirements. Dividend dummy is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if  the firm 
has paid dividend at end of the year .and zero otherwise. Foreign Sales /Total sales is the percentage of the sum of all geographic 
segments (all foreign segments) of the firm divided by net sales. Total Assets is defined as current assets plus net property, plant and 
equipment plus other non current assets of the firm in millions of dollars. Diversification dummy is a dummy variable that takes the 
value of 1 if  the firm is active in more than one business segment and zero otherwise
Variables No. Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev.
Excess Market Values
627 2.03 1.09 2.543
Tobin’s Q
624 2.31 1.62 2.049
Notional Values of Foreign Currency Derivatives 
(millions $)
627 15548 46.3 27029
Foreign Exchange Derivative Dummy 627 0.59 1 0.49
Return on Assets 672 7.41 6.72 8.13
Return on Equity 623 17.23 16.61 25.48
EBIT
625 14.45 13.13 15.28
Ldebt/Toal Assets ratio 626 21.87 18.91 17.29
Ldebt 625 333162 82949.5 1317956
Dividend Dummy 619 0.756 1 0.600
Divided Pay out 612 28.96 23.89 70.87
Foreign Sales / Total Sales% 627 33.85 32.82 21.63
Total Assets 
( millions $)
Industrial Diversification Dummy
627
614
2349.5
0.62
357.69
1
5334.52
0.46
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Table 4
________________Pre-Crisis, Crisis and Post -Crisis Univariate Analysis of Hedging and Non-Hedging Firms (Asian sample)________________
The table presents mean [median] values of some performance and firm-specific variables for our sample of foreign exchange currency hedging and 
non-hedging firms before, during and after the Asian crisis, 1996-1998. The sample consists of 627 Non Financial firms that have data available on their 
foreign currency hedging activity in their 10-K annual reports. The sample does not cover firms that have foreign sales to total sales ratio equal zero. 
Firms with size less than $ 10 million. Firms that do not have operations (subsidiaries and /or Foreign Sales) in any of the East Asian countries. Financial 
Firms in Finance, Insurance and Real Estate (2-Digit sic codes from 60-67) are also excluded from the sample. “Hedging” firms are defined as firms that 
have data on any type of Foreign Exchange Currency Derivatives (Forwards, Options, swaps) available in the firm’s 10-K Annual Reports from 1996- 
1998. “Non-Hedging” firms are defined as firms that do not report any type of currency hedging activity in their annual reports. Firms that report other 
types of hedging activity (Commodity and/or Interest Rate hedging) are included in the “Non-Hedging” sample. Performance and firm-specific 
variables are defined, as before, in the previous table. The significance of means difference between foreign currency hedgers and non-hedgers is 
computed by one-way ANOVA. Non-parametric Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test is used to test for the difference of medians of hedgers and non-hedgers. ***, 
**, And * denote statistical significance for difference of groups at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
1996 (Pre-Crisis) 1997 (Crisis) 1998 (Post-Crisis)
Hedging
(1)
Non-
Hedging
(2)
Difference
(1-2)
P-
Values
Hedging
0 )
Non-
Hedging
(2)
Difference
(1-2)
P-
Values
Hedging
(1)
Non-
Hedging
(2)
Difference
(1-2)
P-
Values
Size (Total 
Assets)
12559 8415.8 4143.2*** 0.000 13141.2 9595.7 3545.5*** 0.000 13984.07 10792.1 3191.97*** 0.000
[5088.44] 
(n=l 12)
[3632.12]
(n=97)
[1456.32]*** [0.000] [5360.9]
(n“ 125)
[4382.7]
(n=84)
[978.2]*** [0.000] [5715.50]
(n=133)
[5048.80]
(n=76)
[666.7]*** [0.000]
39.45 24.7 14.75*** 0.000 38.49 25.98 12.51*** 0.000 38.81 28.81 10.00*** 0.000
(Foreign
Sales)/(Total
Sales)
[38.42] 
(n=l 12)
[22.5]
(n=97)
[15.87]*** [0.000] [36.95]
(n=125)
[20.19]
(n=84)
[16.76]*** [0.000] [37.67]
(n=133)
[25.81]
(n=76)
[11.86]*** [0.000]
19.4 20.00 -0.60 0.668 20.67 22.50 -1.83 0.233 24.101 24.778 -0.677 0.827
LDebt/Assets [17.69] 
(n=l 12)
[19.68]
(n=97)
[-1-99] [0.196] [17.94]
(n=125)
[18.91]
(n=84)
[-0.97] [0.443] [18.63]
(n=133)
[24.06]
(n=76)
[-5.43] [0.689]
12.31 16 -3.69** 0.036 13.84 16.09 -2.25** 0.012 14.85 14.13 0.720 0.510
EBIT [12.60] 
(n=l 12)
[14.23]
(n=97)
[-1.63]** [0.021] [12.80]
(n=125)
[14.80]
(n=84)
[-2.00]** [0.015] [12.81]
(n=133)
[12.72]
(n=76)
[0.09]* [0.087]
7.38 7.52 -0.14*** 0.010 6.482 8.185 -1.70*** 0.000 6.21 7.94 -1.73** 0.010
ROA [6.71]
(n=112)
[7.00]
(n=97)
[-0.29]*** [0.002] [6.66]
(n=125)
[7.41]
(n=84)
[-0.75]*** [0.000] [6.527]
(n=133)
[6.588]
(n=76)
[-0.06]*** [0.004]
18.28 16.29 1.99 0.163 14.61 17.56 -2.95* 0.096 19.54 16.67 13.93 0.524
ROE [17.19] 
(n=l 12)
[16.04]
(n=97)
[1.15] [0.135] [16.72]
(n=125)
[15.90]
(n=84)
[0.82] [0.203] [17.35]
(n=133)
[16.10]
(n=76)
[1.25] [0,652]
Dividend
Payout
31.30 23.25 14.97*** 0.000 38.20 29.10 9.1*** 0.008 42.80 37.45 5.35*** 0.004
[28.27]
(n=112)
[21.81]
(n=97)
[6.46]*** [0.000] [26.34]
(n=125)
[20.28]
(n=84)
[6.06]*** [0.000] [24.90]
(n=133)
[21.85]
(n=76)
[3.05]*** [0.002]
u>
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Table 5
The Determinants of Foreign Currency Hedging (Asian Sample)
The table presents the results o f a cross sectional regression that relates firm characteristics and some of its 
operating measures o f  performance to its hedging profile from 1996-1998 (panel A). The dependent variable is 
FCD which is the gross notional value o f foreign currency contracts as reported in the firm’s 10-K annual 
reports. Notional value is defined as the contract amount o f any foreign currency forward, swap or option made 
by the firm, it represents the future cash flows under the contract in millions o f dollars. The independent 
variables include the following; Total Assets (TA), defined as current assets plus net property, plant and 
equipment plus other non current assets o f the firm in millions of dollars. Foreign Sales /Total sales (FSTS), 
defined as die percentage of the sum o f all geographic segments (all foreign segments) o f the firm divided by net 
sales. Return on assets (ROA) is defined as the income before depreciation and other extraordinary items divided 
by total assets. LDebt/Assets (DEBTA) ratio is defined as the percentage o f  long term debt divided by total 
assets. (EBIT) margin is defined as operating income after depreciation less cost o f goods sold, Selling, General 
& administrative expenses divided by net sales. Tobin’s Q is computed as market value o f  outstanding shares 
plus liquidation value of preferred stock plus net current assets plus long- term debt divided by total assets of the 
firm. Dividend pay out (DIVP) is defined as the percentage o f the total amount o f  dividends declared on the 
common stock divided by income before extraordinary items and discounted operations less preferred dividend 
requirements. (DIVDUM) Dividend dummy is a dummy variable that takes the value o f 1 i f  the firm has paid 
dividend at end o f the year .and zero otherwise. EXMKT is defined as Excess market value it is the market value 
o f equity less book value of equity normalized by total sales. T values o f coefficients are in parenthesis. ***, **, 
And * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. (Panel B) represents the results 
o f a logit regression where the dependent variable is (FCD-DUM), which is the foreign exchange derivative 
dummy that takes a value of 1 if  the firm reports the notional value o f  foreign currency contracts in its 10-K 
annual reports and zero otherwise.
Panel A: OLS regression
Dependent variable; FCD
Independent
Variables Regression 1 1 Regression 2
Constant 0.405 0.4995
(1.007) (0.1571)
Log(TA) 0.08221
(9.304)***
TA 0.093
(2.013)**
FSTS 0.300 0.286
(6.391)*** (7.052)***
ROA -0.065 -1.110
(-1.703)* (-2.065)**
DEBTA 0.060 0.078
(1.178) (1.665)*
EBIT -0.021
(1.748)* -0.018
(-1.990)**
DIVDUM 0.039
(2.210)**
DIV P 0.076
(2.425)**
Tobin’s Q 0.177 0.187
(2.990)** (4.626)***
F value 9.087 9.089
P value 0.000*** 0.000***
R2 0.032 0.044
AdjR2 0.027 0.039
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Table 5 (continued)
Panel B: logit regression
Dependent variable; FCD-DUM
Independent Variables Regression 1 Regression 2
Log(TA) 0.0544 0.1755
(2.507)*** (2.839)***
FSTS 0.0288 0.0314
(5.317)*** (6.202)***
ROA -0.0576 -0.0576
(-2.359)*** (-2.359)***
DEBTA 0.0028 0.004
(1.391) (0.941)
EBIT -0.0137 -0.014
(-1.797)** (-1.762)*
ROE -0.001 0.002
(-0.452) (0.235)
DIVDUM 0.041
(2.272)**
DIVP 0.008
(0.606)
Tobin’s Q 0.229 0.133
(2.552)** (1.709)*
Logliklihood -398.078 -287.54
# Obs D=1 361 359
# Obs D=0 238 236
Convergence 0.001 0.001
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Table 6
Pre-Crisis, Crisis and Post-Crisis Valuation Measures of Hedging and Non-Hedging Firms
(Asian Sample)
The table presents the pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis univariate analysis of mean and and 
[median] hedging premium/discount of the S&P 500 Non- financial firms that have hedged 
their currency exposure during the Asian Financial crisis from 1996-1998. The sample 
consists of 627 Non Financial firms that have data available on their foreign currency hedging 
activity in their 10-K annual reports. The sample does not cover firms that have foreign sales 
to total sales ratio equal zero. Firms with size less than $10 million, firms that do not have 
operations (subsidiaries and /or Foreign Sales) in any of the East Asian countries, financial 
Firms in Finance, Insurance and Real Estate (2-Digit sic codes from 60-67) are also excluded 
from the sample. Valuation measures used are Tobin’s Q (Panel A) and Excess Market value 
(Panel B). Tobin’s Q is computed as market value of outstanding shares plus liquidation value 
of preferred stock plus net current assets plus long term debt divided by total assets of the 
firm. Excess market value is defined as the market value of equity less book value of equity 
normalized by total sales. The significance of means difference between foreign currency 
hedgers and non-hedgers is computed by one-way ANOVA. Non-parametric Wilcoxon Rank- 
Sum test is used to test for the difference of medians of hedgers and non-hedgers. ***, **, 
And * denote statistical significance for difference of groups at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively.
Panel A: Tobin’s Q valuation measure Panel B: Excess Market Value valuation
Tobin’s Q Excess Market Value
Years Hedgingfirms
Non-
Hedging
firms
M e a n H -  
Mean N-H P-value
Hedging
firms
Non-
Hedging
firms
M ean H -  
M ean N-H
P-
value
1996 (Pre- 
Crisis)
2.064
[1.490]
(n=112)
1.981
[1.452]
(n=97)
0.083
[0.038]
0.738
[0.935]
1.846 
[1.046] 
(n= 112)
1.591
[1.028]
(n=97)
0.255
[0.017]*
0.375
[0.090]
1997
(Crisis)
2.351
[1.751]
(n=125)
2.240
[1.624]
(n=84)
0.111**
[0.127]"*
0.041
[0.008]
2.070
[1.194]
(n=125)
1.960
[1.176]
(n=84)
0.111"
[0.018]***
0.016
[0.000]
1998 (Post- 
Crisis)
2.779
[1.657]
(n=133)
2.280
[1.620]
(n=76)
0.499"
[0.024]**
0.050
[0.049]
2.614
[1.178]
(n=133)
1.917
[1.114]
(n=76)
0.697"
[0.064]**
0.026
[0.016]
All
years(1996-
1998)
2.394
[1.647]
(n=370)
2.186
[1.617]
(n=257)
0.028**
[0.030]**
0.023
[0.031]
2.122
[1.119]
(n=370)
1.907
[1.081]
(n=257)
0.215**
[0.038]***
0.030
[0.002]
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Table 7
Foreign Currency Derivative Use and Firm Value (Asian Sample)
The table presents the results of a cross sectional regression that relates the firm’s valuation measures to its hedging profile. The dependent variables are; Tobin’s Q (panels A1 and A2) and Excess market 
value (panels B1 and B2). Tobin’s Q is computed as market value o f outstanding shares plus liquidation value o f preferred stock plus net current assets plus long term debt divided by total assets o f the firm. 
Excess market value is defined as the market value of equity less book value of equity normalized by total sales. The independent variables are: log total assets log (TA), defined as natural log of current assets 
plus net property, plant and equipment plus other non current assets of the firm in millions o f dollars. Foreign Sales /Total sales (FSTS), defined as the percentage of foreign sales (the sum of all sales from all 
geographic segments o f the firm) divided by total sales. (DERVDUM) is Foreign exchange derivative dummy , which is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm hedges its foreign currency 
exposure and equal zero otherwise. (DERV) is the gross notional value o f derivatives, which is the future cash flow under the contract. Return on assets (ROA) is defined as the income before depreciation and 
other extraordinary items divided by total assets. Return on Equity (ROE) is defined as Income before depreciation and other extraordinary items divided by common Equity. EBIT margin is defined as 
operating income after depreciation less cost of goods sold, Selling, General & administrative expenses divided by net sales. (DIVDUM) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 i f  the firm pays a 
dividend and zero otherwise. LDebt/Assets (LDEBTA) ratio is defined as the percentage of long debt divided by total assets. INDDIV is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if  the firm is active in more 
than one business segment and zero otherwise. T values o f coefficients are in parenthesis. ***, **, And * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
Panel A l: Tobin’s Q and Foreign Currency Derivatives
Dependent variable 
Tobin’s 0
Independent
Variables
Regression 96 Regression 97 Regression 98 Regression All years 
1996-1998
Constant 0.6521 0.4631 0.048 0.328 0.4602 0.429 1.302 0.632 0.419 3.300 0.702 0.044
(1.008) (0.079) (0.561) (0.310) (0.527) (0.584) (0.165) (0.577) (0.494) (0.519) (0.664) (0.058)
Log (TA) ^0.1321 -0.204 -0.0969 -0.254 -0.164 -0.151 -0.057 -0.291 -0.239 -0.237 -0.192
(-1.896)** (-2.91)*** (-1.198) (-3.27)*** (-1.73)* (-1.608)* (-1.658)* (-2.533)** (-2.261)** -0.206 (-2.975)*** (-2.54)**
(-2.883)***
FSTS 0.004 -0.005 -0.007 -0.004 -0.011 -0.0124 -0.005 -0.005 -0.009 -0.003 -0.013 -0.140
(0.727) (-1.379) (-1.695)* (-1.997)** (-1.935)** (-2.16)** (-0.034) (-0.721) (-1.428) (-2.628)** (-3.07)*** (-3.2)***
DERVDUM 0.504 0.204 0.294 0.331 0.423 0.466 0.504 0.364 0.470 0.317 0.371 0.466
(1.834)* (1.963)** (2.329)** (2.106)** (1.978)** (1.783)* (2.045)** (2.189)** (1.671)* (2.761)** (1.978)* (2.301)**
ROA 0.0698 0.032 0.1455 0.093
(3.38)*** (3.570)*** (3.129)*** (3.389)***
ROE 0.029 0.016 0.032 0.008
(3.675)*** (3.073)*** (3.281)*** (2.601)**
EBIT 0.014 0.029 0.082 0.072
(2.578)*** (3.41)*** (3.249)*** (3.004)***
DIVDUM -0.520 -1.330 -1.198 -0.436 -1.129 -1.728 -1.335 -1.567 -1.474 -0.620 -0.657 0.624
(-2.308)** (-3.621)*** (-4.30)*** (-2.019)** (-3.28)*** (3.45)*** (-3.044)** (-3.23)*** (-3.431)*** (-3.638)*** (-3.42)*** (-3.39)***
LDEBTA 0.0001 0.022 0.023 0.0002 0.015 0.0166 0.004 0.032 0.020 0.0005 0.001 0.006
(2.165)** (3.780)*** (2.914)*** (0.406) (1.928)** (1.377) (0.264) (0.352)*** (2.608)*** (2.289)** (2.168)** (2.49)**
INDDIV -0.008 -0.018 -0.102 -0.131 -0.013 -0.122 -0.180 -0.145 -0.120 -0.161 -0.154 -0.132
(-2.110)** (-2.100)** (-1.989)** (1.998)** (-1.997)** (-1.989)** (-2.040)** (-1.981)** (-1.997)** (-2.098)** (-2.100)** (1.910)*
F value 6.459 19.20 8.23 9.755 5.35 5.77 13.144 12.91 18.23 24.02 10.97 16.93
P value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 0.289 0.470 0.283 0.296 0.203 0.214 0.386 0.358 0.438 0.293 0.145 0.207
A djR 2 0.244 0.451 0.243 0.266 0.165 0.177 0.357 0.326 0.414 0.280 0.132 0.125
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Table 7 (continued)
Panel A2: Tobin’s Q and Foreign Currency Derivatives
Dependent variable 
Tobin’s Q_______
Independent
Variables
Regression 96 Regression 97 Regression 98 Regression All years 
1996-1998
Constant 0.259 0.239 0.213 0.062 0.045 0.021 0.587 0.452 0.459 0.328 0.302 0.242
(0.544) (0.679) (0.461) (0.902) (0.572) (0.485) (0.165) (0.377) (0..394) (0.258) (0.264) (0.258)
Cog (TA) -0.122 -0.135 -0.241 -0051 -0.015 -0.023 -0.035 -0.029 -0.037 -0.106 -0.032 -0.102
(-1.996)* (2.111)*** (-2.108)** (-2.031)** (-1.989)* (-1.798)* (-1.858)* (-2.500)** (-2.061)** (-2.183)** (-2.015)** (-2.22)**
FSTS -0.007 -0.005 -0.003 -0.005 -0.004 -0.010 -0.004 -0.013 -0.010 -0.001 -0.010 -0.040
(-1..976)* (-1.887) (-1..295) (-1..979)* (-2..243)** (-2..26)** (-0.024) (-0.271) (-1.228) (-1.980)* (-1.207) (-1.12)
DERV 0.511 0.211 0.322 0.073 0.004 0.006 0.025 0.035 0.047 0.205 0.216 0.221
(1.463) (1.363) (1.329) (0.311) (1.527) (1.283) (1.045) (1.109) (1.251) (0.761) (0.978) (0.781)
ROA 0.147 0.033 0.012 0.023
(3.996)*** (3.476)*** (3.229)*** (2.001)**
ROE 0.005 0.006 0.031 0.012
(0.970) (2.073)** (2.343)** (2.002)**
EBIT 0.004 0.005 0.022 0.045
(0.745 (1.451) (2.249)** (2.123)**
DIVDUM -0.281 -0.333 -0.198 -0.527 -0.482 -0.154 -1.033 -1.067 -1.034 -1.025 -0.327 -0.012
(2.405)*** (-2.100)** (-2.330)** (-2.970)*** (-2.451)** (2.330)** (-2.044)** (-3.13)*** (-2.001)** (-2.038)** (-2.12)** (-2.05)**
LDEBTA 0.0004 0.0002 0.0002 0.027 0.003 0.006 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.001
(1.345) (0.780) (0.914) (0.406) (0.800) (1.377) (0.326) (0.152) (0.214) (0.289) (0.168) (0.251)
INDDIV -0.012 -0.010 -0.100 -0.002 -0.003 -0.100 -0.100 -0.105 -0.030 -0.006 -0.004 -0.001
(-2.010)** (-2.900)*** (-2.589)*** (-1.456) (-1.558) (-1.289) (-1.040) (-1.998)* (-1.725)* (-1.098) (-1.900)* (1.980)*
F value 15.20 13.94 7.23 5.677 9.755 5.89 4.244 10.712 10.812 17.021 18.571 18.542
P value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R* 0.402 0.485 0.283 0.187 0.296 0.200 0.178 0.230 0:221 0.253 0.280 0.208
Adj R2 0.376 0.450 0.243 0.154 0.266 0.192 0.165 0.200 0.215 0.225 0.262 0.198
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Table 7 (continued)
Panel B l: Excess Market value and Foreign Currency Derivatives
Dependent variable 
Excess MKT value
Independent
Variables
Regression 96 Regression 97 Regression 98 Regression All years 
1996-1998
Constant 1.271 1.487 1.328 0.691 0.479 0.558 0.139 0.142 0.144 0.708 0.454 0.887
(0.527) (0.812) (0.522) (1.177) (0.382) (0.422) (1.080) (0.480) (0.231) (0.094) (0.883) (0 .451)
Log (TA) -2.049 -0.235 -0.035 -0.081 -0.187 -0.201 -0.122 -0.250 -0.144 -0.104 -0.266 -0.199
(-2.355)** (-2.581)** (-2.451)** (-1.228) (-2.603)** (-2.180)** (-2.533)** (-1.695)* (-2.012)** (-2.563)** (-2.7)* (-2.65)**
FSTS -0.001 -0.005 0.002 -0.002 -0.094 0.003 0.0024 -0.002 -0.002 -0.0006 0.01 -0.005
(-0.501) (-1.086) (0.897) (-0.611) (-2.291)** (1.025) (0.2517) (-0.237) (-0.221) (-0.283) (2.1)** (-0.982)
DERVDUM 0.091 0.373 0.132 0.295 0.624 0.545 0.748 0.677 0.524 0.711 0.577 0.325
(1.977)* (2.423)** (2.011)** (1.869)* (1.898)* (2.123)** (1.923)** (1.725)* (2.011)** (1.988)** (2.26)** (2.111)**
ROA 0.078 0.0305 0.103 0.041
(3.342)*** (2.977)*** (2.873)*** (5.724)***
ROE 0.061 0.029 0.101 0.023
(1.554) (1.921)* (2.110)** (1.456)
EBIT 0.012 0.018 0.111 0.032
(1.979)** (1.65)* (6.871)*** (4.6)***
DIVDUM -0.326 -1.710 -0.211 -0.5080 -1.880 -1.90 -0.654 -0.012 -0.212 -0.3172 -0.911 -0.93
(-2.096)** (-5.35)*** (-2.88)** (-2.636)** (-2.23)*** (-4.42)*** (-2.384)** (-2.33)*** (-4.81)*** (-4.09)*** (-1.99)* (-1.76)*
LDEBTA 0.017 0.012 0.015 0.0095 0.001 0.018 0.003 -0.004 -0.008 0.005 0.002 0.002
(1.977)* (1.204) (1.897)* (1.879)* (0.978) (1.724)* (2.280)** (-0.556) (-0.756) (2.461)** (2.33)** (2.51)**
INDDIV -0.023 -0.012 -0.003 -0.115 -0.101 -0.112 -0.016 -0.015 -0.017 -0.090 -0.098 -0.007
(-1.813)* (1.823)** (1.900)** (-1.452)** (-1.611)* (-1.523)* (-0.288) (-2.020)** (-2.011)** (-2.221)** (-1.99)* (-1.91)*
F value 4.445 3.455 7.54 4.115 3.730 3.930 12.27 11.05 14.05 17.57 10.190 11.390
P value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R1 0.175 0.222 0.256 0.167 0.145 0.151 0.376 0.301 0.364 0.196 0.111 0.144
A djR 2 0.136 0.198 0.126 0.127 0.123 0.113 0.346 0.298 0.338 0.185 0.109 0.131
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Table 7 (continued)
Panel B2: Excess Market value and Foreign Currency Derivatives
Dependent variable 
Excess MKT value
Independent
Variables
Regression 96 Regression 97 Regression 98 Regression All years 
1996-1998
Constant 0.271
(0.507)
0.462
(0.712)
0.311
(0.4350
0.144
(0.613)
0.234
(0.182)
0.165
(0.345)
0.135
(1.082)
0.103
(0.280)
0.202
(0.160)
0.028
(0.024)
0.054
(0.082)
0.042
(0.123)
Log(TA) -0.295
(-3.231)***
-0.205
(-2.631)**
-0.234
(-2.113)**
-0.065
(-1.992)*
-0.081
(-2.001)**
-0.054
(1.998)*
-0.433
(-2.123)**
-0.450
(-1.992)*
-0.267
(1.870)*
-0.214
(-2.300)**
-0.266
(-1.93)*
-0.120
(1.999)*
FSTS -0.005
(-1.612)*
-0.005
(-1.086)
-0.004
(-1.076)
-0.001
(-0.511)
-0.001
(-1.291)
-0.001
(-1.340)
0.002
(0.124)
-0.010
(-0.047)
0.002
(0.213)
0.004
(0.883)
0.003
(0.987)
0.023
(0.945)
DERV 0.004
(1.927)*
0.002
(1.423)
0.002
(1.354)
0.123
(1.069)
0.121
(1.095)
0.231
(1.450)
0.226
(1.321)
0.230
(1.612)
0.345
(1.432)
0.217
(1.234)
0.207
(1.360)
0.201
(1.326)
ROA 0.125
(3.221)***
0.076
(3.657)***
0.100
(2.003)**
0.021
(2.274)**
EBIT 0.012
(1.979)**
0.023
(2.011)**
0.132
(2.344)**
0.031
(2.11)**
ROE -0.010
(-1.279)
0.026
(2.100)**
0.210
(2.001)**
0.123
(2.101)**
DIVDUM -0.315
(-2.025)**
-0.760
(-3.25)***
-0.511
(3.231)***
-0429
(-2.232)**
-1.002
(-2.110)**
-0.320
(-1.985)*
-0.234
(-2.025)**
-0.321
(-2.241)**
-0.221
(-2.102)**
-0.132
(-2.110)**
-0.13
(-2.16)*
-0.112
(-2.100)**
LDEBTA 0.070
(0.577)
0.052
(0.204)
0.100
(0.123)
0.010
(2.022)**
0.010
(2.024)**
0.001
(1.450)
0.002
(1.280)
-0.002
(-0.956)
0.003
(0.765)
0.012
(1.891)*
0.102
(2.01)**
0.112
(1.780)
INDDIV -0.012
(-1.830)*
-0.010
(1.823)*
-0.002
(2.010)**
-0.001
(-2.052)**
-0.100
(-2.123)**
0.019
(1.456)
-0.010
(-1.188)
-0.010
(-1.011)
0.002
(0.987)
-0.010
(-1.921)*
-0.009
(-1.91)*
-0.005
(-1.98)*
F value 
P value 
R2
AdjR2
10.12
0.000
0.156
0.123
12.45
0.000
0.145
0.122
11.25
0.000
0.115
0.105
14.38
0.000
0.376
0.350
15.61
0.000
0.381
0.365
14.22
0.000
0.325
0.314
12.14
0.000
0.386
0.357
13.28
0.000
0.376
0.346
14.52
0.000
0.366
0.361
15.42
0.000
0.532
0.519
16.52
0.000
0.521
13.14
0.000
0.385
Reproduced 
with 
perm
ission 
of the 
copyright ow
ner. 
Further reproduction 
prohibited 
without perm
ission.
Table 8
Firm Value Foreign Currency Derivatives and Geographic Diversification
(Asian currency crisis sample)
This table reports the results of OLS regression that relates the firm’s financial and non-financial hedging strategies to its value 
during the Asian financial crisis. Financial hedging is proxied by the foreign exchange derivative dummy (DERVDUM), which is 
a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm reports any type of currency hedging instruments in its 10K annual Reports. 
Non-financial hedging is proxied by two variables; GEOi represents the ratio of percentage of Asian sales relative to the total sales 
ratio of the firm. GEO2 represents the total number of countries that the firm operates in the Asian region around the time of the 
crisis. The sample consists of 627 firm year observations obtained from the S&P 500 non-financial firms. The dependent variable 
in the regression is the firm’s Tobin’s Q ratio ( panel A) and Excess Market Value (panel B). The rest of the control variables are 
those discussed before. T values of coefficients are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% respectively.
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Panel A: Tobin’s Q, foreign currency derivatives and geographic diversity 
Dependent variable: Tobin’s Q
Independent variables 1996 1997 1998 All Years
1996-1998
Constant 0.652 0.314 0.123 0.062 0.490 0.321 0.771 0.672 0.676 0.330 0.284 0.342
(0.315) (0.410) (0.546) (0.495) (0.623) (0.422) (0.391) (0.241) (0.400) (0.519) (0.566) (0.611)
DERVDUM 0.504 0.034 0.031 0.145 0.162 0.160 0.241 0.451 0.504 0.317 0.405 0.313
(1.935)* (1.883)* (1.891)* (1.897)* (1.897)* (1.988)* (2.117)** (1.989)* (2.045)** (1.978)* (2.092)** (2.012)**
GEOi 0.004 -0.004 -0.002 -0.004
(0.727) (-1.979)** (-0.562) (-1.772)*
DERVDUM*GEOi 0.254 -0.075 0.126 0.157
(1.141) (-1.043) (0.352) (1.542)
g e o 2 0.066 0.067 0.017 0.017 0.009 0.010 0.012 0.010
(1.964)* (1.694)* (1.023) (1.022) (0.210) (1.854)* (1.983)* (1.885)*
DERVDUM*GEOj 0.050 0.090 0.258 0.261
(1.755)* (0.745) (1.855)* (1.875)*
Log (TA) -0.295 -0.122 -0.251 -0.065 -0.054 -0.057 -0.152 -0.135 -0.133 -0.142 -0.207 -0.165
(-3.231)*** (1.765)* (2.113)** (-1.999)** (-1.987)* (1.982)* (-2.110)** (-1.999)** (-2.0122)** (-2.115)** (-2.885)** (-2.532)**
ROA 0.069 0.145 0.033 0.033 0.144 0.104 0.040 0.038
(3.383)*** (2.900)*** (2.030)** (2.452)** (2.004)** (2.850)** (2.260)** (2.890)***
EBIT 0.003 0.007 0.028 0.072
(2.745)** (2.130)** (2.071)** (2.004)**
DIVDUM -0.520 -0.281 -0.215 -0.572 -0.436 -0.456 -1.340 -1.320 -2.090 -0.321 -0.622 -0.193
(-2.308)** (-2.405)** (2.312)** (2.971)*** (-2.410)** (-2.130)** (-2.415)** (3.050)*** (-2.343)** (-3.100)*** (-3.628)*** (-2.319)**
LDEBTA 0.004 0.0001 0.005 0.0008 0.0003 0.0002 -0.030 -0.002 0.005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0004
(0.749) (1.345) (1.257) (0.406) (0.800) (0.480) (-0.256) (-0.332) (0.383) (1.559) (2.089)** (1.938)*
INDIV -0.001 -0.002 -0.011 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.011 -0.001 -0.011 -0.012 -0.002 -0.002
(-2.111)** (-1.987)* (-1.971)* (-1.958)* (-1.982)* (-1.997)* (-1.925)* (-1.900)* (-1.852)* (-1.895)* (-1.910)* (-1.855)*
F  value 6.429 9.451 12.25 9.677 7.902 9.755 12.09 12.97 14.52 16.37 22.02 22.9
P value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R 2 0.279 0.485 0.554 0.296 0.350 0.300 0.537 0.534 0.536 0.187 0.293 0.314
A djR 2 0.254 0.450 0.533 0.266 0.330 0.295 0.517 0.513 0.519 0.176 0.280 0.306
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Table 8(continued)
Panel B: Excess Market Value, foreign currency derivatives and geographic diversity
Dependent variable:Excess MKT value
Independent variables 1996 1997 1998 All Years 
1996-1998
Constant 0.271 0.215 0.213 0.465 0.618 0.523 0.326 0.312 0.258 0.194 0.187 0.192
(0.255) (0.310) (0.346) (1.458) (1.178) (0.212) (0.924) (0.852) (0.512) (0.708) (0.725) (0.712)
DERVDUM 0.309 0.304 0.314 0.718 0.295 0.650 0.747 0.520 0.461 0.171 0.168 0.170
(1.775)* (1.993)** (1.910)* (2.476)**** (1.861)* (2.436)** (1.923)* (1.782)* (1.852)* (1.789)* (1.825)* (1.952)*
GEOj -0.0054 -0.008 0.002 0.006
(-1.210) (-1.697)* (0.258) (0.278)
DERVDUM*GEO, -0.153 -0.356 0.375 0.083
(-1.308) (-1.769)* (0.825) (0.764)
GEOj 0.070 0.071 0.017 0.042 0.014 0.009 0.003 0.002
(0.906 (0.694) (0.257) (1.412) (0.133) (0.211) (1.602)* (1.526)*
d e r v d u m *g e o 2 0.210 0.351 0.236 0.100
(1.727)* (1.840) (1.833)* (1.984)**
Log (TA) -0.122 -0.132 -0.152 -0.081 -0.066 -0.067 -0.051 -0.045 -0.0542 -0.110 -0.115 -0.113
(-2.631)*** (1.625)* (2.103)** (-1.229) (-1.991)* (1.882)* (0.985) (-1.928)* (-2.100)** (-2.635)** (2.526)** (-2.320)**
ROA 0.078 0.045 0.0736 0.076 0.104 0.120 0.041 0.051
(3.283)*** (2.100)** (3.230)*** (2.622)** (2.861)*** (2.410)** (2.526)** (2.214)**
EBIT 0.002 0.008 0.0723 0.0321
(1.745)* (1.478) (3.451)*** (2.152)**
DIVDUM -0.326 -0.381 -0.325 -0.538 -0.572 -0.429 -0.281 -0.205 0.311 -0.313 -0.314 -0.321
(-2.080)** (-2.050)** (2.112)** (2.284)** (-2.974)*** (-2.230)** (-3.061)*** (-3.382)*** (3.215)*** (-2.095)** (-2.013)** (-2.100)**
LDEBTA 0.018 0.015 0.015 0.009 0.000 0.010 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.006 0.003 0.005
(1.577)* (1.556)* (1.557)* (1.719)* (0.406) (2.022)** (0.734) (0.287) (0.338) (1.636)* (1.687)* (1.521)
1ND1V -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.013 -0.001 -0.012 -0.013 -0.010 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002
(-1.981)** (-1.987)* (-1.821)* (-1.768)* (-1.873)* (-1.546) (-0.952) (-1.235) (-1.325) (-1.875)* (-1.785)* (-1.892)*
F  value 4.465 4.981 5.02 5.651 5.550 5.040 4.050 5.027 5.170 15.430 16.320 16.361
P  value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R s 0.175 0.178 0.137 0.259 0.187 0.195 0.163 0.172 0.175 0.182 0.180 0.187
A d jR 2 0.136 0.135 0.123 0.213 0.154 0.156 0.136 0.152 0.136 0.171 0.169 0.176
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Table 9
Number and Percentages of US firms using Foreign Exchange Currency Derivatives and the Type of 
Instrument Used: Brazilian Currency Crisis sample
The table presents the number and percentages o f  foreign Exchange Derivative use for a sample o f  612 US. Non- 
Financial firms around the Brazilian Real Devaluation crisis (1999-2000) Panel (A). The sample excludes firms 
with: Foreign Sales/Total Sales Ratio equal to zero. Firms with size less than $10 million. Firms that do not have 
operations (subsidiaries and /or Foreign Sales) in any of the Latin American region. Financial Firms in Finance, 
Insurance and Real Estate (2-Digit sic codes from 60-67) are also excluded from the sample. “Hedging” firms are 
defined as firms that have data on any type o f Foreign Exchange Currency Derivatives (Forwards, Options, 
swaps) available in the firm’s 10-K Annual Reports from 1999-2000. “Non-Hedging” firms are defined as firms 
that do not report any type o f currency hedging activity in their annual reports. Firms that report other types of  
hedging activity (Commodity and/or Interest Rate hedging) are also included in the “Non-Hedging” sample. 
Foreign Currency Hedging data is obtained from the Firms’ 10-K annual Reports via the Electronic Data 
Gathering, Analysis and Retrieval database “EDGAR” and/or Annual Report Gallery. Mean Notional value o f  
foreign currency derivatives is the average contract amount o f any foreign currency forward, futures, swap or 
option made by the firm during the year, it represents the future cash flows under the contract. It is expressed in 
millions o f  dollars Foreign operations data is obtained from the Directory of American Firms Operating Abroad. 
All other variables are obtained from the COMPUSTAT database. Panel (B) shows the total number and 
percentages o f the type o f foreign currency derivative instrument used by the hedging firms in the sample
Panel A
Foreign currency hedging profile for the S&P500 Firms
Year #HedgingFirms %
# Non- 
Hedging 
firms
% Total % Mean Notional Value(millions) %
1998 124 60.78 80 39.2 204 100 4165.6 29.22
1999 127 62.56 76 37.4 203 100 5350.2 37.53
2000 118 57.6 87 42.4 205 100 4738.1 33.24
All Years 369 60.29 243 39.7 612 100 14253.9 100
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Table 9 (continued)
Panel B
Type of Foreign Currency Derivative Instruments used by Hedging firms
Year ForwardContracts %
Options
contracts %
Swap
contracts % Total Users %
1998 86 69.35 34 27.4 4 3.23 124 100
1999 93 73.2 31 24.41 3 2.36 127 100
2000 86 72.8 28 23.75 4 3.39 118 100
All
Years
265 71.81 93 25.20 11 2.98 369 100
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Table 10
Summary Statistics for US. Foreign Currency Hedging and Non-Hedging Arms ( Brazilian Sample)
The table presents the summary statistics of firms in the s&p 500 that “used” or “have not used” foreign currency derivatives to hedge their 
exposure to currency risk around the Brazilian Real devaluation 1998-2000. The sample consists of 612 Non Financial firms that have data 
available on their foreign currency hedging activity in their 10-K annual reports. The sample does not cover firms that have foreign sales to 
total sales ratio equal zero. Firms with size less than $10 million. Firms that do not have operations (subsidiaries and /or Foreign Sales) in 
any of the Latin American countries. Financial Firms in Finance, Insurance and Real Estate (2-Digit sic codes from 60-67) are also excluded 
from the sample. Excess market value is defined as the market value of equity less book value of equity normalized by total sales. Tobin’s Q 
is computed as market value of outstanding shares plus liquidation value of preferred stock plus net current assets plus long term debt divided 
by total assets of the firm. Notional value of foreign currency derivatives is the contract amount of any foreign currency forward, futures, 
swap or option made by the firm, it represents the future cash flows under the contract. Foreign exchange derivative dummy is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 if  the firm hedges its foreign currency exposure and equal zero otherwise. Return on assets (ROA %) is 
defined as the income before depreciation and other extraordinary items divided by total assets. Return on Equity (ROE%) is defined as 
Income before depreciation and other extraordinary items divided by common Equity. EBIT margin is defined as operating income after 
depreciation less cost o f goods sold, Selling, General & administrative expenses divided by net sales. LDebt/Assets ratio is defined as the 
percentage of long- term debt divided by total assets. Ldebt is the firm’s long term debt. Dividend pay out is defined as the percentage o f the 
total amount of dividends declared on the common stock divided by income before extraordinary items and discounted operations less 
preferred dividend requirements. Dividend dummy is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if  the firm has paid dividend at end of the 
year .and zero otherwise. Foreign Sales /Total sales is the percentage of the sum of all geographic segments (all foreign segments) o f the firm 
divided by net sales. Total Assets is defined as current assets plus net property, plant and equipment plus other non current assets of the firm 
in millions o f dollars. Diversification dummy is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if  the firm is active in more than one business 
segment and zero otherwise
Variables No. Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev.
Excess Market Values 609 2.64 1.24 3.6368
Tobin’s Q 610 2.71 1.61 3.1246
Notional Values of Foreign Currency Derivatives 
(millions $)
612 4751.8 47.1 31435
Returns on Assets 612 7.446 6.74 7.4245
Return on Equity
612 19.90 17.15 52.537
EBIT
612 14.49 13.08 11.001
Ldebt/Toal Assets ratio
609 24.80 22.28 18.493
Dividend Dummy
602 0.753 1 0.1322
Divided Pay out
602 32.89 25.04 65.60
Foreign Sales / Total Sales%
612 33.34 32.65 20.53
Total Assets 
( millions $)
612 14741 5622 36198
Industrial Diversification Dummy
598 0.59 1 0.37
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Table 11
Pre-Crisis, Crisis and Post -Crisis Univariate Analysis of Hedging and Non-Hedging Firms (Brazilian Sample)
The table presents mean [median] values of some performance and firm-specific variables for our sample of foreign exchange currency hedging and 
non-hedging firms before, during and after the Brazilian crisis, 1998-2000. The sample consists of 612 Non Financial firms that have data available on 
their foreign currency hedging activity in their 10-K annual reports. The sample does not cover firms that have foreign sales to total sales ratio equal 
zero. Firms with size less than $10 million. Firms that do not have operations (subsidiaries and /or Foreign Sales) in any of the Latin American 
countries. Financial Firms in Finance, Insurance and Real Estate (2-Digit sic codes from 60-67) are also excluded from the sample. “Hedging” firms are 
defined as firms that have data on any type of Foreign Exchange Currency Derivatives (Forwards, Options, swaps) available in the firm’s 10-K Annual 
Reports from 1996-1998. “Non-Hedging” firms are defined as firms that do not report any type of currency hedging activity in their annual reports. 
Firms that report other types of hedging activity (Commodity and/or Interest Rate hedging) are included in the “Non-Hedging” sample. Performance 
and firm-specific variables are defined, as before, in the previous table. The significance of means difference between foreign currency hedgers and non­
hedgers is computed by one-way ANOVA. Non-parametric Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test is used to test for the difference of medians of hedgers and non­
hedgers. ***, **, And * denote statistical significance for difference of groups at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
1998 (Pre-Crisis) 1999 (Crisis) 2000 (Post-Crisis)
Hedging
(1)
Non-
Hedging
(2)
(1-2) P-Values
Hedging
(1)
Non-
Hedging
(2)
(1-2) P-Values
Hedging
(1)
Non-
Hedging
(2)
(1-2) P-Values
Size (Total 
Assets)
12559 
[5088.44] 
(n=l 124)
8415.8
[3632.12]
(n=80)
4143.2***
[1456.32]***
0.000
[0.000]
13141.2
[5360.9]
(n=127)
9595.7
[4382.7]
(n=76)
3545.5***
[978.2]***
0.000
[0:000]
13984.07 
[5715.50] 
(n=l 18)
10792.1
[5048.80]
(n=87)
3191.97***
[666.7]***
0.000
[0.000]
(Foreign
Sales)/(Total
Sales)
39.45
[38.42]
(n=124)
24.7 
[22.5] 
(n=80) .
14.75***
[15.87]***
0.000
[0.000]
38.49
[36.95]
(n=127)
25.98
[20.19]
(n=76)
12.51***
[16.76]***
0.000
[0.000]
38.81
[37.67]
(n=118)
28.81
[25.81]
(n=87)
10.00***
[11.86]***
0.000
[0.000]
LDebt/Assets
19.4
[17.69]
(n=124)
20.00
[19.68]
(n=80)
-0.60
[-1-99]
0.668
[0.196]
20.67
[17.94]
(n=127)
22.50
[18.91]
(n=76)
-1.83
[-0.97]
0.233
[0.443]
24.101 
[18.63] 
(n=l 18)
24.778
[24.06]
(n=87)
-0.677
[-5.43]
0.827
[0.689]
EBIT
12.31
[12.60]
(n=124)
16
[14.23]
(n=80)
-3.69**
[-1.63]**
0.036
[0.021]
13.84
[12.80]
(n=127)
16.09
[14.80]
(n=76)
-2.25**
[-2.00]**
0.012
[0.015]
14.85 
[12.81] 
(n=l 18)
14.13
[12.72]
(n=87)
0.720
[0.09]*
0.510
[0.087]
ROA
7.38
[6.71]
(n=124)
7.52
[7.00]
(n=80)
-0.14***
[-0.29]***
0.010
[0.002]
6.482
[6.66]
(n=127)
8.185
[7.41]
(n=76)
-1.70***
[-0.75]***
0.000
[0.000]
6.21
[6.527]
(n=118)
7.94
[6.588]
(n=87)
-1.73**
[-0.06]***
0.010
[0.004]
ROE
18.28
[17.19]
(n=124)
16.29
[16.04]
(n=80)
1.99
[1.15]
0.163
[0.135]
14.61
[16.72]
(n=127)
17.56
[15.90]
(n=76)
-2.95*
[0.82]
0.096
[0.203]
19.54 
[17.35] 
(n=l 18)
16.67
[16.10]
(n=87)
13.93
[1.25]
0.524
[0.652]
Dividend
Payout
31.30
[28.27]
(n=124)
23.25
[21.81]
(n=80)
14.97***
[6.46]***
0.000
[0.000]
38.20
[26.34]
(n=127)
29.10
[20.28]
(n=76)
9 I*** 
[6.06]***
0.008
[0.000]
42.80 
[24.90] 
(n=l 18)
37.45
[21.85]
(n=87)
5.35***
[3.05]***
0.004
[0.002]
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Table 12
Pre-Crisis, Crisis and Post-Crisis Valuation Measures of Hedging and Non-Hedging Firms
(Brazilian currency crisis Sample)
The table presents the pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis univariate analysis of mean and and 
[median] hedging premium/discount of US. s&p 500 Non- financial firms that have hedged 
their currency exposure during the Brazilian crisis in 1998-2000. The sample consists of 612 
Non Financial firms that have data available on their foreign currency hedging activity in their 
10-K annual reports. The sample does not cover firms that have foreign sales to total sales 
ratio equal zero. Firms with size less than $10 million. Firms that do not have operations 
(subsidiaries and /or Foreign Sales) in any of the East Asian countries. Financial Firms in 
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate (2-Digit sic codes from 60-67) are also excluded from the 
sample. Valuation measures used are Tobin’s Q (Panel A) and Excess Market value (Panel B). 
Tobin’s Q is computed as market value of outstanding shares plus liquidation value of 
preferred stock plus net current assets plus long term debt divided by total assets of the firm. 
Excess market value is defined as the market value of equity less book value of equity 
normalized by total sales. The significance of means difference between foreign currency 
hedgers and non-hedgers is computed by one-way ANOVA. Non-parametric Wilcoxon Rank- 
Sum test is used to test for the difference of medians of hedgers and non-hedgers. ***, **, 
And * denote statistical significance for difference of groups at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively.
Panel A: Tobin’s Q valuation measure Panel B: Excess Market Value valuation
Tobin’s Q Excess Market Value
Years Hedgingfirms
Non-
Hedging
firms
Mean H -  
Mean N-H P-value
Hedging
firms
Non-
Hedging
firms
Mean H -  
Mean N-H
P-
value
1998 (Pre- 
Crisis)
2.42 2.36 0.06* 0.071 2.34 2.08 0.26** 0.035
[1.71]
(n=124)
[1.65]
(n=80)
[0.06]** [0.035] [1.195]
(n=124)
[1.060]
(n=80)
[0.135]*** [0.01]
1999
(Crisis)
2.930 2.790 0.140*** 0.002 3.32 2.91 0.410** 0.016
[1.710]
(n=127)
[1.675]
(n=76)
[0.039]’** [0.003] [1.10]
(n=127)
[1.07]
(n=76)
[0.030]*** [0.000]
2000 (Post- 
Crisis)
2.69 2.260 0.430** 0.050 2.56 2.22 0.34** 0.026
[1.740]
(n=118)
[1.385]
(n=87)
[0.380]** [0.040] [1.00]
(n=118)
[0.90]
(n=87)
[0.010]** [0.035]
All
years(1998-
2000)
2.68
[1.720]
(n=369)
2.47
[1.568]
(n=243)
0.21**
[0.152]**
0.023
[0.021]
2.122
[1.119]
(n=369)
1.907
[1.081]
(n=243)
0.215**
[0.038]***
0.030
[0.002]
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Table 13
Foreign Currency Derivative Use and Firm Value (Brazilian currency crisis Sample)
The table presents the results of a cross sectional regression that relates the firm’s valuation measures to its hedging profile for a sample of 612 US non financial firms that hedged their currency exposure 
during the Brazilian crisis 1998-2000. The dependent variables are; Tobin’s Q (panel A) and Excess market value (panel B). Tobin’s Q is computed as market value o f outstanding shares plus liquidation value 
of preferred stock plus net current assets plus long term debt divided by total assets o f the firm. Excess market value is defined as the market value o f equity less book value o f equity normalized by total sales. 
The independent variables are: log total assets log (TA), defined as natural log of current assets plus net property, plant and equipment plus other non current assets o f the firm in millions of dollars. Foreign 
Sales /Total sales (FSTS), defined as the percentage of foreign sales(the sum o f all foreign sales form all o f the firms’ geographic segments divided by Total sales. (DERVDUM) is Foreign exchange 
derivative dummy , which is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if  the firm hedges its foreign currency exposure and equal zero otherwise. Return on assets (ROA) is defined as the income before 
depreciation and other extraordinary items divided by total assets. Return on Equity (ROE) is defined as Income before depreciation and other extraordinary items divided by common Equity. EBIT margin is 
defined as operating income after depreciation less cost of goods sold, Selling, General & administrative expenses divided by net sales. (DIVDUM) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 i f  the firm pays 
a dividend and zero otherwise. LDebt/Assets (LDEBTA) ratio is defined as the percentage o f long-term debt divided by total assets. INDDIV is a dummy variable that takes the value o f 1 if  the firm is active 
in more than one business segment and zero otherwise. T values o f coefficients are in parenthesis. ***, **, And * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
Panel A: Tobin’s Q and Foreign Currency Derivatives.
Dependent variable 
Tobin’s Q
Independent Regression 98 
Variables
Regression 99 Regression 00
Regression All years
Constant 0.347 0.311 0.155 0.296 0.201 0.199 0.191 0.210 0.133 0.041 0.5719 0.205
(1.660) (1.451) (0.123) (0.334) (0.441) (0.398) (1.292) (1.321) (0.988) (0.302) (1.006) (0117)
Log (TA) -0.354 -0.2031 -0.315 0.143 0.123 -0.325 0.067 0.055 0.065 -0.032 -0.116 0.078
(-1.873)** (-1.888)** (-1.980)* (0.599) (0.610) (-1.200)* (0.963) (0.789) (1.201) (-1.791)* (-1-53) (0.787)
FSTS -0.054 -0.002 0.005 0.074 0.050 -0.002 0.001 0.002 0.011 0.082 -0.0147 -0.007
(-0.370) (-0.298) (0.312) (0.804) (0.685) (-1.23)* (0.005) (0.024) (0.112) (1.889)* (-1.966)** (-1.09)
DERVDUM 0.154 0.178 0.168 0.147 0.137 0.211 0.087 0.099 0.098 0.088 0.360 0.275
(2.503)** (2.468)** (2.82)** (2.367)** (2.425)** (2.651)** (1.992)* (2.10)** (2.22)** (2.323)** (1.77)** (1.924)**
ROA 0.543 0.583 0.573 0.607
(7.062)*** (7.306)*** (6.827)*** (7.458)***
ROE 0.046 0.120 0.092 0.020
(2.226)** (2.597)** (1.462) (4.15)***
EBIT 0.196 0.162 0.185 0.106
(2.572)*** (2.138)** (2.205)** (7.741)***
DIVDUM -0.282 -0.321 -0.412 -0.436 -0.555 -0.612 -0.192 -0.211 -0.312 -0.254 -2.053 -1.672
(-2.682)** (-2.222)** (2.133)** (-2.047)** (-2.123)** (-2.233)** (-2.150)** (-2.22)** (-2.311)** (-6.818)*** (-5.10)*** (-4.25)***
LDEBTA 0.297 0.130 0.302 0.445 0.325 0.362 0.021 0.031 0.005 0.028 0.037 0.032
(1.651)* (1.466)* (1.330) (3.166)*** (3.77)*** (2.11)** (0.295) (0.299) (1.002) (0.765) (3.72)*** (3.361)***
INDDIV -0.018 -0.010 -0.122 -0.011 -0.001 0.012 -0.120 -0.101 -0.001 -0.101 -0.120 -0.111
(-2.010)** (-1.988)* (-1.522) (-2.102)** (-2.01)** (-2.10)* (-2.010)** (-2.11)** (-2.01)* (-2.108)** (-1.988)* (-1.871)*
F  value 22.02 18.99 16.85 10.93 10.00 12.80 19.42 18.57 16.85 20.80 10.85 15.75
P value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 0.528 0.411 0.328 0.416 0.399 0.421 0.543 0.466 0.321 0.471 0.289 0.368
Ad i R2 0.504 0.398 0.318 0.378 0.387 0.402 0.515 0.432 0.299 0.461 0.269 0.345
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Table 13 (continued)
Panel B: Excess M arket value and Foreign C urrency Derivatives
Dependent variable: Excess Market value
Dependent Regression 98 Regression 99 Regression 00 Regression All years
variables 1998-2000
Constant 0.627 0.612 0.512 0.231 0.211 0.322 0.306 0.254 0.231 0.187 0.180 0.179
(0.507) (0.515) (0.612) (0.874) (0.535) (0.745) (1.170) (1.009) (1.020) (1.096) (0.258) (0.504)
Log (TA) -2.775 -2.100 -2.181 -0.129 -0.122 -0.132 -0.125 -0.135 -0.133 -0.010 -0.102 0.197
(-2.323)** (-2.213)** (-2.233)* (-1.689)** (-1.697)* (-2.011)** (-1.533)* (-2.005)** (-1.60)** (-2.216)** (-2.100)** (1.46)
FSTS 0.001 0.002 -0.021 -0.164 -0.153 -0.115 0.011 0.001 0.130 0.082 -0.002 -0.005
(0.121) (0.120) (-0.118) (-1.825)* (-1.684)* (-1.807)* (0.167) (0.258) (1.624)* (1.983)** (-0.358) (-0.599)
DERVDUM 0.140 0.137 0.124 0.116 0.112 0.124 0.092 0.072 0.102 0.087 0.065 0.0800
(1.813)* (1.997)* (1.987)* (1.809)* (1.952)* (1.987)* (1.981)* (1.752)* (2.103)** (2.093)** (1.985)* (2.01)***
ROA 0.249 0.436 0.120 0.345
(2.671)*** (3.563)*** (2.223)** (3.624)***
ROE 0.145 0.251 0.105 0.053
(1.988)* (1.521) (1.952)* (2.520)**
EBIT 0.321 0.451 0.222 0.028
(3.328)*** (3.22)*** (2.054)** (2.729)***
DIVDUM -0.317 -0.312 -0.328 -0.250 -0.226 -0.340 -0.654 -0.632 -0.714 -0.205 -0.205 -0.457
(-3.484)*** (-2.987)*** (-3.981)*** (-2.659)** (-2.130)** (-3.451)*** (-4.484)** (-3.514)*** (-3.468)*** (-3.20)*** (2.897)*** (-3.71)***
LDEBTA 0.041 0.001 0.002 0.031 0.021 0.012 0.140 0.132 0.241 0.002 0.002 0.0518
(0.602) (0.524) (0.781) (0.305) (0.301) (0.482) (1.880)* (1564) (2.057)** (0.966) (0.812) (0.981)
INDIV -0.001 -0.001 -0.010) -0.005 -0.002 -0.010 -0.006 -0.002 -0.001 -0.010 -0.0002 -0.001
(-1.083) (-1.235) (-1.23)* (-1.053) (-1.023) (-1.030) (-0.689) (-1.412) (-1.750)* (-1.908)* (-1..568) (-1.912)*
F value 11.092 11.000 10.002 9.087 8.052 8.087 8.986 8.656 10.860 18.340 18.025 20.850
P valuie 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 0.355 0.342 0.255 0.456 0.210 0.256 0.305 0.289 0.355 0.380 0.258 0.428
Adi R2 0.323 0.320 0.152 0.404 0.198 0.203 0.271 0.217 0.301 0.366 0.210 0.407
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Table 14 
Firm Value Foreign Currency Derivatives and Geographic Diversification 
(Brazilian currency crisis sample)
This table reports the results of OLS regression that relates the firm’s financial and non-financial hedging strategies to its value during 
the Brazilian Real devaluation. Financial hedging is proxied by the foreign exchange derivative dummy (DERVDUM), which is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm reports any type of currency hedging instruments in its 10K annual Reports. Non- 
financial hedging is proxied by two variables; GEOi represents the ratio of percentage of Latin American sales relative to the total sales 
ratio of the firm. GEO2 represents the total number of countries that the firm operates in the Latin American region around the time of the 
crisis. The sample consists of 612 firm year observations obtained from the S&P 500 non-financial firms. The dependent variable in the 
regression is the firm’s Tobin’s Q ratio ( panel A) and Excess Market Value (panel B). The rest of the control variables are those 
discussed before. T values of coefficients are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively.
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Panel A: Tobin’s Q, foreign currency derivatives and geographic diversity
Dependent variable: Tobin’s Q
Independent variables 1998 1999 2000 All Years 
1998-2000
Constant 0.150 0.156 0.149 0.137 0.129 0.123 0.310 0.316 0.256 0.101 0.108 0.115
(0.246) (0210) (0.246) (0.495) (0.494) (0.242) (0.221) (0.421) (0.411) (1.513) (1.066) (0.953)
DERVDUM 0.145 0.154 0.157 0.084 0.123 0.106 0.163 0.154 0.150 0.182 0.151 0.158
(1.813)* (1.823)* (1.891)* (1.997)** (2.011)** (2.008)** (1.741)* (1.719)* (1.645)** (2.100)** (2.012)** (2.130)**
GEO, -0.110 0.074 0.012 -0.082
(-0.180) (0.804) (0.313) (-1.772)*
DERVDUM*GEOi -0.128 0.363 0.142 -0.132
(-0.725) (1.443) (0.552) (-1.062)
GEOj 0.053 0.051 0.073 0.071 0.067 0.056 0.092 0.072
(0.964) (1.694)* (1.823)* (1.822)* (1.745)* (1.654)* (2.234)** (2.100)**
DERVDUM*GEOj 0.210 0.089 0.206 0.230
(0.655) (1.845)* (1.905)* (2.120)**
Log (TA) -0.415 -0.324 -0.334 -0.182 -0.187 -0.157 -0.032 -0.040 -0.033 -0.009 -0.024 -0.105
(-2.237)** (-2.165)** (-2.123)** (-1.867)* (-1.980)* (1.882)* (-1.791)* (-1.729)* (-1.712)** (-2.202)** (-1.885)* (-2.022)**
ROA 0.354 0.248 0.381 0.352 0.290 0.204 0.349 0.315
(2.062)** (2.475)*** (3.215)** (2.552)** (2.284)** (2.250)** (2.620)*** (2.512)**
EBIT 0.303 0.036 0.052 0.256
(2.045)** (1.480) (1.058) (2.094)**
DIVDUM -0.268 -0.294 -0.278 -0.383 -0.291 -0.262 -0.231 -0.247 -2.490 -0.217 -0.273 -0.219
(-2.284)*** (-2.194)** (-2.177)** (-2.929)*** (-2.481)** (-2.100)** (-2.465)** (-2.178)** (-2.143)** (-2.600)*** (-2.428)** (-2.310**
LDEBTA 0.207 0.217 0.211 0.345 0.312 0.267 0.050 0.075 0.068 0.004 0.033 • 0.002
(1.652)* (1.754)* (1.507) (2.166)** (1.890)* (1.600) (1.220) (1.622)* (1.830)* (0.096) (0.563) (0.042)
INDIV -0.003 -0.004 -0.011 -0.013 -0.011 -0.023 -0.020 -0.022 -0.021 -0.010 -0.001 -0.012
(-1.988)** (-1.897)* (-1.971)* (-1.658)* (-1.652)* (-2.010)** (-1.625)* (-1.800)* (-1.702)* (-1.685)* (-1.810)* (-1.652)*
F value 12.026 10.093 12.015 15.701 15.912 17.407 12.009 15.970 17.510 22.847 24.274 24.580
P value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R* 0.428 0.417 0.338 0.488 0.389 0.300 0.375 0.537 0.471 0.372 0.405 0.425
Adi R1 0.405 0.379 0.311 0.411 0.366 0.295 0.327 0.517 0.461 0.359 0.388 0.410
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Table 14(continued)
Panel B: Excess Market Value, foreign currency derivatives and geographic diversity
Dependent variable:Excess MKT value
Independent variables 1998 1999 2000 All Years 
1998-2000
Constant 0.247 0.118 0.119 0.132 0.156 0.523 0.309 0.322 0.288 0.189 0.154 0.142
(0.660) (0.212) (0.236) (0.833) (0.708) (0.212) (0.965) (0.853) (0.582) (0.769) (0.234) (0.522)
DERVDUM 0.154 0.157 0.151 0.085 0.116 0.650 0.011 0.025 0.061 0.087 0.056 0.071
(2.402)** (1.799)* (1.910)* (1.981)* (1.842)* (2.436)** (1.961)* (1.872)* (1.862)* (2.093)** (2.103)** (2.052)**
GEOi 0.001 -0.011 0.051 0.050
(0.100) (0.167) (0.258) (1.357)
DERVDUM* GEOi -0.005 0.075 0.032 0.069
(-0.899) (1.208) (0.805) (1.768)*
g e o 2 0.073 0.051 0.216 0.042 0.003 0.005 0.065 0.062
(1.009) (0.686) (2.257)** (1.912)* (0.047) (0.261) (1.678)*) (1.688)*
DERVDUM*GEOj 0.202 0.231 0.033 0.122
(1.514) (1.980)** (2.833**) (2.099)**
Log (TA) -0.425 -0,577 -0.030 -0.125 -0.066 -0.067 -0.032 -0.125 -0.0542 -0.033 -0.021 -0.023
(-2.227)** (-1.925)* (0.519) (-1.229) (-1.991)* (1.882)* (-0.498) (-1.529) (-2.100)** (-2.079)** (2.825)*** (-2.320)**
ROA 0.249 0.143 0.345 0.076 0.290 0.305 0.056 0.053
(2.670)*** (1.921)** (3.108)*** (2.622)** (3.281)*** (2.450)** (2.371)** (2.211)**
EBIT 0.290 0.215 0.341 0.0321
(2.855)*** (1.972* (3.451)*** (2.152)**
DIVDUM -0.317 -0.169 -0.215 -0.242 -0.243 -0.429 -0.167 -0.153 -0.176 -0.222 -0.314 -0.216
(-3.384)*** (-2.044)** (2.282)** (-2.226)** (-2.587)** (-2.230)** (-2.290)** (-2.282)** (2.225)** (-2.095)** (-2.280)** (-2.110)**
LDEBTA -0.041 0.028 0.001 0.011 0.013 0.010 0.003 0.002 0.010 0.046 0.046 0.043
(-0.602) (1.054) (0.700) (0.119) (0.116) (2.022)** (0.044) (0.028) (0.213) (1.098) (1.098 (1.014)
INDIV -0.012 -0.022 -0.012 -0.001 -0.001 -0.012 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.015 -0.015 -0.014
(-1.951)* (-1.990)* (-1.921)* (-1.868)* (-1.873)* (-1.546) (-0.322) (-1.035) (-1.025) (-1.699)* (-1.699)* (-1.692)*
F  value 11.091 10.837 11.109 8.327 9.087 9.040 8.023 7.020 7.170 14.920 16.410 18.955
P value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 0.356 0.416 0.338 0.274 0.456 0.295 0.308 0.277 0.305 0.468 0.472 0.487
Adj R2 0.323 0.378 0.311 0.164 0.405 0.256 0.279 0.254 0.271 0.457 0.461 0.476
L /i
156
TABLE 15 
Distribution of the Governance Index
The table provides sample statistics on the distribution of the corporate governance index (G) in a sample of firms 
from the S&P 500 during the period 1993, 1995 and 1998 respectively. The sample consists of 1422 firm year 
observations. The Corporate Governance index (G) is used as a proxy for the level of agency in the firm. The G index 
is constructed using regulations and 24 distinct corporate governance provisions, which define the power sharing 
relationship between shareholders and managers. Firms that score from 0-5 (G£ 5) are considered to be in the 
Shareholder portfolio. Firms in the shareholder portfolio are considered to have a very low level of agency conflicts. 
Firms with a G index score of 14 and above (G > 14) are considered to be firms in the Management portfolio. Firms in 
the Management portfolio are considered to have a very high level of agency conflicts. Panel A shows the distribution 
of the index in the entire sample. In Panel B, the distribution of the G index is shown across 744 firms that have 
reported the use of currency hedging strategies (Forwards, options and/or currency'swap contracts) during 1993, 1995 
an 1998. Panel C, shows the distribution of the G index in a sample of 678 firms that did not report any type of foreign 
currency hedging contracts during the sample period. Panel D, shows the total number of firm across the G index 
deciles for the entire sample during the years 1993, 1995 and 1998. Foreign Currency Hedging data is obtained from 
the Firms’ 10-K annual Reports via the Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis and Retrieval database “EDGAR” and/or 
Annual Report Gallery.
Panel A
The distribution of the G index in the S&P 500 firms
Year M IN G Max G M ean G Med G St Dev G Total#
Firms
1993 2 16 9.592 10 2.759 459
1995 3 16 9.642 10 2.638 472
1998 3 16 9.557 10 2.648 491
All Years 2.67 16 9.597 10 ' 2.682 1422
Panel B The distribution of the G index in the S&P 500 Hedging firms
Year M IN G M axG M ean G Med G St Dev G Total#
Firms
1993 4 16 10.057 11 2.488 199
1995 4 16 10.076 11 2.480 242
1998 4 16 9.752 10 2.592 303
All Years 4 16 9.962 10.7 2.520 744
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Table 15 continued
Panel C______________________________________________________________________
The distribution of the G index in the S&P 500 Non- Hedging firms
Year M IN G Max G Mean G M ed G St Dev G Total#
Firms
1993 2 15 9.143 9 2.942 260
1995 3 15 9.105 9 2.747 230
1998 3 14 9.247 9 2.722 188
All years 2.67 14.67 9.165 9 2.800 678
Panel D
The total number of Hr ms in the S&P 500 across the G index Deciles
1993 % 1995 % 1998 %
G<S5 31 6.7 37 7.9 42 8.5
G=6 51 11.1 44 9.3 47 9.6
G=7 35 7.7 33 7.0 37 7.5
G=8 52 11.3 42 8.9 41 8.3
G=9 51 11.1 58 12.3 57 11.6
G=10 35 7.6 45 9.5 82 16.7
G = ll 85 18.5 92 19.5 70 14.3
G=12 69 15.0 67 14.2 56 11.4
G=13 32 6.9 34 7.2 38 7.7
G i l 4 18 3.9 20 4.2 21 4.2
Total 459 100 472 100 491 100
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TABLE 16 
Use of Foreign Currency Derivatives
The table presents the number and percentages o f US non-financial firms from the S&P 500 using foreign 
exchange currency derivatives during the years 1993, 1995 and 1998. The sample excludes Financial Firms 
in Finance, Insurance and Real Estate (2-Digit sic codes from 60-67). “Hedging” firms are defined as firms 
that have data on any type o f  Foreign Exchange Currency Derivatives (Forwards, Options, swaps) available 
in the firm’s 10-K Annual Reports in 1993, 1995 and 1998. “Non-Hedging” firms are defined as firms that 
do not report any type o f currency hedging activity in their annual reports. Firms that report other types of 
hedging activity (Commodity and/or Interest Rate hedging) are also included in the “Non-Hedgers” sample. 
Foreign Currency Hedging data is obtained from the Finns’ 10-K annual Reports via the Electronic Data 
Gathering, Analysis and Retrieval database “EDGAR” and/or Annual Report Gallery. Notional value o f  
foreign cunency derivatives is the contract amount o f  any foreign cunency forward, futures, swap or option 
(in millions) made by the firm, it represents the future cash flows under the contract. Mean Notional value 
(in millions) represents the average value of foreign currency contracts in each year in the hedging sample
Foreign exchange currency hedging profile for the S&P 500 Firms
Year #HedgingFirms %
# Non- 
Hedging 
firms
% Total %
Mean Notional 
Value of 
hedging
%
1993 199 43.4 260 56.6 459 100 1747 14.9
1995 242 51.3 230 48.7 472 100 2152 18.4
1998 303 61.7 188 38.3 491 100 7820 66.7
All Years 744 100 678 100 1422 100 11719 100
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TABLE 17 
Distribution of S&P 500 Hedging and Non-Hedging firms based on the G index 
Deciles
The table presents the total number and distribution of hedging and non-hedging firms across the deciles o f  
the corporate governance index (G) respectively. The sample consists o f  1422 firm year observations drawn 
from the S&P 500 non-financial firms during the years 1993, 1995 and 1998. The Corporate Governance 
index (G) is used as a proxy for the level o f agency in the firm. The G index is constructed using 
regulations and 24 distinct corporate governance provisions, which define the power sharing relationship 
between shareholders and managers. Firms that score from 0-5 (G<, 5) are considered to be in die 
Shareholder portfolio. Firms with a G index score of 14 and above (G > 14) are considered to be firms in 
the Management portfolio. Hedging firms (H) are firms that have data on any type o f Foreign Exchange 
Currency Derivatives (Forwards, Options, swaps) available in the firm’s 10-K Annual Reports in 1993, 
1995 and 1998. Non-Hedging (Non H) firms are defined as firms that do not report any type o f currency 
hedging activity in their annual reports. Firms that report other types o f hedging activity (Commodity 
and/or Interest Rate hedging) are also included in the Non-Hedgers sample. Foreign Currency Hedging data 
is obtained from the Firms’ 10-K annual Reports via the Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis and Retrieval 
database “EDGAR” and/or Annual Report Gallery.
G-index 1993 1995 1998
H N on-H H N on-H H N on-H
G^5 4 27 4 33 19 23
G=6 9 42 23 21 26 21
G=7 14 21 10 23 16 21
G=8 22 30 21 21 21 20
G=9 20 31 27 31 36 21
G=10 20 15 23 22 62 20
G = ll 44 41 63 29 48 22
G=12 39 30 40 27 35 21
G=13 17 15 21 13 24 14
G>14 10 8 10 10 16 5
Total 199 260 242 230 303 188
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
160
Table 18
Summary Statistics for US. Foreign Currency Hedging and Non-Hedging Firms.
The table presents the summary statistics o f some valuation and performance measurers of the S&P 500 
Non-financial firms that “used” or “have not used” foreign currency derivatives to hedge their exposure to 
currency risk during the years 1993, 1995 and 1998. The sample consists o f 1422 firm year observations. 
The sample includes firms that have data available on their foreign currency hedging activity in their 10-K 
annual reports dining the sample period. Firms with size less than $10 million, Financial Firms in Finance, 
Insurance and Real Estate (2-Digit SIC codes from 60-67) are excluded from the sample. Excess market 
value is defined as the market value o f equity less book value o f equity normalized by total sales. Tobin’s 
Q is computed as market value o f outstanding shares plus liquidation value o f preferred stock plus net 
current assets plus long term debt divided by total assets o f  the firm. Notional value o f foreign currency 
derivatives is the contract amount o f  any foreign currency forward, futures, swap or option made by the 
firm, it represents the future cash flows under the contract. Foreign exchange derivative dummy is a 
dummy variable that takes the value o f 1 if  the firm hedges its foreign currency exposure and equal zero 
otherwise. Total Assets is defined as current assets plus net property, plant and equipment plus other non 
current assets of the firm in millions o f dollars. Long-term debt is defined as Debt obligation due in more 
than one year from firm’s balance sheet (in millions). Long-term debt/total assets is the ratio o f the firm’s 
long term debt to its total assets. Return on assets is defined as the income before depreciation and other 
extraordinary items divided by total assets. Return on Equity is defined as Income before depreciation and 
other extraordinary items divided by common Equity. EBIT margin is defined as operating income after 
depreciation less cost o f goods sold, Selling, General & administrative expenses divided by net sales. 
Dividend pay out ratio is defined as the percentage o f the total amount o f dividends declared on the 
common stock divided by income before extraordinary items and discounted operations less preferred 
dividend requirements. Institutional ownership structure o f  the firm is defined as the percentage o f  the 
firm’s aggregate number o f shares held by institutions to the common shares outstanding. Except for the 
notional value o f derivatives and the hedge dummy, all other variables are obtained from the annual data 
files of the COMPUSTAT database. Panel A shows the summary statistics for the entire sample. Panels B 
and C show the statistics for hedging and non-hedging firms in the sample respectively.
Panel A: Summary statistics for the S&P 500 firms
Variables No. Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev.
Excess Market value 1422 1.83 0.91 2.56
Tobin’s Q
Notional Values o f  Foreign Currency
1422 2.07 1.49 1.91
Derivatives (in millions $) 1422 4266 0 16126
Foreign Exchange Derivative Dummy 1422 0.52 1 0.50
Total Assets 1417 10609 3630 27278
Long term debt 1414 21953 69287 48834
Long term debt/total asset 1414 20.36 18.06 15.51
Return on Assets 1417 6.82 6.42 7.18
Return on Equity 1417 16.41 14.01 25.30
EBIT 1417 13.81 12.58 13.99
Divided Pay out ratio 1417 44.85 24.7 276.7
Institutional ownership 1417 25.67 24.92 14.17
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Table 18 (continued)
Panel B: Summary statistics for the S&P 500 Hedging firms
Variables No. Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev.
Excess Market value 744 2.05 0.99 2.89
Tobin’s Q 744 2.27 1.56 2.24
Notional Values of Foreign Currency Derivatives 744 11719 7772.3 22159
(in millions $)
Foreign Exchange Derivative Dummy 744 1 1 0
Total Assets 744 10738 3750 28263
Long term debt 735 23077 7043 58347
Long term debt/total asset 735 21.84 18.42 15.81
Return on Assets 744 6.76 6.59 7.64
Return on Equity 744 16.61 16.41 22.89
EBIT 744 14.02 12.85 15.30
Divided Pay out ratio 698 50.80 24.30 77.14
Institutional ownership 712 25.40 20.22 14.49
Panel C: Summary statistics for the S&P 500 Non- Hedging firms
Variables No. Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev.
Excess Market value 678 1.57 0.85 2.13
Tobin’s Q 678 1.87 1.45 1.42
Notional Values of Foreign Currency Derivatives 
(in millions $)
678 0 0 0
Foreign Exchange Derivative Dummy 678 0 0 0
Total Assets 678 10480 3295 26212
Long term debt 668 19601 5015 54323
Long term debt/total asset 668 19.75 17.16 15.21
Return on Assets 678 6.88 6.34 6.66
Return on Equity 678 16.19 15.90 27.69
EBIT 678 13.58 12.11 12.44
Divided Pay out ratio 606 29.35 25.08 120.46
Institutional ownership 619 29.01 30.68 13.86
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Table 19
Summary Statistics for the S&P 500 Firms Across the G- index Deciles.
The table presents the summary statistics o f some valuation and firm specific measurers o f performance for the S&P 500 Non financial firms classified according to the G index deciles during the years 1993, 
1995 and 1998 respectively. The sample consists of 1422 firm year observations. The sample includes firms that have data available on their foreign currency hedging activity reported in their 10-K annual 
reports during the sample period. The sample also includes firms that have a reported G index score in each year respectively. Firms with size less than $10 million, Financial Firms in Finance, Insurance and 
Real Estate (2-Digit SIC codes from 60-67) are excluded from the sample. The valuation measures include Excess market value measure and the firm’s Tobin’s Q ratio. The firm’s notional value o f foreign 
currency derivatives is the contract amount of any foreign currency forward, futures, swap or option made by the firm, it represents the future cash flows under the contract. The rest o f the firm  specific and 
performance measures include: Total Assets (TA), Long term debt/total assets (LDEBTA), Institutional ownership structure o f the firm (INSTIT), Dividend pay out ratio (DIVP), Return on assets (ROA), 
Return on Equity (ROE) and the EBIT margin. Except for the notional value of derivatives and the G index score, all other variables are obtained from the annual files o f the COMPUSTAT data base. All 
these variables are defined in details in the previous tables. The table shows the mean, [median] and (STDEV.) for each variable respectively.
G index 
deciles
Tobin’s Q (Q) Excess Market 
value 
(EXMKT)
Notional value 
of derivatives 
( DERV)
Total
assets
(TA)
Long-term
debt/total
assets
(LDEBTA)
Institutional
investors
(INSTIT)
Dividend
Payout
ratio
(DIVP)
Return
on
Assets
(ROA)
Return on 
Equity 
(ROE)
Earning before 
interest and taxes 
(EBIT)
GS5 2.66 2.14 96 5663 20.37 29.84 23.84 8.89 23.08 14.81
[2.27] [1.70] [0] [3479] [16.87] [28.40] [20.89] [8.54] [17.13] [14.21]
(1.68) (2.10) (173) (7042) (17.29) (13.13) (47.81) (6.07) (33.99) (9.07)
G=6 1.88 1.52 418 8373 20.26 28.52 26.43 8.76 18.81 14.69
[1.33] [0.79] [0] [5102] [19.69] [27.81] [20.06] [7.52] [16.37] [14.05]
(1.44) (1.81) (895) (9164) (15.92) (14.61) (32.15) (6.45) (11.10) (8.94)
G=7 2.03 1.90 718 8770 15.39 29.48 25.90 7.66 16.81 16.45
[1.62] [0.91] [0] [3879] [12.82] [25.13] [22.83] [6.51] [15.94] [11.92]
(1.74) (2.84) (2027) (13442) (12.42) (10.49) (29.60) (6.46) (10.28) (11.74)
G=8 2.15 1.84 1008 8035 15.84 29.16 26.16 7.05 17.93 10.36
[1.37] [0.67] [0] [4073] [12.74] [29.91] [15.91] [6.15] [15.61] [11.78]
(2.07) (235) (350) (10862) (13.79) (14.96) (34.04) (8.89) (44.37) (26.29)
G=9 2.27 2.06 6813 14283 21.55 26.81 38.58 6.95 17.54 14.97
[1.49] [0.86] [0] [2954] [22.19] [25.94] [24.75] [6.70] [16.96] [13-29]
(2.04) (2.55) (4221) (3476) (11.83) (12.85) (112.9) (5.65) (13.84) (9.89)
G=10 2.07 1.89 13077 13383 27.31 26.43 28.73 6.41 15.03 14.25
[1.48] [0.88] [0] [5171] [27.21] [28.38] [26.03] [6.77] [15.63] [12.84]
(1.88) (2.55) (4131) (32195) (18.51) (16.20) (17.30) (7.41) (26.29) (9.14)
G = ll 1.94 1.49 2298 9419 21.56 22.75 29.36 6.98 16.37 14.48
[1.48] [0.88] [0] [2830] [18.94] [24.91] [24.04] [6.32] [15.84] [12.56]
(1.80) (1.88 (622) (26815) (14.71) (11.39) (131.7) (7.28) (16.22) (9.39)
G=12 2.12 2.28 1692 15274 22:59 22.19 39.38 5.59 16.03 12.11
[1.37] [0.76] [0] [3272] [21.92] [20.60] [25.05] [6.26] [15.23] [12.82]
(2.24) (4.01) (691) . (48945) (19.96) (15.30) (56.80) (8.92) (23.54) (15.88)
G=13 2.11 1.77 1625 11431 17.12 20.85 24.23 5.62 15.61 14.90
[1.38] [0.89] [0] [2937] [17.23] [20.44] [27.6] [5.52] [15.55] [13.31]
(2.60) (2.84) (1073) (30423) (10.89) (15.83) (51.79) (4.61) (7.76) (9.05)
G>14 1.70 1.36 481 10697 21.25 20.28 29.96 4.38 - 12.39 10.21
[1.30] [0.88] [0] [4437] [20.87] [17.73] [27.32] [3.65] [9.68] [9.09]
(1.44) (1.76) (873) (1634) (13.97) (13.49) (47.81) (5.57) (27.73) (8.23)
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Table 20
Industry Classification of US. Foreign Currency Hedging and Non-Hedging Firms Based on the 2
Digit SIC code
The table presents the industry classification (based on the 2-digit SIC code) and number of firms using foreign Exchange currency 
Derivatives for a sample of US. firms from the S&P 500 during the years 1993,1995 and 1998. The sample excludes Financial Firms 
in Finance, Insurance and Real Estate (2-Digit sic codes from 60-67). “Hedging” firms are defined as firms that have data on any type 
of Foreign Exchange Currency Derivatives (Forwards, Options, swaps) available in the firm’s 10-K Annual Reports in 1993,1995 and 
1998. “Non-Hedging” firms are defined as firms that do not report any type of currency hedging activity in their annual reports. Firms 
that report other types of hedging activity (Commodity and/or Interest Rate hedging) are also included in the “Non-Hedgers” sample. 
Foreign Currency Hedging data is obtained from the Firms’ 10-K annual Reports via the Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis and 
Retrieval database “EDGAR” and/or Annual Report Gallery. Panel A shows the industry classification code of hedging and non­
hedging firms in 1993. Panels B and C show their distribution in the years 1995 and 1998 respectively.
Panel A: 1993
2 Digit Sic 
Code
Title & Description of Industry # o fHedging
Firms
# of Non- 
Hedging 
Firms
13 Oil and Gas Extraction 0 23
14 Mining and Quarrying Nonmetal Minerals (Except Fuels) 0 2
17 Construction-Special Trade Contractors 2 2
20 Food and Kindered Products 10 9
24 Lumber and Wood Products, Except Furniture 3 2
25 Furniture and Fixtures 0 4
26 Paper and Allied Products 9 6
27 Printing, Publishing and Allied Industries 2 6
28 Chemicals and Allied Products 43 19
29 Petroleum Refining and Related Industries 7 2
30 Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastic Products 9 6
33 Primary Metal Products 2 4
34 Fabricated Metal Products. Except Machinery and Transportation 
Equipment
7 9
35 Industrial and Commercial Machinery and Computer Equipment 32 11
36 Electronics and Other Electronic Equipment 19 26
37 Transportation Equipment 15 9
38 Measuring, Analyzing and Controlling Instruments 15 19
39 Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries 7 2
42 Motor Freight Transportation, Warehousing 0 2
45 Air Transportation 0 4
47 Transportation Services 2 9
48 Communications 0 19
49 Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services 0 4
50 Whole Sale Trade- Durable Goods 3 2
51 Whole Sale Trade -  Non Durable Goods 0 2
55 Automotive Dealers, Gas Service Stations 0 10
58 Eating and Drinking Places 0 2
59 Miscellaneous Retail 2 5
73 Business Services 10 32
75 Automotive Repair Services and Parking 0 4
87 Engineering, Accounting and Research Services 0 4
Total 199 260
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Table 20 (continued)
Panel B: 1995
2 Digit Sic 
Code
Title & Description of Industry # o f
Hedging
Firms
# of Non- 
Hedging 
Firms
13 Oil and Gas Extraction 9 15
14 Mining and Quarrying Nonmetal Minerals (Except Fuels) 0 2
17 Construction-Special Trade Contractors 0 5
20 Food and Kindered Products 14 7
24 Lumber and Wood Products, Except Furniture 0 5
25 Furniture and Fixtures 3 2
26 Paper and Allied Products 11 5
27 Printing, Publishing and Allied Industries 3 7
28 Chemicals and Allied Products 55 18
29 Petroleum Refining and Related Industries 7 2
30 Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastic Products 7 9
33 Primary Metal Products 4 2
34 Fabricated Metal Products. Except Machinery and Transportation 
Equipment
7 9
35 Industrial and Commercial Machinery and Computer Equipment 35 9
36 Electronics and Other Electronic Equipment 32 15
37 Transportation Equipment 16 9
38 Measuring, Analyzing and Controlling Instruments 18 15
39 Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries 7 2
42 Motor Freight Transportation, Warehousing 0 2
45 Air Transportation 3 2
47 Transportation Services 4 7
48 Communications 0 20
49 Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services 0 5
50 Whole Sale Trade-Durable Goods 0 5
51 Whole Sale Trade -  Non Durable Goods 0 7
55 Automotive Dealers, Gas Service Stations 0 2
58 Eating and Drinking Places 3 2
59 Miscellaneous Retail 4 5
73 Business Services 0 31
75 Automotive Repair Services and Parking 0 2
87 Engineering, Accounting and Research Services 0 2
Total 242 230
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Table 20 (continued)
Panel C: 1998
2 Digit Sic 
Code
Title & Description of Industry # o fHedging
Firms
# of Non- 
Hedging 
Firms
13 Oil and Gas Extraction 3 21
14 Mining and Quarrying Nonmetal Minerals (Except Fuels) 0 2
17 Construction-Special Trade Contractors 5 0
20 Food and Kindered Products 16 5
24 Lumber and Wood Products, Except Furniture 0 5
25 Furniture and Fixtures 5 0
26 Paper and Allied Products 11 5
27 Printing, Publishing and Allied Industries 0 10
28 Chemicals and Allied Products 53 12
29 Petroleum Refining and Related Industries 2 7
30 Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastic Products 14 2
33 Primary Metal Products 5 2
34 Fabricated Metal Products. Except Machinery and Transportation 
Equipment
11 5
35 Industrial and Commercial Machinery and Computer Equipment 41 5
36 Electronics and Other Electronic Equipment 29 18
37 Transportation Equipment 23 2
38 Measuring, Analyzing and Controlling Instalments 27 10
39 Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries 9 0
42 Motor Freight Transportation, Warehousing 0 2
45 Air Transportation 3 2
47 Transportation Services 3 7
48 Communications 5 15
49 Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services 0 5
50 Whole Sale Trade- Durable Goods 2 5
51 Whole Sale Trade -  Non Durable Goods 0 2
55 Automotive Dealers, Gas Service Stations 2 5
58 Eating and Drinking Places 2 2
59 Miscellaneous Retail 7 2
73 Business Services 25 26
75 Automotive Repair Services and Parking 0 2
87 Engineering, Accounting and Research Services 0 2
Total 303 188
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Table 21 
Univariate Analysis of the Agency Costs Between Hedging and Non- Hedging firms 
Based on the G Index.
The table presents univariate analysis of mean [median] values of the Corporate Governance Index (G) across a sample 
of Hedging ( G I h )  and Non Hedging ( G I mh)  firms obtained from the S&P 500 firms during the years 1993,1995 and 
1998. The sample consists of 1422 firm year observations. The sample includes Non Financial firms that have data 
available on their foreign currency hedging activity as well as information on their level of agency conflict as proxied 
by the Corporate Governance index (G). The G index is constructed using regulations and 24 distinct corporate 
governance provisions, which defme the power sharing relationship between shareholders and managers. 
Currency hedging information is available in the firms’ 10-K annual reports. Financial Firms in Finance, Insurance and 
Real Estate (2-Digit sic codes from 60-67) are excluded from the sample. “Hedging” firms are defined as firms that 
have data on any type of Foreign Exchange Currency Derivatives (Forwards, Options, swaps) available in the firm’s 
10-K Annual Reports from 1993-1998. “Non-Hedging” firms are defined as firms that do not report any type of 
currency hedging activity in their annual reports. Firms that report other types of hedging activity (Commodity and/or 
Interest Rate hedging) are included in the “Non-Hedging” sample. The significance o f means is computed by one­
way ANOVA. Non-parametric Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test is used to test for the differences of the median o f  
G across hedging and non-hedging firms. ***, **, And * denote statistical significance for difference of 
groups at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
Years GIh
(1)
GInh
(2)
(1-2) P-value
1993 10.057 9.143 0.911** 0.026[11.1]
(n=199)
[9]
(n=260)
[2.1]** [0.03]
1995 10.076 9.105 0.971** 0.011
[11-4] [9] [2.4]** [0.016]
(n=242) (n=230)
1998 9.752 9.247 0.505** 0.017
[10.1] [9] [0.35]** [0.011]
(n=303) (n=188)
All Years 9.962 9.165 0.797*** 0.000
[10.67] [9.00] [1.67]*** [0.001]
(n=744) (n=678)
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Table 22
Univariate Analysis of the performance and firm specific characteristics of Hedging and Non-Hedging firms Based on the G Index.
The table presents univariate analysis mean [median] values of some performance and firm-specific variables for our sample of foreign exchange currency hedgers and non­
hedgers during the period 1993,1995 and 1998. The sample consists of 1422 Non Financial firms that have data available on their foreign currency hedging activity in their 10-K 
annual reports. Firms with size less than $10 million. Financial Firms in Finance, Insurance and Real Estate (2-Digit sic codes from 60-67) are also excluded from the sample. The 
classification of “Hedging” firms and “Non-Hedging” firms is the same as that described above. Performance and firm-specific variables are defined, as before, in the previous 
tables. The significance of means difference between foreign currency hedgers and non-hedgers is computed by one-way ANOVA. Non-parametric Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test is 
used to test for the difference of medians of hedgers and non-hedgers. ***, **, And * denote statistical significance for difference of groups at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively. Panel A shows the univariate analysis of all firms in all deciles of G. Panels B and C show the univariate analysis of firms in the Shareholder portfolio and in the 
Management portfolio respectively.
Panel A: firms across the G- index deciles_________________________________________________________________________________________________
1993 1995 1998
Hedging
(D
Non-
Hedging
(2)
(1-2) P-Value
Hedging
0 )
Non-
Hedging
(2)
(1-2) P-Value
Hedging
0 )
Non-
Hedging
(2)
(1-2) P-Value
11025 6915 4110 0.241 11838 7883 3955 0.255 14028 10550 3478** 0.043
TA
[2319]
(n=199)
[3255]
(n=267)
[936]** [0.023] [3503]
(n=242)
[2763]
(n=230)
[740]** [0.020] [5502]
(n=303)
[4971] 
(n=l 88)
[531]** [0.030]
16.55 18.57 -2.02 0.321 19.10 18.25 0.85* 0.070 25.12 24.18 0.94* 0.065
LDEBTA
[14.07]
(n=199)
[16.6]
(n=267)
[-2.45] [0.364] [16.97]
(n=242)
[16.55]
(n=230)
[0.4]* [0.056] [21.8]
(n=303)
[19.7] 
(n=l 88)
[2.1]** [0.050]
28.39 28.84 -0.46 0.319 28.31 28.99 -0.68 0.336 28.01 30.08 -2.07* 0.091
INSTIT
[28.66]
(n=199)
[30.72]
(n=267)
[-2.06] [0.229] [28.6]
(n=242)
[30.94]
(n=230)
[-2.34]* [0.097] [29.14]
(n=303)
[31.13]
(n=188)
[-1.99]* [0.072]
12.80 13.38 -0.58** 0.053 11.71 15.54 -3.83*** 0.012 14.50 14.58 -0.08*** 0.010
EBIT
[10.78]
(n=199)
[11.54]
(n=267)
[-0.82]** [0.036] [12.38]
(n=242)
[14.18]
(n=230)
[-1.80]** [0.025] [12.88]
(n=303)
[13.09] 
(n=l 88)
[-0.21]** [0.037]
6.10 6.56 -0.46** 0.039 7.30 7.31 -0.01 0.999 6.39 7.94 -1.55** 0.021
ROA
[5.06] 
(n=l 99)
[5.88]
(n=267)
[-0.82]** [0.025] [6.78]
(n=242)
[7.36]
(n=230)
[-0.53]* [0.091] [6.66]
(n=303)
[6.71] 
(n=l 88)
[-0.05]* [0.054]
12.59 14.68 -2.09* 0.063 16.17 16.72 -0.55* 0.0% 18.50 19.73 -123** 0.024
ROE
[13.75]
(n=199)
[14.71]
(n=267)
[-0.96]** [0.035] [16.55]
(n=242)
[16:91]
(n=230)
[-0.36] [0.203] [16.01]
(n=303)
[17.38]
(n=188)
[-1.37]* [0.052]
94.55 57.7 36.85** 0.020 28.30 23.30 5.00*** 0.008 37.7 31.72 5.98*** 0.004
DIVP [28.31]
(n=199)
[26.94]
(n=267)
[1.37]*** [0.000] [22.83]
(n=242)
[22.17]
(n=230)
[0.66]** [0.030] [26.20]
(n=303)
[24.90]
(n=188)
[1.30]*** [0.002]
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Table 22 continued
Panel B: firms in the Shareholder Portfolio (G £  5)
1993 1995 1998
Hedging
(1)
Non-
Hedging
(2)
d -2 ) P-Value
Hedging
(1)
Non-
Hedging
(2)
(1-2) P-Value
Hedging
(1)
Non-
Hedging
(2)
(1-2) P-Value
6812 15198 -8368 0.589 11646 3570 8076*** 0.009 15678 11645 4033*** 0.000
TA [5012]
(«=4)
[3940]
(n=27)
[1072]* [0.10] [11544]
(n=4)
[2424]
(n=33)
[9120]*** [0.000] [9358]
(ii=19)
[8916]
(n=22)
[442]*** [0.000]
23.31 21.70 [1.61* 0.090 45.1 27.27 17.83** 0.030 25.62 27.30 -1.68 0.887
LDEBTA
[22.30]
(n-4)
[14.81]
(n=27)
[7.49]* [0.100] [40.20]
(n=4)
[19.07]
(n=33)
[21.13]*** [0.000] [18.04]
(n=19)
[20.58]
[n=22)
[-2.54] [0.200]
22.40 27.70 -5.30 0.585 59.4 61.20 -1.80 0.233 59.01 67.62 -8.62 0.172
INSTIT
[22.7]
(n=4)
[23.40]
(n=27)
[3.30] [0.196] [59.2]
(n=4)
[63.41]
(n=33)
[-4.27] [0.443] [57.43]
(n=19)
[66.67]
(n=22)
[-9.24] [0.236]
20.45 9.27 11.18** 0.015 34.50 11.98 22.52** 0.020 18.22 13.32 4.90*** 0.010
EBIT
[17.63]
(n-4)
[7.08]
(n=27)
[10.55]** [0.021] [33.45]
(n=4)
[8.47]
(n=33)
[24.98]** [0.015] [16.71]
(n=19)
[11.48]
(n=22)
[5.23]** [0.027]
14.4 10.5 3.90** 0.050 11.64 6.72 4.68** 0.022 9.07 6.97 2.10** 0.033
ROA
[13.15]
(n=4)
[5.66]
(n=27)
[7.49] [0.112] [11.75]
(n=4)
[6.75]
(n=33)
[5.00]*** [0.000] [10.92]
(n=19)
[6.25]
(n=22)
[4.67]*** [0.024]
23.80 12.55 11.25** 0.043 14.05 33.50 -19.45 0.650 41.18 18.77 22.41* 0.064
ROE
[26.29]
(n-4)
[12.34]
(n=27)
[13.95]** [0.035] [13.05]
(n-4)
[14.79]
(n=33)
[-1.74] [0.203] [18.97]
(n=19)
[17.44]
(n=22)
[1.53]* [0.052]
34.87 27.00 7.87*** 0.008 39.41 29.45 . 9.96** 0.017 35.06 24.60 10.46** 0.041
DIVP [33.75]
(n-4)
[16.03]
(n=27)
[17.72]*** [0.000] [34.18]
(n=4)
[25.28]
(n=33)
[8.90]*** [0.000] [32.29]
(n=19)
[26.34]
(n=22)
[5.95]*** [0.001]
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Table 23
The Determinants of Foreign Currency Hedging
The table presents the results o f  a logit regression that relates firm characteristics and some o f its operating 
measures of performance to its hedging profile. The sample includes 1422 firm year observations drawn 
from the S&P 500 non-financial firms. The dependent variable is the foreign exchange derivative dummy 
(FCD dummy) that takes the value o f  1 i f  the firm reports a notional value o f derivative in its 10-K annual 
report and zero otherwise. The independent variables include the following; Corporate Governance Index 
(G), Log o f Total Assets (log TA), defined as current assets plus net property, plant and equipment plus 
other non current assets o f  the firm in millions o f  dollars. Return on assets (ROA) is defined as the income 
before depreciation and other extraordinary items divided by total assets. Return on Equity (ROE) is 
defined as Income before depreciation and other extraordinary items divided by common Equity. Long­
term Debt/ total assets (LDEBTA) ratio is defined as the percentage o f total debt divided by total assets. 
EBIT margin is defined as operating income after depreciation less cost o f goods sold, Selling, General & 
administrative expenses divided by net sales. Firm Dividend pay out ratio (DIVP) is defined as the 
percentage o f the total amount o f dividends declared on the common stock divided by income before 
extraordinary items and discounted operations less preferred dividend requirements. T values o f  
coefficients are in parenthesis. ***, **, And * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively. Panel A presents the result o f  the regression for the sample pooled across the G index deciles. 
Panels B and C present the results o f the regression for firms in the Shareholder portfolio and Management 
portfolio respectively.
Dependent variable: 
FCD dummy
Independent variables Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3
G 0.0975 0.0968 0.0976
(2.784)*** (2.7581)*** (2.785)***
Log(TA) 0.0343 0.0271 0.0347
(1.7090)** (1.5606)** (1.702)**
LDEBTA 0.0018 0.0011 0.0021
(0.268) (0.169) (0.3051)
INSTIT -0.01413 -0.0142 -0.0144
(-2.406)*** (-2.457)*** (-2.483)***
ROA -0.0051
(-2.329)**
ROE 0.0031
(0.611)
EBIT -0.0019
(-2.263)**
DIVP -0.0019 -0.002 -0.0020
(-1.4037) (-1.389) (-1.388)
Logliklihood -284.77 -284.23 -284.79
# obs D=T 742 743 744
# obs D=0 678 678 678
convergence 0.001 0.001 0.001
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Table 24
Univariate Valuation Measures of Hedging and Non-Hedging Firms Based on the
“G”index.
The table presents the mean and [median] hedging premium/discount of US. non- financial firms 
that have hedged their currency exposure during the years 1993, 1995 and 1998. The sample 
covers 1422 firms from the S&P500 firms that have data available on their foreign currency 
hedging activity in their 10-K annual reports. The sample does not cover firms in Financial Firms 
in Finance, Insurance and Real Estate (2-Digit sic codes from 60-67). Firms with total assets less 
than $ 10 million are also excluded from the sample. Valuation measures used are Tobin’s Q 
(Panel A) and Excess Market value (Panel B). Tobin’s Q is computed as market value of 
outstanding shares plus liquidation value of preferred stock plus net current assets plus long term 
debt divided by total assets of the firm. Excess market value is defined as the market value of 
equity less book value of equity normalized by total sales. The significance of means difference 
between foreign currency hedgers and non-hedgers is computed by one-way ANOVA. Non- 
parametric Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test is used to test for the difference of medians of hedgers and 
non-hedgers. ***, **, And * denote statistical significance for difference of groups at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels respectively.
Panel A: Firms across the G index deciles_________ ______________________________ _________________
Excess Market Value
Hedging
Firms
(1)
Non-
Hedging
Firms
(2)
(1-2) P-value
Hedging
Firms
Non-
Hedging
Firms (1-2)
P-
value
1993
1.824
[1.368]
(n=199)
1.725
[1.356]
(n=260)
0.099
[0.012]
0.671
[0.852]
1.660
[0.812]
(n=199)
1.380
[0.741]
(n=260)
0.280
[0.071]
0.359
[0.944]
1995
1.885
[1.495]
(n=242)
1.874
[1.345]
(n=230)
0.011
[0.150]**
0.976
[0.028]
1.740
[0.797]
(n=242)
1.490
[0.769]
(n=230)
0.250
[0.028]**
0.216
[0.049]
1998 2.848[1.809]
(n=303)
2.260
[1.575]
(n=188)
0.248**
[0.234]**
0.020
[0.036]
2.555
[1.418]
(n=303)
1.986
[0.973]
(n=188)
0.569**
[0.445]**
0.026
[0.016]
All
Years
2.273
[1.647]
(n=744)
1.870
[1.617]
(n=678)
0.011***
[0.030]**
0.023
[0.031]
2.122
[1.119]
(n=744)
1.907
[1.081]
(n=678)
0.215**
[0.038]***
0.030
[0.002]
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Table 24 (continued)
Panel B: Firms in the shareholder Portfolio (G S 5)_______________________________
Tobin’s Q Excess market value
Hedging
Firms
Non-
Hedging
Firms (1-2)
P-value HedgingFirms
Non-
Hedging
Firms (1-2)
P-
value
1993
1.680
[1.457]
(n=4)
2.280
[2.457]
(n=27)
-0.600
[-1.000]
0.317
[0.234]
1.159
[1.011]
(n=4)
1.507
[1.529]
(n=27)
-0.348
[-0.518]
0.564
[0.684]
1995
2.490
[2.570]
(n=4)
1.760
[1.766]
(n=33)
0.730
[0.804]
0.529
[0.770]
1.910
[1.795]
(n=4)
1.290
[1.269]
(n=33)
0.620
[0.526]
0.532
[0.637]
1998 4.220[4.146]
(n=19)
3.370
[3.364]
(n=22)
0.850
[0.782]
0.467
[0.497]
3.830
[3.431]
(n=19)
3.330
[2.889]
(n=22)
0.500
[0.542]
0.734
[0.724]
All
Years
2.897
[2.705]
(n=27)
2.558
[2.205]
(n=82)
0.339**
[0.500]**
0.049
[0.039]
2.482
[2.460]
(n=27)
2.240 
‘ [1.870] 
(n=82)
0.242
[0.590]
0.275
[0.571]
Panel C: Firms in the Management Portfolio (G > 14)____________________________
Tobin’s Q Excess market value
Hedging
Firms
Non-
Hedging
Firms (1-2)
P-value HedgingFirms
Non-
Hedging
Firms (1-2)
P-
value
1993
2.584
[2.351]
(n=10)
0.981
[0.862]
(n=8)
1.603***
[1.489]***
0.010
[0.009]
1.842
[1.183]
(n=10)
0.628
[0.414]
(n=8)
1.214**
[0.769]**
0.043
[0.045]
1995
1.700
[1.523]
(n=10)
1.640
[1.173]
(n=10)
0.060*
[0.350]*
0.074
[0.062]
1.198
[1.134]
(n=10)
0.881
[0.562]
(n=10)
0.317*
[0.572]**
0.056
[0.024]
1998 1.874[1.049]
(n=16)
1.357
[0.945]
(n=5)
0.517**
[0.104]**
0.040
[0.030]
1.090
[0.832]
(n=16)
1.540
[0.774]
(n=5)
0.450*
[0.058]*
0.092
[0.059]
All
Years
2.033
[1.810]
(n=36)
1.630
[0.950]
(n=23)
0.403**
[0.860]**
0.0486
[0.042]
1.344
[1.130]
(n=36)
1.316
[0.570]
(n=23)
0.028**
[0.560]**
0.030
[0.022]
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
173
Table 25
Foreign Currency Derivative Use Agency Costs and Firm Value
The table presents the results of a cross sectional OLS regression that relates the firm’s valuation measures to its 
hedging profile. The dependent variables are the firms’ valuation measures; Tobin’s Q (Panel A) and Excess market 
value (Panel B). Panel A1 presents the results of OLS regression of firms that are pooled across the G index deciles 
and where Tobin’s Q is the dependent variable. Panels A2 and A3 present the results of the same OLS regression of 
firms in the shareholder portfolio (G<5) and firms in the Management portfolio (G>14) respectively. Panel B1 presents 
the results of OLS regression where the Firm’s Excess market value is the dependent variable and the sample includes 
firms pooled across the G index deciles. Panels B2 and B3 show the same OLS regression for firms in the Shareholder 
Portfolio and Management Portfolio respectively. The independent variables are: the gross notional value of foreign 
exchange contracts (DERV), the foreign exchange derivative dummy (DERV Dummy), which is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1 if the firm hedges its foreign currency exposure and equal zero otherwise, log Total Assets log 
(TA), Long-term debt/Assets (LDEBTA) ratio is defined as the percentage of total debt divided by total assets. 
(rNSTIT) is Institutional ownership it is defined as the percentage of the firm’s aggregate number of shares held by 
institutions to the common shares outstanding. Return on assets (ROA), Return on Equity (ROE) is defined as Income 
before depreciation and other extraordinary items divided by common Equity. EBIT margin is defined as operating 
income after depreciation less cost of goods sold, Selling, General & administrative expenses divided by net sales. 
Dividend pay out (DIVP) is defined as the percentage of the total amount of dividends declared on the common stock 
divided by income before extraordinary items and discounted operations less preferred dividend requirements. T values 
of coefficients are in parenthesis. ***, **, And * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respective
Panel A l: Firms across the G index deciles
Dependent 
Variable: 
Tobin’s Q
Independent
Variables
Regression
1
Regression
2
Regression
3
Regression
4
Regression
5
Regression
6
Constant 0.0483 0.8983 0.7756 0.3360 0.3331 0.3214
(0.523) (0.351) (0.365) (0.595) (0.408) (0.429)
DERV 0.0041 0.0551 0.0512
(0.335) (0.402) (0.390)
DERVDUM 0.1971 0.1871 0.1919
(2.137)** (2.0667)** (2.1007)**
Log (TA) -0.1549 -0.1667 -0.1805 -0.1473 -0.1594 -0.1725
(-2.557)*** (-2.7247)*** (-2.933)*** (-2.435)*** (-2.601)*** (-2.807)***
LDEBTA 0.0005 -0.0034 -0.0022 0.00067 -0.003 -0.0021
(0.0915) (-0.5583) (-0.374) (0.109) (-0.536) (-0.351)
INSTIT -0.0203 -0.0221 -0.0214 -0.0205 -0.0222 -0.0216
(-3.053)*** (-3.299)*** (-3.208)*** (-3.069)*** (-3.308)*** (-3.222)***
EBIT 0.0082 0.0081
(1.403)** (1.380)*
ROA 0.0362 0.0362
(2.574)*** (2.564)***
ROE 0.0033 0.0035
(0.7671) (0.814)
DIVP -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0003
(-0.181) (-0.330) (-0.328) (-0.2472) (-0.390) (-0.390)
F value 4.1459 3.0440 3.3039 3.9381 2.8747 3.1196
P value 0.000*** 0.006*** 0.003*** 0.000*** 0.009*** 0.005***
R2 0.0556 0.04167 0.0448 0.0532 0.0394 0.0424
Adi R2 0.0422 0.0279 0.0312 • 0.0395 0.0257 0.0288
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Table 25 (Continued)
Panel A2: F irm s in the Shareholder Portfolio
Dependent 
Variable: 
Tobin’s Q
Independent
Variables
Regression
1
Regression
2
Regression
3
Regression
4
Regression
5
Regression
6
Constant 0.3570 0.6130 0.6692 0.441 0.4730 0.878
(0.172) (0.553) (0.622) (0.244) (0.633) (0.538)
DERV 0.3104 0.4202 0.4676
(2.227)** (2.821)** (2.317)**
DERVDUM 0.4288 -0.2102 -0.2452
(1.416) (-0.707) (-0.875)
Log(TA) -0.233 -0.2063 -0.1920 -1.5404 -1.1592 -1.1916
(-2.390)** (-2.019)** (-1.795)* (-4.727)*** (-4.998)*** (-4.607)***
LDEBTA -0.0020 -0.0012 -0.0022 -0.0116 -0.0414 -0.0415
(-0.040) (-0.1813) (-0.319) (-0.885) (-3.834797) (-2.150)**
INSTIT 0.0013 -0.0033 -0.0014 0.0968 0.8716 -0.0033
(2.113)** (-0.267) (-0.106) (3.720)*** (3.188)*** (-1.249)
EBIT 0.0061 0.365
(2.398** (4.920)***
ROA 0.0396 0.133
(2.335)** (3.407)***
ROE -0.0001 0.116
(-0.030) (0.838)
DIVP 0.0001 -0.0033 0.0009 0.6147 0.0036 0.0130
(0.155) (-0.267) (0.7789) (1.8925) (3.652)*** (2.963)**
F value 3.2054 2.817208 2.651626 7.955727 10.055 8.9644
P value 0.009*** 0.030** 0.036** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
R2 0.3115 0.2345 0.2210 0.9557 0.9679 0.9196
AdjR2 0.0530 0.0524 0.0421 0.8229 0.8716 0.8972
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Table 25 ( continued)
Panel A3: F irm s in the M anagem ent Portfolio
Dependent 
Variable: 
Tobin’s 0
Independent
Variables
Regression
1
Regression
2
Regression
3
Regression
4
Regression
5
Regression
6
Constant 0.1563 0.1629 0.1418 0.752 0.770 0.873
(0.427) (0.489) (0.500) (0.893) (1.072) (0.370)
DERV 0.009 0.092 0.0017
(0.985) (1.017) (1.591)
DERVDUM 0.816 0.790 1.121
(2.097)** (2.089)** (3.183)***
Log (TA) -0.346 -0.399 -0.524 -0.241 -0.323 -0.5045
(-1.851)* (-1.975)* (-2.579)*** (-1.663)* (-1.518)* (-2.157)**
LDEBTA 0.014 0.011 -0.009 0.0246 0.0153 -0.018
(0.571) (0.577) (-0.558) (0.858) (0.671) (-0.944)
INSTIT -0.012 -0.013 -0.028 0.0013 -0.0028 -0.0189
(-2.643)** (-0.742) (-1.586) (2.068)** (-0.154) (-0.939)
EBIT 0.021 0.037
(2.762)*** (1.135)
ROA 0.072 0.1111
(1.647) (2.651)***
ROE 0.044 0.061
(2.132)** (3.034)***
DIVP -0.0005 -0.002 -0.004 -0.001 -0.004 -0.009
(-0.102) (-0.521) (-0.802) (-0.199) (-0.886) (-1.368)
F value 4.2307 4.7787 3.4731 3.0924 3.5780 2.5991
P value 0.008*** 0.004*** 0.010*** 0.030** 0.010*** 0.010***
R2 0.5018 0.5443 0.4526 0.4240 0.4721 0.2757
AdjR2 0.3831 0.4304 0.3223 0.2869 0.3401 0.1033
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Table 25 (Continued)
Panel B 1: F irm s across the G  index Deciles
Dependent
Variable:
Excess
Market
value
Independent Regression Regression Regression Regression Regression Regression
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6
Constant 0.249 0.718 0.668 0.306 0.790 0.656
(0.565) (0.998) (0.994) (0.121) (0.991) (0.690)
DERV 0.1250 0.0891 0.092
(1.502)* (1.480)* (1.550)*
DERVDUM 0.263 0.2605 0.2671
(2.124)** (2.105)** (2.139)**
Log (TA) -0.297 -0.308 -0.3186 -0.2884 -0.2976 -0.3006
(-3.634)*** (-3.762)*** (-3.863)*** (-3.531)*** (-3.643)*** (-3.674)***
LDEBTA 0.0061 0.0007 0.0038 0.0054 -0.0001 0.0022
(0.756) (0.092) (0.484) (0.662) (-0.036) (0.293)
INSTIT -0.0221 -0.0235 -0:0232 -0.022 -0.0234 -0.0231
(-2.501)** (-2.651)*** (-2.630)*** (-2.485)*** (-2.641)*** (-2.617)***
EBIT 0.0055 0.0043
(1.690)* (0.535)
ROA 0.0286 0.0273
(1.512)** (1.436)*
ROE 0.0010 -0.0009
(0.201) (-0.174)
DIVP -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.597
(-0.427) (-0.497) (-0.500) (-0.519) (-0.575) (-2.103)**
F value 3.6757 3.2682 3.3606 3.7010 3.3506 4.0715
P value 0.001*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.003*** 0.000***
R2 0.04662 0.04184 0.04271 0.0469 0.0428 0.0520
Adj R2 0.03393 0.02904 0.03006 0.0342 0.0300 0.0392
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
177
Table 25 (continued)
Panel B2: F irm s in  the Shareholder Portfolio
Dependent
Variable:
Excess
Market
value
Independent
Variables
Regression
1
Regression
2
Regression
3
Regression
4
Regression
5
Regression
6
Constant 0.4001 0.756 0.626 0.4008 0.1294 0.0506
(0.338) (0.358) (0.877) (0.349) (0.126) (0.105)
DERV 0.2432 0.0149 0.2056
(1.123) (1.126) (1.221)
DERVDUM -0.1266 0.1462 0.0389
(-0.283) (0.319) (0.079)
Log (TA) 0.2286 0.1999 0.0628 0.7826 0.6958 0.6373
(1.502)* (1.831)** (2.3400)** (2.239)** (4.961)*** (2.300)**
LDEBTA 0.0061 -0.0072 -0.0018 -0.0418 -0.0312 -0.0370
(0.572) (-0.588) (-0.149) (-1.024) (-2.354)** (-1.432)
INSTIT 0.0012 -0.0187 -0.0018 0.0112 0.0407 0.0125
(0.067) (-0.971) (-0.089) (0.465) (2.321)** (0.569)
EBIT 0.6799 0.3484
(2.794)** (0.338)
ROA 0.1361 0.0003
(2.884)*** (0.004)
ROE 0.3700 0.0099
(1.398) (2.453)**
DIVP -0.0005 -0.004 0.00179 0.0013 0.0004 0.0017
(-0.239) (-0.823) (0.8396) (0.850) (0.484) (0.981)
F value 2.16191 1.9238 2.181953 2.1365 7.4260 2.2373
P value 0.048** 0.061* 0.053* 0.080* 0.001*** 0.055*
R2 0.3709 0.2170 0.2437 0.1803 0.9369 0.1171
AdjR2 0.1993 0.1017 0.0375 0.0331 0.8107 0.0521
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T able 25 (Continued)
Panel B3: F irm s in the M anagem ent Portfolio
Dependent
Variable:
Excess
Market
value
Independent
Variables
Regression
1
Regression
2
Regression
3
Regression
4
Regression
5
Regression
6
Constant 1.8611 1.352 1.724 0.3873 1.166 1.1932
(0.956) (0.190) (0.198 (0.199) (0.619) (0.287)
DERV .00075 0.0031 0.0006
(0.089) (0.158) (0.745)
DERVDUM 0.6121 0.682 0.822
(1.947)** (2.044)** (2.844)***
Log (TA) -0.103 -0.1555 -0.1810 -0.0173 -0.074 -0.1211
(-0.709) (-2.071)** (-2.271)** (-2.115)** (-2.487)*** (-2.748)***
LDEBTA 0.0145 0.0133 0.005 0.015 0.0117 -0.0034
(0.994) (1.039) (0.532) (0.924) (0.756) (-0.267)
INSTIT -0.0103 -0.0125 -0.016 0.0031 -0.0001 -0.0060
(-0.684) (-0.868) (-1.163) (0.213) (-0.008) (-0.386)
EBIT 0.0218 0.0310
(0.931) (1.1366)
ROA 0.0474 0.080
(1.350) (2.456)***
ROE 0.0226 0.0399
(1.272) (2.308)**
DIVP 0.001 0.0003 -0.0003 0.007 -0.001 -0.004
(0.268) (0.089) (-0.328) (0.173) (-0.296) (-0.807)
F value 2.382 2.4040 2.11008 2.4732 2.3139 2.4798
P value 0.030** 0.020** 0.001*** 0.020** 0.029** 0.070*
R2 0.3512 0.3640 0.3241 0.2508 0.2382 0.2138
AdjR2 0.2031 0.2126 0.1705 0.0805 0.0569 0.0983
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Appendix A
The Corporate Governance Provisions
This appendix describes the provisions, laws and regulations used as components of the 
Governance Index. The shorthand title of each provision is given in bold. These 
descriptions are taken from Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2001).
Antigreenmail -  Greenmail refers to the agreement between a large shareholder and a 
company in which the shareholder agrees to sell his stock back to the company, usually at 
a premium, in exchange for the promise not to seek control of the company for a 
specified period of time. Antigreenmail provisions prevent such arrangements unless the 
same repurchase offer is made to all shareholders or the transaction is approved by 
shareholders through a vote. They are thought to discourage accumulation of large blocks 
of stock because one source of exit for the stake is closed, but the net effect on 
shareholder wealth is unclear. Five states have specific antigreenmail laws, and two other 
states have “recapture of profits” laws, which enable firms to recapture raiders’ profits 
earned in the secondary market. Recapture of profits laws are considered to be a version 
of antigreenmail laws (albeit a stronger one). The
antigreenmail category includes both firms with the provision and those incorporated in 
states with either antigreenmail or recapture of profits laws.
Blank check preferred stock -  This is preferred stock over which the board of directors 
has broad authority to determine voting, dividend, conversion, and other rights. While it 
can be used to enable a company to meet changing financial needs, it can also be used to 
implement poison pills or to prevent takeover by placement of this stock with friendly 
investors. Companies who have this type of preferred stock but who have required 
shareholder approval before it can be used as a takeover defense are not coded as having 
this provision.
Business Combination laws -  These laws impose a moratorium on certain kinds of 
transactions (e.g., asset sales, mergers) between a large shareholder and the firm for a 
period usually ranging between three and five years after the shareholder’s stake passes a 
pre-specified (minority) threshold.
Bylaw and Charter amendment limitations -  These provisions limit shareholders’ ability 
to amend the governing documents of the corporation. This might take the form of a 
supermajority vote requirement for charter or bylaw amendments, total elimination of the 
ability of shareholders to amend the bylaws, or the ability of directors beyond the 
provisions of state law to amend the bylaws without shareholder approval.
Classified board -  A classified board is one in which the directors are placed into 
different classes and serve overlapping terms. Since only part of the board can be 
replaced each year, an outsider who gains control of a corporation may have to wait a few 
years before being able to gain control of the board. This provision may also deter proxy 
contests, since fewer seats on the board are open each year.
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Compensation plans with changes in control provisions -  These plans allow participants 
in incentive bonus plans to cash out options or accelerate the payout of bonuses should 
there be a change in control. The details may be a written part of the compensation 
agreement, or discretion may be given to the compensation committee.
Director indemnification contracts -  These are contracts between the company and 
particular officers and directors indemnifying them from certain legal expenses and 
judgments resulting from lawsuits pertaining to their conduct. Some firms have both 
“indemnification” in their bylaw/charter and these additional indemnification “contracts”.
Control-share cash-out laws enable shareholders to sell their stakes to a “controlling” 
shareholder at a price based on the highest price of recently acquired shares. This works 
something like fair-price provisions (see below) extended to non-takeover situations.
Cumulative voting — Cumulative voting allows a shareholder to allocate his total votes 
in any manner desired, where the total number of votes is the product of the number of 
shares owned and the number of directors to be elected. By enabling them to concentrate 
their votes, this practice helps enable minority shareholders to elect favored directors. 
Cumulative voting and secret ballot (see below), are the only two provisions whose 
presence is coded as an increase in shareholder rights, with an additional point to G if  the 
provision is absent.
Directors’ duties allow directors to consider constituencies other than shareholders when 
considering a merger. These constituencies may include, for example, employees, host 
communities, or suppliers. This provision provides boards of directors with a legal basis 
for rejecting a takeover that would have been beneficial to shareholders. 31 states also 
have laws with language allowing an expansion of directors’ duties, but in only two of 
these states (Indiana and Pennsylvania) are the laws explicit that the claims of 
shareholders should not be held above those of other stakeholders [Pinnell (2000)]. Firms 
in these two states are treated as though they had an expanded directors’ duty provision 
unless the firm has explicitly opted out of coverage under the law.
Fair-Price Requirements -  These provisions limit the range of prices a bidder can pay in 
two-tier offers. They typically require a bidder to pay to all shareholders the highest price 
paid to any during a specified period of time before the commencement of a tender offer 
and do not apply if  the deal is approved by the board of directors or a supermajority of 
the target’s shareholders. The goal of this provision is to prevent pressure on the target’s 
shareholders to tender their shares in the front end of a two-tiered tender offer, and they 
have the result of making such an acquisition more expensive. This category includes 
both the firms with this provision and the firms incorporated in states with a fair price 
law.
Golden parachutes -  These are severance agreements which provide cash and non-cash 
compensation to senior executives upon a triggering event such as termination, demotion, 
or resignation following a change in control. They do not require shareholder approval.
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Director indemnification -  This provision uses the bylaws and/or charter to indemnify 
officers and directors from certain legal expenses and judgments resulting from lawsuits 
pertaining to their conduct. Some firms have both this “indemnification” in their 
bylaws/charter and additional indemnification “contracts”. The cost of such protection 
can be used as a market measure of the quality of corporate governance [Core (2000)].
Limitations on director liability -  These charter amendments limit directors’ personal 
liability to the extent allowed by state law. They often eliminate personal liability for 
breaches of the duty of care, but not for breaches of the duty of loyalty or for acts of 
intentional misconduct or knowing violation of the law.
Pension parachute -  This provision prevents an acquirer from using surplus cash in the 
pension fund of the target in order to finance an acquisition. Surplus funds are required to 
remain the property of the pension fund and to be used for plan participants’ benefits.
Poison pills -  These securities provide their holders with special rights in the case of a 
triggering event such as a hostile takeover bid. If a deal is approved by the board of 
directors, the poison pill can be revoked, but if the deal is not approved and the bidder 
proceeds, the pill is triggered. In this case, typical poison pills give the holders of the 
target’s stock other than the bidder the right to purchase stock in the target or the bidder’s 
company at a steep discount, making the target unattractive or diluting the acquirer’s 
voting power. The early adopters of poison pills also called them “shareholder rights” 
plans, ostensibly since they give current shareholders the “rights” to buy additional 
shares, but more likely as an attempt to influence public perceptions. A raider- 
shareholder might disagree with this nomenclature.
Secret ballot -  Under secret ballot (also called confidential voting), either an 
independent third party or employees sworn to secrecy are used to count proxy votes, and 
the management usually agrees not to look at individual proxy cards. This can help 
eliminate potential conflicts of interest for fiduciaries voting shares on behalf of others, or 
can reduce pressure by management on shareholder-employees or shareholder-partners. 
Cumulative voting (see above) and secret ballot, are the only two provisions whose 
presence is coded as an increase in shareholder rights, with an additional point to G if  the 
provision is absent.
Executive severance agreements -  These agreements assure high-level executives of 
their positions or some compensation and are not contingent upon a change in control 
(unlike Golden or Silver parachutes).
Silver parachutes -  These are similar to golden parachutes in that they provide 
severance payments upon a change in corporate control, but unlike golden parachutes, a 
large number of a firm’s employees are eligible for these benefits.
Special meeting requirements -  These provisions either increase the level of shareholder 
support required to call a special meeting beyond that specified by state law or eliminate
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the ability to call one entirely.
Supermajority requirements for approval of mergers -  These charter provisions 
establish voting requirements for mergers or other business combinations that are higher 
than the threshold requirements of state law. They are typically 66.7, 75, or 85 percent, 
and often exceed attendance at the annual meeting. This category includes both the firms 
with this provision and the firms incorporated in states with a “control-share acquisition” 
law. These laws require a majority of disinterested shareholders to vote on whether a 
newly qualifying large shareholder has voting rights. In practice, such laws work much 
like supermajority requirements.
Unequal voting rights -  These provisions limit the voting rights of some shareholders 
and expand those of others. Under time-phased voting, shareholders who have held the 
stock for a given period of time are given more votes per share than recent purchasers. 
Another variety is the substantial-shareholder provision, which limits the voting power of 
shareholders who have exceeded a certain threshold of ownership.
Limitations on action by written consent -  These limitations can take the form of the 
establishment of majority thresholds beyond the level of state law, the requirement of 
unanimous consent, or the elimination of the right to take action by written consent.
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Appendix B
List and Definition of Variables
G Index: is the corporate governance index. It is the sum of one point for the existence of 
provisions (see appendix A) that increase managerial power and limit shareholder’s rights 
in the firm. The index ranges from 0-24.
Tobin’s Q: is computed as market value of outstanding shares plus liquidation value of 
preferred stock plus net current assets plus long term debt divided by total assets of the 
firm.
Excess market value: is defined as the market value of equity less book value of equity 
normalized by total sales
Notional value of foreign currency derivatives: is the contract amount of any foreign 
currency forward, futures, swap or option made by the firm, it represents the fixture cash 
flows under the contract, (obtained from 10-K annual reports)
Foreign exchange derivative dummy: is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if 
the firm hedges its foreign currency exposure and equal zero otherwise.
Total Assets: is defined as current assets plus net property, plant and equipment plus 
other non current assets of the firm in millions of dollars.
Long-term debt: is defined as Debt obligation due in more than one year from firm’s 
balance sheet (in millions).
Long-term debt/total assets: is the ratio of the firm’s long term debt to its total assets.
Return on assets: is defined as the income before depreciation and other extraordinary 
items divided by total assets.
Return on Equity: is defined as Income before depreciation and other extraordinary 
items divided by common Equity.
EBIT margin: is defined as operating income after depreciation less cost of goods sold, 
Selling, General & administrative expenses divided by net sales.
Dividend pay out ratio: is defined as the percentage of the total amount o f dividends 
declared on the common stock divided by income before extraordinary items and 
discounted operations less preferred dividend requirements.
Institutional ownership: is defined as the percentage of the firm’s aggregate number of 
shares held by institutions to the common shares outstanding.
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Foreign sales to Total sales Ratio: The percentage of foreign sales (from all foreign 
segments of the firm) divided by total sales of the firm.
Regional Foreign sales to Total sales Ratio: The percentage of foreign sales (from the 
crisis region) divided by total sales of the firm, (obtained from the 10K annual Reports 
and/or the Directory of American Firms Operating in Foreign Countries)
Number of Countries of Operations: The total number of countries that the firm 
operates in the crisis region, (obtained from the Directory of American Firms Operating 
in Foreign Countries)
Except for the Corporate Governance Index, the notional value of derivatives, the hedge 
dummy, all other variables are obtained from the annual data files of the COMPUSTAT 
database.
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Appendix C
Distribution of S&P 500 firms across the G index and across industries
The appendix shows the number o f firms in each industry based on the 2- digit SIC code and in each decile o f the corporate governance index (G index). The 
sample consists o f 1422 US. Firm years from the S&P 500 during the years 1993, 1995 and 1998. Appendix Cl shows the distribution o f the firms in 1993. 
Appendix C2 ands C3 shows the distribution in years 1995 and 1998 respectively.
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Appendix C l:  1993
2 Digit Sic 
Code
Title & Description of Industry G<5
G=6 G=7 G=8 G=9 G=10 G = ll G=12 G=13 G>14
13 Oil and Gas Extraction 0 0 4 6 0 0 9 1 2 1
20 Food and Kindered Products 6 0 0 2 3 4 4 0 0 0
24 Lumber and Wood Products, Except Furniture 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 0 0
25 Furniture and Fixtures 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0
26 Paper and Allied Products 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 2 4 5
27 Printing, Publishing and Allied Industries 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 2 2 0
28 Chemicals and Allied Products 2 4 4 2 9 9 18 8 2 4
29 Petroleum Refining and Related Industries 0 1 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 0
30 Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastic Products 0 3 3 0 6 0 0 1 0 2
33 Primary Metal Products 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 0 0 0
34 Fabricated Metal Products. Except Machinery and 
Transportation Equipment
0 0 0 0 0 0 9 7 0 0
35 Industrial and Commercial Machinery and 
Computer Equipment
7 5 3 5 3 9 5 2 2 2
36 Electronics and Other Electronic Equipment 4 4 8 10 4 0 6 3 3 3
37 Transportation Equipment 0 4 0 4 0 0 4 9 0 3
38 Measuring, Analyzing and Controlling Instruments 0 0 4 6 4 4 0 14 2 0
39 Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 3 2
42 Motor Freight Transportation, Warehousing 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
45 Air Transportation 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 0
48 Communications 0 0 7 0 6 0 6 0 0 0
49 Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
50 Whole Sale Trade- Durable Goods 2 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0
51 Whole Sale Trade -  Non Durable Goods 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
55 Automotive Dealers, Gas Service Stations 4 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
58 Eating and Drinking Places 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
59 Miscellaneous Retail 1 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0
73 Business Services 0 16 0 8 4 3 3 4 4 0
75 Automotive Repair Services and Parking 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
87 Engineering, Accounting 3 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
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Appendix C2: 1995
2 Digit Sic 
Code
Title & Description of Industry G<5 G=6 G=7 G=8 G=9 G=10 G = ll G=12 G=13 G>14
13 Oil and Gas Extraction 0 4 0 6 0 2 8 1 1 2
20 Food and Kindered Products 7 0 0 3 6 3 0 2 0 0
24 Lumber and Wood Products, Except Furniture 0 0 0 0 0 o 2 3 0 0
25 Furniture and Fixtures 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 0 0 0
26 Paper and Allied Products 0 0 0 3 0 0 3 6 2 2
27 Printing, Publishing and Allied Industries 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 4 2 0
28 Chemicals and Allied Products 0 8 8 4 4 10 15 10 8 6
29 Petroleum Refining and Related Industries 0 2 0 2 2 0 3 0 0 0
30 Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastic Products 0 4 0 2 6 0 0 2 0 2
33 Primary Metal Products 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 0 0 0
34 Fabricated Metal Products. Except Machinery and 
Transportation Equipment
0 0 0 0 0 0 8 8 0 0
35 Industrial and Commercial Machinery and 
Computer Equipment
10 8 2 4 2 6 4 2 4 2
36 Electronics and Other Electronic Equipment 0 8 10 4 6 0 8 3 4 4
37 Transportation Equipment 0 4 0 4 4 2 3 2 2 2
38 Measuring, Analyzing and Controlling Instruments 0 0 5 0 10 4 0 9 5 0
39 Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries 0 0 0 0 3 2 0 2 2 0
42 Motor Freight Transportation, Warehousing 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0
45 Air Transportation 0 0 0 0 2 3 0 0 0 0
48 Communications 5 0 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 0
49 Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services 2 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
50 Whole Sale Trade- Durable Goods 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0
51 Whole Sale Trade -  Non Durable Goods 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 2 0 2
55 Automotive Dealers, Gas Service Stations 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0
58 Eating and Drinking Places 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0
59 Miscellaneous Retail 4 0 0 0 3 0 2 0 0 0
73 Business Services 0 9 6 4 6 2 2 2 0 0
75 Automotive Repair Services and Parking 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0
87 Engineering, Accounting 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 oo<1
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Appendix C 3 :1998
2 Digit Sic 
Code
Title & Description of Industry G<5 G=6 G=7 G=8 G=9 G=10 G = ll G=12 G=13 G2:14
13 Oil and Gas Extraction 2 2 2 6 2 4 4 0 0 2
20 Food and Kindered Products 6 0 0 0 10 0 5 0 0 0
24 Lumber and Wood Products, Except Furniture 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0
25 Furniture and Fixtures 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 0 0 0
26 Paper and Allied Products 0 0 0 4 0 0 4 8 0 0
27 Printing, Publishing and Allied Industries 0 0 0 3 3 0 0 2 2 0
28 Chemicals and Allied Products 3 4 3 4 4 14 10 9 10 4
29 Petroleum Refining and Related Industries 0 2 0 2 0 2 3 0 0 0
30 Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastic Products 0 0 0 2 2 2 0 6 0 4
33 Primary Metal Products 0 0 0 0 0 3 4 0 0 0
34 Fabricated Metal Products. Except Machinery and 
Transportation Equipment
0 0 0 0 0 2 6 4 4 0
35 Industrial and Commercial Machinery and 
Computer Equipment
6 8 4 6 6 10 1 1 2 2
36 Electronics and Other Electronic Equipment 6 3 10 5 5 6 6 0 3 3
37 Transportation Equipment 0 9 0 0 2 4 0 5 4 5
38 Measuring, Analyzing and Controlling Instruments 0 0 4 4 10 4 0 10 5 4
39 Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 2 3
42 Motor Freight Transportation, Warehousing 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0
45 Air Transportation 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 0 0 0
48 Communications 0 4 0 0 4 4 4 0 0 4
49 Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services 3 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
50 Whole Sale Trade- Durable Goods 0 0 3 0 1 0 0 1 0 1
51 Whole Sale Trade -  Non Durable Goods 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
55 Automotive Dealers, Gas Service Stations 4 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 0
58 Eating and Drinking Places 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
59 Miscellaneous Retail 4 2 0 2 0 0 3 0 0 0
73 Business Services 11 9 7 0 6 6 5 4 3 0
75 Automotive Repair Services and Parking 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0
87 Engineering, Accounting 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
